United States v. Dotson ( 2000 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-30277
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
GREGORY DARNELL DOTSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
CONSOLIDATED WITH
No. 00-30360
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JEFFERY BERNARD MCDANIEL,
Defendant-Appellant.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 99-CR-30017-8
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November 9, 2000
Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 00-30277 c/w
00-30360
-2-
Gregory Darnell Dotson and Jeffery Bernard McDaniel appeal
from the sentences imposed after they pleaded guilty to
possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute.1
Dotson argues that the district court erred in determining
that a stop of his vehicle was justified by a violation of the
traffic laws. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that
Dotson has shown no reversible error in the district court’s
decision to credit a state trooper’s testimony over that of his
brother’s. See United States v. Castro, 166 F.3d 728, 733 (5th
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 78 (1999).
Dotson argues that even if the traffic stop was valid, the
district court erred in upholding a trooper’s patdown search of
his person. Because a reasonably prudent officer would--under
the totality of circumstances--have been concerned for his safety
or the safety of others, the patdown search was justified. See
United States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d 838, 840-41 (5th Cir. 1994)
(en banc).
Dotson’s final argument is that the evidence obtained from a
search of an abandoned bag must be suppressed because it was the
product of an unlawful stop or an illegal patdown. As we have
rejected Dotson’s arguments about the stop and the patdown, we
find this argument to be meritless as well.
McDaniel contends that, at sentencing, he sufficiently
objected to the presentence report’s failure to award him a
1
Acting sua sponte, we concur with the district court in
determining that a letter written by McDaniel to the district
court could serve as an effective notice of appeal. See Cobb v.
Lewis, 488 F.2d 41, 45 (5th Cir. 1974).
No. 00-30277 c/w
00-30360
-3-
downward adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. Having
reviewed the transcript, however, we conclude that McDaniel made
no such objection. See United States v. Bullard, 13 F.3d 154,
157-58 (5th Cir. 1994). In addition, we perceive no plain error
that occurred regarding § 3B1.2. See United States v. Fierro, 38
F.3d 761, 774 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Lujan-Sauceda,
187 F.3d 451, 452 (5th Cir. 1999).
McDaniel argues, in the alternative, that if sentencing
counsel did not sufficiently raise the § 3B1.2 issue, he provided
ineffective assistance of counsel. We decline to reach this
argument on direct appeal. See United States v. Kizzee, 150 F.3d
497, 503 (5th Cir. 1998).
AFFIRMED.