United States v. Hernandez ( 2000 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 00-50064
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    FELICIANA HERNANDEZ,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    --------------------
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. EP-99-CR-1051-2-DB
    --------------------
    July 24, 2000
    Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Feliciana Hernandez appeals the jury verdict finding her
    guilty of (1) conspiracy to import marijuana; (2) importation of
    marijuana; (3) conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to
    distribute; and (4) possession of marijuana with intent to
    distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 846, 952, 963.
    We affirm.
    Hernandez failed to renew her motion for judgment of
    acquittal at the close of all the evidence, or within seven days
    of the jury’s discharge.    FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a), (c).   Therefore,
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 00-50064
    -2-
    our review is limited to the “manifest miscarriage of justice”
    standard, under which we determine whether the record is so
    devoid of evidence of guilt or the evidence is so tenuous on an
    essential element as to render the verdict shocking.    See United
    States v. Galvan, 
    949 F.2d 777
    , 783 (5th Cir. 1991).
    We do not infer lightly a defendant’s knowing participation
    in a drug conspiracy.    See United States v. Dean, 
    59 F.3d 1479
    ,
    1485 (5th Cir. 1995).   In addition, the marijuana was hidden in
    the vehicle, and Hernandez was a passenger and did not exercise
    control over the vehicle.   Thus additional evidence of guilt is
    required.    See United States v. Reyna, 
    148 F.3d 540
    , 544 (5th
    Cir. 1998); United States v. Moreno-Hinojosa, 
    804 F.2d 845
    , 847
    (5th Cir. 1986).    However, Hernandez’ demeanor during her post-
    arrest interview and her implausible story to the Customs agents
    that she was going to purchase materials despite having no
    currency or wallet with her, support an inference of guilty
    knowledge.
    Further, Adame’s testimony demonstrated that Hernandez was
    familiar with the drug suppliers who paid her to accompany Adame,
    and that she had made similar trips before.   Although Adame
    admittedly hoped to receive leniency in sentencing as a result of
    his testimony, and although his testimony does contain some
    inconsistencies, these facts do not render his testimony as a
    whole incredible.    See United States v. Westbrook, 
    119 F.3d 1176
    ,
    1190 (5th Cir. 1997).   When viewed through the prism of the
    manifest miscarriage of justice standard, we cannot say that the
    evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s verdict.
    No. 00-50064
    -3-
    We also reject Hernandez’ claim that the district court
    erred in admitting Adame’s plea agreement and in failing to give
    a cautionary instruction.     Hernandez failed to object, and her
    counsel concurred in the admission of the plea agreement,
    limiting review to either the plain error standard or the invited
    error doctrine.     See United States v. Lemaire, 
    712 F.2d 944
    , 948-
    49 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Mattoni, 
    698 F.2d 691
    , 694-
    95 (5th Cir. 1983).    Hernandez’ conclusional allegation that the
    admission of the agreement prejudiced her is unsupported, and we
    note that the government did not attempt to use the agreement as
    substantive evidence of Hernandez’ guilt.     Further, Hernandez
    herself was able to use the agreement to attack Hernandez’
    credibility.     The admission does not rise to the level of plain
    error, much less require reversal under the more stringent
    invited error doctrine.     See 
    Mattoni, 698 F.2d at 694-95
    ; United
    States v. Gray, 
    626 F.2d 494
    , 501 n.2 (5th Cir. 1980).
    As for Hernandez’ contention that a limiting instruction
    should have been given at the time the agreement was introduced,
    Hernandez requested no such instruction, limiting our review
    again to plain error.     See United States v. Waldrip, 
    981 F.2d 799
    , 805 (5th Cir. 1993).     The district court charged the jury in
    its general instructions that the plea agreement could not be
    considered as evidence of Hernandez’ guilt, and the government
    made no attempt to use the plea agreement to demonstrate that
    Hernandez was guilty.     The district court did not plainly err.
    See 
    id. AFFIRMED. No.
    00-50064
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