United States v. Detraz ( 2000 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-30722
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MICHAEL JAMES DETRAZ, JR;
MICHAEL JAMES DETRAZ, SR,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
(99-CR-6006)
June 9, 2000
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
This case presents an appeal of an adjustment of probation for
offenses arising under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. Michael
Detraz, Sr. and Michael Detraz, Jr. plead guilty to violations of
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703. As part of the
conditions of their probation, they were required not to hunt
“anything at all.” The Detrazes went dove-hunting in Mexico during
their probationary period, and the United States moved for a
revocation of probation. The district court did not revoke
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
probation but adjusted its terms, a change which included an
extension of the hunting bar to December 2001.
The Detrazes claim that they were not on notice that hunting
in Mexico was not allowed, a lack of notice which violated their
due process rights under the Constitution. They had contacted a
Louisiana Wildlife Enforcement Agent asking whether the bar
extended to hunting in Mexico. Although the agent contacted a U.S.
Wildlife official and apparently learned that Wildlife felt that
such hunting would constitute a probation violation, no one called
the Detrazes back. They also asked an assistant U.S. Attorney
whether such hunting was permissible, and he advised that they
should contact the probation office or the court.1 The Detrazes
decided to go dove hunting in Mexico without making further
inquiries.
The Detrazes’ failure to seek court or probation office
guidance as to the permissibility of the hunting bars their claim
to fair notice. No one misled the Detrazes into going hunting;
they simply decided to take their chances. The clear terms of the
conditions of probation barred any hunting.
The Detrazes also contend that the district court could not
control their behavior outside the United States. They note that
the scope of legislation, including the Migratory Bird Act, is
1
The Detrazes dispute some of the government officials’
recollections of these exchanges, but that issue was a credibility
determination within the discretion of the district court.
2
presumptively territorial.2 Without evidence that Congress
intended to cover extraterritorial acts, the Detrazes could not be
prosecuted under the statute for acts in Mexico.
This theory is not on point, however, because the Detrazes
were punished not for an infraction of the statute but for a
violation of the conditions of their probation. The court had
authority to impose upon them conditions of probation that limited
their ability to conduct otherwise-legal activities – such as
hunting in general. It is not outside that authority to bar such
activities whether they were done in the United States or outside
of it.3 It was not an abuse of discretion for the district court
to adjust probation based on the Detrazes’ participation in legal
activities that nonetheless were barred by the terms of their
probation.
AFFIRMED.
2
See United States. v. Perez-Herrera, 610 F.2d 289, 289 (5th
Cir. 1980).
3
See United States v. Dane, 570 F.2d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 1977)
(upholding revocation of probation where the defendant violated
conditions in foreign country, and holding that court was allowed
to consider otherwise-legal behavior that bore on the
rehabilitation of the prisoner and his potential danger to
society).
3