Mork v. Ingalls Shipbuilding ( 2000 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_________________
No. 99-60534
USDC No. 1:97-CV-259-BrR
Summary Calendar
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CHARLES MORK,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
INGALLS SHIPBUILDING, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
February 23, 2000
Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. (“Ingalls”) appeals the district court’s denial of its motion for
judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial. Finding a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to support
the jury verdict, we affirm.
Plaintiff-appellee Charles Mork (“Mork”), an employee of Lockheed Martin, sued Ingalls for
injuries he sustained while monitoring the delivery of eight Lockheed Martin VLS modules to Ingalls
pursuant to a Navy contract. Mork was struck by a gantry crane when he crossed the track in front
of the crane while it was transporting the eighth VLS module from a truck to the VLS stand. As a
result of the accident, Mork suffered injuries to his foot.
At trial, Ingalls moved for a judgment as a matter of law (“JML”) under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 50 both at the conclusion of Mork’s case and at the end of the jury trial. The jury
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
returned a verdict for the plaintiff, finding Mork 65% at fault and Ingalls 35% at fault. After the trial
court denied Ingalls’ JML motion and entered judgment in favor of Mork, Ingalls renewed its motion
for JML or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The district court denied that motion, finding that
sufficient evidence existed such that reasonable jurors could differ as to whether Ingalls had satisfied
its duty of reasonable care owed to Mork. On appeal, Ingalls only challenges the court’s denial of
judgment as a matter of law.
We review the denial of a motion for JML de novo, applying the same standard as the district
court. See Nichols v. Lewis Grocer, 138 F.3d 563, 565 (5th Cir. 1998). “A JML is appropriate if
the ‘facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that a reasonable
jury could not have concluded’ as the jury did.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 197
F.3d 688, 691 (5th Cir. 1999) (internal citation omitted). Applying this standard here, we should
reverse the district court only if there is no sufficient evidentiary basis for finding that Ingalls breached
its duty of care to Mork. See id.
On appeal, Ingalls contends that the district court erred in denying its motion for JML because
the evidence demonstrated that Ingalls satisfied its duty to Mork to “make the work site reasonably
safe o r warn.” Under Mississippi law, a premises owner owes an invitee the duty to “keep the
premises reasonably safe and when not reasonably safe to warn only where there is hidden danger or
peril that is not in plain and open view.” Little v. Bell, 719 So. 2d 757, 760 (Miss. 1998). In Hoffman
v. Planters Gin Co., Inc., 358 So. 2d 1008 (Miss. 1978), however, the Mississippi Supreme Court
created an exception to the duty typically owed invitees: “[T]he premises owner is liable for injury
proximately caused by his affirmative or active negligence in the operation or control of a business
which subjects either licensee or invitee to unusual danger, or increases the hazard to him, when his
presence is known . . . .” Id. at 1013. Where the “Hoffman exception” applies, the standard of care
becomes that of ordinary and reasonable care. See id.
We agree with the district court that the facts of this case place it within the Hoffman
exception, and that the court was correct in submitting the issue of liability to the jury under that
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theory. See Saucier v. Biloxi Regional Med. Ctr., 708 So. 2d 1351, 1356 (Miss. 1998) (“To fall
within the Hoffman exception, there must be evidence that the landowner (1) was aware of the
licensee’s presence on the premises, and (2) engaged in affirmative or active negligence in the control
or operation of activities on the premises.”) It is uncontested that Ingalls was aware that Mork was
on the premises at the time of the accident. Additionally, an Ingalls employee—the gant y crane
r
operator—was actively operating the crane at the time of the accident. See Davis v. Illinois Central
Railroad Co., 921 F.2d 616, 619 (5th Cir. 1991) (concluding that metal blades that revolve on an
auger constitute active hazards while conditions upon the premises are passive hazards).1
Having determined that the Hoffman exception applies, the issue becomes whether Ingalls
satisfied its duty of ordinary and reasonable care. Reasonable care requires Ingalls to exercise “that
degree of care and prudence that a person of normal intelligence would exercise under the same or
similar circumstances.” See Tate v. Southern Jitney Jungle Co., 650 So. 2d 1347, 1350 (Miss. 1995)
(citing General Tire & Rubber co. v. Darnell, 221 So. 2d 104, 107 (Miss. 1969). The question here
is whether Ingalls exercised reasonable care when moving the gantry crane down the tracks so as to
prevent injury to those on the premises.
Ingalls clearly did have safety equipment—including yellow lines around the crane tracks,
warning bells, and flashing lights—in place to warn workers of the movement of the gantry crane. The
testimony presented at trial also indicates that Ingalls had a policy of sending a rigger out both to
signal the gantry crane operator to start moving and to clear any employees off of the crane tracks.
However, while several employees testified that this equipment was functioning at the time of the
accident, others testified that they could not recall hearing warning bells or seeing flashing lights at
that time. More significantly, Mork’s fellow employee testified that no Ingalls rigger cleared workers
1
Ingalls’ argument that it did not subject Mork to “unusual danger or increased hazard”
because Mork both had actual knowledge of and was warned about the danger of the crane, is
without merit. Under Hoffman, the “premises owner is liable for injury proximately caused by his
affirmative or active negligence in the operation or control of a business which subjects either licensee
or invitee to unusual danger” See Hoffman, 358 So. 2d at 1012. It is the negligence in operation or
warning—not the mere existence of a potentially dangerous object—that subjects the licensee or
invitee to unusual danger. See id.; see also Little, 719 So. 2d at 760.
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off of the tracks prior to the crane’s operat ion. Additionally, there was disputed testimony as to
whether the crane operator engaged the crane prior to receiving a signal from the rigger. Whether
or not the facts indicate negligence on the part of the crane operator or inadequate warnings were
questions for the jury. See Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Lumpkin, 725 So. 2d 721, 728 (Miss.
1998). The evidence presented provided a legally sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to find
that Ingalls did not satisfy its duty of care owed Mork.2 Accordingly, the judgment of the district
court is AFFIRMED.
2
Testimony that Mork (1) paused on the tracks to light a cigarette and (2) had actual
knowledge through prior work experience of the dangers and operation of the crane does not negate
Ingalls’ liability. See Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Lumpkin, 725 So. 2d 721, 728 (Miss. 1998)
(finding the duty of the defendant to exercise reasonable care is not “obviated by the failure of the
injured party or another to exercise such care unless it is determined by the factfinder that the latter’s
conduct was the sole proximate cause of the injury”). As made clear by its apportionment of fault,
the jury did not conclude that Mork’s actions were the sole proximate cause of his injury.
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