U.S. v. Menesses ( 1992 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
______________________________
No. 90-2660
______________________________
UNITED STATES of AMERICA
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MARIO V. MENESSES, Jr., DANNY PINEDA BARRETO and HAROLD BRATOVICH
Defendants-Appellants.
_________________________________________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
_________________________________________________________
(May 22, 1992)
Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, GARZA, Reynaldo G., and WIENER, Circuit
Judges.
GARZA, Reynaldo G., Circuit Judge:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 29, 1989, an indictment was filed in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas charging
six individuals with violations of federal narcotics laws. The
indictment alleged that Soto Angel Andrade, a/k/a Julian Rivera
1
("Andrade"), Mario Menesses, Harold Bratovich, Carlos Alberto
Alegria-Moreno ("Alegria"), Danny Pineda Barreto ("Barreto"), and
Frank David Barreto ("Frank Barreto"),1 conspired with intent to
distribute in excess of five kilograms of cocaine (Count One) and
aided and abetted one another in the possession with intent to
distribute in excess of five kilograms of cocaine (Count Two), in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
841(b)(1)(B), and 846. The Appellants pleaded not guilty to all
charges. Trial by jury commenced on April 24, 1990 and concluded
two days later with verdicts of guilty on all counts.
On July 13, 1990, the district court imposed sentence.
Barreto was remanded to the custody of the Attorney General for
concurrent 235 month terms of confinement which were to be followed
by concurrent five year terms of supervised release. Bratovich was
sentenced to concurrent 200 month terms of confinement and
concurrent five year terms of supervised release. The district
court sentenced Menesses to serve concurrent 420 month terms of
confinement to be followed by five year terms of supervised
release. All were ordered to pay the mandatory special assessment
of $100.
These appeals followed.
FACTS
We review the facts in the light most favorable to the jury
verdict. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). The
1
Danny Barreto is Frank Barreto's wife.
2
indictment returned against Appellants was the end result of a
sting operation in which agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation ("FBI") attempted to infiltrate and target Colombian
suppliers of large quantities of cocaine. Specifically, Ishmael
Beltran was viewed as being in charge of a major Colombian cocaine
exporting organization. FBI agent Enrique Mercadal testified that
a "cooperating witness," Raphael Gonzales, introduced him as a
cocaine smuggler to Beltran via telephone sometime in June, 1989.
They led Beltran to believe that Mercadal and Gonzales were
partners.
On August 1, 1989, Mercadal received a telephone call from co-
defendant Alegria who stated that he was calling on behalf of
Beltran in regards to a 500 kilo shipment. Mercadal, however,
failed to deliver the cocaine to Alegria; instead telling him that
his smuggling operation had encountered difficulties. Although
Alegria never received the cocaine, he continued to contact
Mercadal. Beltran made arrangements for Mercadal's organization to
transport a load of cocaine from Colombia to Houston. Beltran and
Alegria were under the impression that Mercadal's organization
handled the cocaine from the moment that it left Colombia. In
fact, the FBI used a Mexican smuggling ring that was unaware that
this was a sting operation. The Mexican smugglers were to bring
the cocaine to El Paso, where Mercadal would take control of it.
The smugglers, however, were late in arriving.
Mercadal stalled Alegria until October 3, 1989, when he
received a telephone call from an individual who identified himself
3
as "Julian Rivera," later identified as Andrade. Andrade related
that he was Beltran's personal envoy and that he had been
dispatched to Miami to look into the delays affecting the shipment
from El Paso. Mercadal told him that the watchword of his
organization was caution and that if he wanted the job done right,
Beltran would have to be patient. Alegria and Andrade telephoned
Mercadal daily until October 17, 1989, when a conference was called
at a Miami restaurant where Andrade told Mercadal that if the
delivery did not occur shortly, "blood would flow."
Finally, Mercadal heard that delivery in El Paso was imminent.
He informed Andrade and reserved a room for him at a Ramada Inn in
Houston. Mercadal then learned that there would be another delay.
He telephoned Andrade, who had already left and had returned to
Miami. Mercadal then called Andrade in Miami. Andrade said that
he had spotted surveillance in Houston and had left so as not to
jeopardize the operation.
Finally, the shipment reached El Paso. Mercadal led Andrade
and Alegria to believe that Mercadal was transporting it overland
to Houston. Actually, the FBI flew it there. Andrade was staying
at the Grand Hotel, and Mercadal telephoned him on November 15th to
tell him that the delivery would take place the next day. That
night, at dinner, Mercadal told Andrade that he would need $250,000
to pay his people. Despite the fact that the cocaine had a street
value of $3,000,000, Andrade hesitated and said that only Beltran
could authorize such a disbursement.
The following morning, Mercadal, Andrade and Alegria spoke via
4
telephone. They argued further about the money. Andrade said he
was there solely to receive the merchandise and that Alegria was
responsible for paying for the transportation. Mercadal pressed
for an answer on how soon he would be paid. Andrade said that he
would have to examine the cocaine and that would take at least an
hour, and that Alegria would pay Mercadal shortly thereafter.
At 11:55 a.m., Mercadal called Andrade and told him that the
delivery would take place in one hour at the Two Pesos Restaurant.
Meanwhile, FBI agents were loading the cocaine into a rented PENSKE
truck. Between 1:30 and 2:00 p.m., Andrade entered the restaurant
where Mercadal and his FBI associate Mark Suarez were waiting.
Menesses, who was previously unknown to Mercadal, accompanied
Andrade. After engaging in shop talk regarding the pitfalls of
transporting cocaine across the border, Mercadal handed the keys to
the PENSKE to Andrade.
Mercadal made one more phone call to Alegria, asking when he
would be paid. Alegria answered that once the shipment was
verified, he would call Mercadal.
Meanwhile, FBI agent Dale Rivett had been circling the area in
a Cessna aircraft. He had observed two men exit the Two Pesos and
get into a white compact pickup truck. The truck drove across the
street to where the PENSKE was parked. The truck drove past the
PENSKE and circled the parking lot. The truck then left the
parking lot and drove to a nearby Circle K, where one man exited
the truck, returned to the PENSKE, walked around it, and returned
to the truck. Another FBI observer identified this man as Andrade.
5
A Mustang automobile then pulled up behind the truck and the man
who had just surveyed the PENSKE walked to the passenger side and
appeared to speak with someone in the car. Both Andrade and
Menesses then walked back to the PENSKE and drove off in it,
followed by the Mustang. The Mustang continued to follow the
PENSKE until it came to a subdivision where the PENSKE turned. The
Mustang continued past the subdivision.
About 2:39 p.m., the PENSKE came to a stop at a house which
FBI agent Douglas John Hanson identified as 9015 Brookwolf as he
walked past it. Menesses and Andrade drove off in the PENSKE an
hour and twenty minutes later and stopped at a transmission shop
off Highway 290 where they unloaded the cocaine. The PENSKE then
drove off to a small shopping center where the FBI arrested Andrade
and Menesses.
FBI agents had continued to observe the Mustang, which drove
over to 1819 Bingle. Special Agent Phil Armand observed Bratovich
exit on the driver's side and Alegria exit on the passenger's side.
The two walked over to a transmission shop on the property. A
Nissan automobile pulled up some two hours later. Alegria came
from the shop and got in the Nissan. The Nissan proceeded on
Bingle to where it became Voss and turned onto Westheimer. The
Nissan driver suddenly moved from the middle lane into the left
lane, made a sharp U-turn, and started back toward Voss.
Travelling quickly through heavy traffic, the Nissan cut past a bus
on Westheimer and turned sharply onto Voss.
On Voss, the Nissan became entangled in traffic and the FBI
6
chase vehicle, which had by now flashed warning lights, overtook
the suspect vehicle and pulled it over. The agents arrested its
passenger, Alegria, and the driver, Ettore Bratovich, Harold
Bratovich's brother. A pager was found on the passenger
floorboard. The number to the pager corresponded to the one used
by Mercadal to contact Alegria.
The agents then returned to the Bingle property and arrested
Harold Bratovich, who did not resist arrest. The agents found no
drugs, weapons, beepers or drug paraphernalia on Bratovich or,
apparently, at the Bingle location. The agents then secured
warrants for a search of the Brookwolf premises, which proved more
successful. The house was the residence of Frank and Danny
Barreto. Frank owned the aforementioned transmission shop, Texas
Transmission, where the agents had located the specially
constructed pallet in which the cocaine had been secreted on board
the PENSKE. The agents found the cocaine, which had been removed
by the time the agents found the pallet, at the Barreto residence.
Also at the Barreto residence, the agents found laboratory
equipment of the type used in making "crack" cocaine, weapons and
large sums of cash. The agents arrested the Barretos.
The FBI had summoned Special Agent James R. Garcia to its
Houston office to interview Danny Barreto and Menesses in Spanish.
Garcia informed Barreto of her rights according to Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1964), using a special form. She was
apparently distraught and refused to sign it and thus indicate in
written form that she understood her rights. She nonetheless
7
indicated that she did understand them and agreed to talk to
Garcia.
Barreto told Garcia, who had not previously been involved in
the investigation and was unaware of the facts, that agents had
arrested her in her home and had seized 160 kilograms2 of cocaine.
She said that she had met someone at a nightclub frequented by
Colombians and that she had offered her house to him as a drop
site. She stressed that she, and she alone, was responsible for
the presence of the cocaine at her house, and that her husband was
not involved. Barreto stated that she desperately needed money,
and that the $72,000 in cash seized at her home represented the
proceeds of a four-kilo sale. Barreto observed that the cocaine
had been brought to her house in a truck remarkably similar to the
one parked outside the FBI's offices.
Garcia interviewed Menesses, who had initiated contact with
his captors, at the Harris County jail. Garcia first advised
Menesses of his constitutional rights and verified his desire to
waive them and to submit to an interview. Menesses related that he
had joined the operation in June of 1989. In late October, he was
instructed to procure transportation, hotel rooms, and a storage
site. He was also told to acquire a pager. A person that he met
offered a house as a storage site. On November 16th, Menesses
received the drugs from some "Mexicans." The contraband's owner
told Menesses that the Mexicans had stolen some of the shipment.
2
The FBI agents had secreted 163 kilograms of cocaine in
the PENSKE.
8
The government concluded its testimony by offering evidence of
two extrinsic offenses, one against Bratovich and the other against
Alegria. Over Bratovich's objection, Drug Enforcement
Administration Agent D.A. Norton testified that on July 7, 1988, he
consummated a one kilogram cocaine purchase with one Daren
Hightower at a parking lot of the Houston Intercontinental Airport.
Bratovich was with Hightower when Norton exited his flight and
walked with the two while they discussed the sale. According to
Norton, Bratovich appeared nervous and stated "Daren, let's don't
talk about it here." Norton explained that after Hightower
expressed a desire not to close the transaction at the airport,
Bratovich said "Daren, let's quit talking about it. Everything's
fine. Let's do it as we'd planned. Let's go ahead with it.
Everything's O.K." Hightower and Norton ultimately went to the
parking lot where Norton was given the opportunity to see the
kilogram in the trunk of a vehicle. Hightower was then placed
under arrest. Bratovich had remained inside the airport where he
was subsequently arrested. At the time of trial the charge was
still pending against Bratovich. Norton acknowledged outside the
presence of the jury that he never made arrangements or negotiated
for the purchase of the contraband with Bratovich.
While Bratovich objected to the introduction of this evidence
at trial, he does not now raise it as a point of error. Whether
this extrinsic act occured as related by Norton and was in fact a
crime is for another tribunal to decide. We note, as did the trial
judge in the case under review in his jury instruction, that the
9
jury could use this act only to judge intent and knowledge. It
would be impermissible for the jury to use it for the purpose of
deciding that Bratovich is possessed of a bad character and could
be expected to behave in conformity therewith. See Fed.R.Civ.P.
404(b). We note also that no other alleged coconspirator in the
case under review was implicated in the extrinsic offense.
The defendants all rested behind the government save
Bratovich. Ettore Bratovich testified in his brother's behalf and
explained the circumstances that led to his arrest on Voss while
chauffeuring Alegria. Bratovich also testified and disavowed any
knowledge of the cocaine conspiracy. He explained that he was a
victim of circumstance merely doing a favor for Alegria, a friend
of his brother's, whom he thought was moving his belongings to
Houston. According to Bratovich, every move that he made on
November 16, 1989, was at Alegria's request and on his
instructions.
ANALYSIS
I. The Evidence did not Suffice to Convict Bratovich.
At oral argument, the government argued for the first time
that Bratovich failed to object to the sufficiency of the evidence
at the trial level. Were this the case, and were the government to
properly raise the issue, our review would be "limited to the
determination of whether there was a manifest miscarriage of
justice. Such a miscarriage would exist only if the record is
devoid of evidence pointing to guilt." United States v. Hinojosa,
10
No.91-2260, slip op. 3924, 3928 (5th Cir. April 3, 1992)(quoting
United States v. Robles-Pantoja, 887 F.2d 1250, 1254 (5th Cir.
1989)). Bratovich's counsel responded at oral argument by claiming
that he implicitly adopted Barreto's motion to acquit for lack of
evidence at the close of the government's case. Fed.R.Crim.P. 29,
however, requires that the defendant renew his motion at the close
of all the evidence in order to preserve the issue for appeal.
"Where a defendant fails to renew his motion at the close of all
the evidence, after defense evidence has been presented, he waives
his objection to the earlier denial of his motion." United States
v. Daniel, No. 91-1739, slip op. 3556, 3559 (5th Cir. March 19,
1992)(citing United States v. Robles-Pantoja, 887 F.2d 1250, 1254
(5th Cir. 1989)). In answer to the government's contention at oral
argument, Bratovich's counsel responded that he effectively did
renew his motion. While we have doubts that this is so, we
recognize, as defense counsel stated at oral argument, that various
district court judges run their courtrooms in various ways. We do
not believe that we can limit our review to a search for manifest
injustice when the government raises such an argument, which in
fairness to the defendant should have been briefed, for the first
time in oral argument. This is especially true in this case
because the government, in its brief, described the standard of
review as we do immediately below, i.e., as an examination of
whether, regarding the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom
in the light most favorable to the verdict, any trier of fact could
have reasonably found Bratovich guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
11
The government did not describe the standard of review as an
examination of whether the record is devoid of evidence of guilt.
The government cannot, at this late date, alter its proposed
standard of review.
The well established standard in this Circuit for reviewing a
conviction allegedly based on insufficient evidence is whether a
reasonable jury could find that the evidence establishes the guilt
of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v.
Gonzales, 866 F.2d 781, 783 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1093
(1989). The evidence adduced at trial, whether it be direct,
circumstantial or both, together with all inferences reasonably
drawn from it, is viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict. United States v. Pigrum, 922 F.2d 249, 253 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 868 (1991). If the "evidence viewed in the
light most favorable to the prosecution gives equal or nearly equal
circumstantial support to a theory of guilt and a theory of
innocence of the crime charged," this court must reverse the
convictions. Clark v. Procunier, 755 F.2d 394, 396 (5th Cir.
1985)(quoting Cosby v. Jones, 682 F.2d 1373, 1383 (11th Cir.
1982)(as quoted in United States v. Fortenberry, 919 F.2d 923, 926
(5th Cir. 1990))). The appellate court does not sit as a de novo
jury, and therefore "it is not necessary that the evidence exclude
every reasonable hypothesis of innocence," United States v. Stone,
No. 91-2193, slip op. 4417, 4421-22 (5th Cir. April 29, 1992); a
jury is, after all, "free to choose among reasonable constructions
of the evidence." United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547, 549 (5th
12
Cir. 1982), aff'd, 462 U.S. 356 (1983). Our task is, rather, to
determine whether "a reasonable trier of fact could find that the
evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." United
States v. Jackson, 700 F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir.)(quoting Bell, 678
F.2d at 549), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 842 (1983).
In order for the government to prove conspiracy, the
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) the existence
of an agreement between two or more persons to violate the
narcotics laws, (2) that each alleged conspirator knew of the
conspiracy and intended to join it, and (3) that each alleged
conspirator did participate in the conspiracy. Stone, No.91-2193,
slip op. at 4421. We conclude that a reasonable jury would have to
entertain a reasonable doubt as to Bratovich's guilt.
The government's evidence has shown that:
(1) Bratovich drove the Mustang that approached the white
truck occupied by co-defendants Andrade and Menesses near
the location where the PENSKE was positioned.
(2) Andrade then approached the passenger side of the
Mustang and appeared to speak with Alegria.
(3) Bratovich made two U-turns in an adjacent residential
area prior to following the PENSKE driven by Andrade and
Menesses.
(4) Bratovich followed the PENSKE for about five miles
and turned away when the PENSKE reached a residential
area.
(5) Bratovich subsequently drove to his place of business
where his brother picked up Alegria.
The government argues that it is (a) reasonable to conclude
that the conversation between Andrade and Alegria concerned the
PENSKE and its destination and that (b) Bratovich overheard the
13
conversation. This argument misses the point. Even if we accept
the government's inferences, it in no way addresses Bratovich's
contention that he thought that the PENSKE contained furniture that
his brother's friend, Alegria, was moving into his new home.
Simply because a conversation may have in fact been about drugs
does not mean that a jury can reasonably conclude that one who may
have overheard it actually knew that said conversation concerned
drugs. Simply because one associates with conspirators does not
mean that a jury can reasonably find that he is a member of the
conspiracy. Jackson, 700 F.2d at 185.
The government also argues that Bratovich's story is
incredible because one who is actually watching his furniture would
not veer off once it had reached his neighborhood. We are not sure
why this is incredible. Could not Bratovich have believed that
someone Alegria trusted was home to receive the furniture? Might
not have Alegria been unwilling to continue on to the unloading
point with Bratovich for fear that Bratovich would see that the
cargo was cocaine? In a similar vein, the government argues that
the jury could have believed that it was unreasonable that
Bratovich would have believed that Alegria would have left his
furniture unattended in a parking lot. There is no evidence,
however, that Bratovich knew that the PENSKE had been left
unattended for any length of time. Even if we agreed that it did
not seem that Alegria was adequately watching over what Bratovich
claims to have believed was furniture, it would then be even harder
to believe that Alegria was adequately looking after three million
14
dollars worth of cocaine.
Finally, the government argues that the jury's verdict
regarding Bratovich was reasonable because the jury could have
credited testimony from FBI agents to the effect that the Mustang's
behavior was consistent with that of a countersurveillance vehicle.
Once again, this misses the point. The Mustang may have been a
countersurveillance vehicle, but the question is did Bratovich know
what he was surveying?
This trial was the end result of a lengthy sting investigation
which never unearthed any evidence of Bratovich's involvement until
the very last day of the operation. The record contains no
evidence of what Alegria and Andrade discussed in the parking lot.
The evidence of Bratovich' guilt is based on inference upon
inference. While one may suspect that Bratovich may have been
aware of the conspiracy, "[j]uries must not be allowed to convict
on mere suspicion and innuendo." Jackson, 700 F.2d at 185.
For similar reasons, we reverse Bratovich's conviction for
aiding and abetting. To sustain a conviction of aiding and
abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2, the government must show that the
defendant (1) associated with the criminal venture, (2)
participated in the venture, and (3) sought by action to make the
venture succeed. Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613
(1949). At most, the government may have proven that Bratovich
"participated" in the criminal venture, but "'[a]ssociation' means
that the defendant shared in the criminal intent of the principal."
United States v. Triplett, 922 F.2d 1174, 1178 (5th Cir.), cert.
15
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2245 (1991). A reasonable trier of fact would
have had to conclude that a reasonable doubt existed regarding
Bratovich's "association" with the criminal venture, and we will
not uphold a conviction for aiding and abetting unless the
government has proven all three elements. See United States v.
Martiarena, No. 90-8726, slip op. 3158 (5th Cir. March 11, 1992).
II. The District Court did not Err in Denying Barreto's Motion to
Suppress her Confession.
Barreto claims that she did not understand her Miranda rights
and could therefore not have voluntarily waived them. Moreover,
she claims, even if she did understand them, the confession was
nevertheless involuntary because she felt that she had to confess
to clear her husband. We affirm the district court's denial of the
suppression motion.
When reviewing a ruling from a suppression hearing, "[t]his
Court must give credence to the credibility choices and findings of
fact of the district court unless clearly erroneous." United
States v. Raymer, 876 F.2d 383, 386 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 870 (1989)(citing United States v. Watson, 591 F.2d 1058, 1061
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 965 (1979)). A finding is
clearly erroneous only when the reviewing court is left with the
"definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985)(quoting
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948)).
The ultimate issue of voluntariness, however, is a legal question
16
requiring the reviewing court to make an independent determination.
Raymer, 876 F.2d at 386 (citations omitted).
At the suppression hearing, Special Agent Garcia testified
that he explained the Miranda rights to Barreto, stressing her
right to have an attorney present and her right not to speak with
him. Garcia also testified that it is usually the case that
Hispanic foreigners will refuse to sign a waiver even if they wish
to waive their rights. Garcia stated that he even left the room so
that Barreto could contemplate whether or not she wished to waive
the rights that Garcia had concluded she understood. Garcia
testified further that he never promised Barreto that her
cooperation would lead to the exoneration of her husband.
Barreto testified at the suppression hearing that Garcia did
not frighten her or raise his voice, but that she could not
remember whether or not he explained her rights to her. She said
that she understood that her cooperation would help her husband,
but did not specifically testify that Garcia told her this.
The district court's crediting of Garcia's testimony that
Barreto understood her rights is not clearly erroneous. Moreover,
Barreto's own testimony does not necessarily imply that she was
acting under what she considered to be a promise that her husband
would go free if she cooperated. A reasonable reading of her
testimony is that she believed that by taking all the blame
herself, her husband would necessarily be helped. While a
confession made induced by an assurance that there will be no
prosecution is not voluntary, United States v. Rogers, 906 F.2d
17
189, 192 (5th Cir. 1990), the district court justifiably found no
such promise here.
III. The District Court did not Err in Increasing Barreto's Base
Offense Level.
Barreto claims that the district court erred in increasing her
base offense level by two points according to Guidelines §
2D1.1(b)(1) which mandates a two point increase if the sentencing
court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, United States v.
Casto, 889 F.2d 562, 570 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1164 (1990), that the defendant possessed firearms during the
commission of the offense. We review the district court's factual
findings for clear error. United States v. Rivera, 898 F.2d 442,
445 (5th Cir. 1990).
FBI agent Michael Sutton, who was involved in the arrest of
the Barretos and the search of their home, testified that he found
a pile of money behind a nightstand in the master bedroom. In the
drawer of the nightstand were several loaded automatic pistols. In
the closet of the bedroom was a coat, the pocket of which contained
cocaine. Also in the closet was a gun in the proximity of loaded
magazines.
Barreto argues that the guns belonged not to her, but to her
husband. This misses the point. What matters is not ownership,
but access. United States v. Villarreal, 920 F.2d 1218, 1221 (5th
Cir. 1991). Moreover, it matters not that Barreto may not have
intended to use these automatic weapons in the offense, it suffices
18
that they could have been so used. Id. Nor, due to amendments in
the Guidelines, is it even necessary for the district court to make
a finding of scienter if the arrest occurred subsequent to November
1, 1989. United States v. Suarez, 911 F.2d 1016, 1020 (5th Cir.
1990).
According to Application Note 3 of the Commentary to Section
2D1.1:
The enhancement for weapon possession reflects the
increased danger of violence when drug traffickers
possess weapons. The adjustment should be applied if the
weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that
the weapon was connected with the offense. For example,
the enhancement would not be applied if the defendant,
arrested at his residence, had an unloaded hunting rifle
in the closet.
The weapons in this case seem to be of the type envisioned by
the Sentencing Commission as triggering the enhancement. These
were not unloaded hunting rifles found only in the closet. These
were loaded automatic pistols by the bed. If a "dinky little gun"
which was probably not intended for use in the drug offense
sufficed to trigger the enhancement in United States v. Hewin, 877
F.2d 3, 5 (5th Cir. 1989), these weapons will certainly do the
trick.
IV. The District Court did not Err in Refusing to Instruct the Jury
as to Menesses' Proposed Entrapment Defense.
Menesses proposed that the district court instruct the jury as
to a proposed defense of entrapment. As we have stated:
Entrapment is an affirmative defense designed to ensure
that persons not be held criminally liable for acts which
they were induced to commit, without prior predisposition
19
to engage in such activity, by law enforcement officials.
In order to be entitled to rely on a defense of
entrapment, a defendant must present some evidence that
Government conduct created a substantial risk that an
offense would be committed by a person other than one
ready to commit it. Once this prima facie showing of
entrapment has been made, the burden falls on the
Government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was predisposed to commit the crime, and
therefore, was not entrapped.
United States v. Johnson, 872 F.2d 612, 620 (5th Cir.
1989)(citations omitted).
Moreover,
[w]hen a court determines that no reasonable jury could
find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was
predisposed to commit the crime, then the court may
determine that entrapment has been established as a
matter of law. Where there is some evidence to support
a finding of predisposition, the issue is properly
presented to the jury.
Id. at 621.
However, "the mere assertion of entrapment does not require
the trial judge to automatically instruct the jury on it." United
States v. Andrew, 666 F.2d 915, 922 (5th Cir. 1982). If the
defendant fails to demonstrate the existence of even a scintilla of
evidence that government agents entrapped him into committing a
crime that he was not otherwise predisposed to commit, then he has
failed to make the required prima facie showing and is therefore
not entitled to such a jury instruction. Id. at 923-24.
The evidence in this case in no way suggests entrapment. The
record reveals that Menesses told Special Agent Garcia that he
became involved in the offense as early as June, 1989. He admitted
that he was responsible for securing rooms for his Miami associates
and a storage site for the contraband. The first contact Menesses
20
had with government agents did not occur until he and Andrade
received the keys to the PENSKE at the Two Pesos Restaurant.
The government did no more than to advertise a service, to
wit, the ability to transport large quantities of drugs. As the
Supreme Court has said, "[t]o determine whether entrapment has been
established, a line must be drawn between the trap for the unwary
innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal." Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958). There is no evidence suggesting
anything but that Menesses was an unwary criminal. Therefore, the
district court did not err in refusing to give an instruction on
entrapment to the jury.
CONCLUSIONS
The record indicates that Danny Barreto understood her rights
and did not confess under the illusion that Special Agent Garcia
had promised that her husband would go free. Therefore, the
district court did not err in refusing to suppress her confession.
Nor did the district court err in enhancing her sentence by two
points, as was required by the Guidelines due to the presence of
nonsporting weapons in the vicinity of her bed and bedstand in
which drug deal money was stashed. Finally, the district court did
not err in refusing to instruct the jury on entrapment because
Menesses has failed to point out evidence suggesting that he had
been entrapped. The district court did err, however, in sending
the counts relating to Bratovich to the jury. We reverse the
conviction as to Bratovich and remand to the district court for
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proceedings in accordance with our opinion.
This judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part,
REVERSED and REMANDED in part.
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