U.S. v. Pierce ( 1992 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 91-4097
_____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
ROY LEE PIERCE,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
_____________________________________________________
(April 21, 1992)
Before GOLDBERG, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge:
The pivotal issues in this appeal from denial of § 2255 relief
are the scope of such proceedings, and Roy Lee Pierce's ineffective
assistance of counsel claim concerning a search purportedly
violative of the Fourth Amendment, but which Pierce lacks standing
to challenge. We AFFIRM.
I.
At the Los Angeles American Airlines terminal in December
1987, Pierce's sister-in-law, Angela Evans, picked up a package
sent from Tyler, Texas. Shortly thereafter, she presented a
package to American Airlines employee McAdam for shipment to Tyler.
In response to his inquiry, Evans stated that it contained an
iron.1 She filled out an invoice, listing Amy Long as the shipper
and Hazel Crumpton as the recipient. Evans informed McAdam that
she was shipping the package for a friend; but Evans, not Amy Long,
was the sender.
After Evans left, McAdam became suspicious, because the
package was too light to contain an iron; his resulting x-ray
revealed an opaque mass instead. McAdam contacted his supervisor;
and, pursuant to airline policy, they opened the package and
discovered what later proved to be rock cocaine.2 McAdam's
supervisor then contacted the DEA office at the airport, which
arranged a controlled delivery, forwarding the package to its
intended destination and establishing surveillance there. The next
day, at the Tyler airport, Crumpton was arrested after she picked
up the package. Pierce had been observed driving her to the
airport and was waiting in the car. He was arrested as he
attempted to escape.
In January 1988, Pierce, Crumpton, Angela Evans, and her
husband, James Evans, were indicted for conspiracy to distribute
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; Pierce and Crumpton, also
for possession of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
Pierce moved to suppress the cocaine found in the package,
1
The facts underlying this court's affirmance on direct appeal
are found in United States v. Pierce, 893 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1990).
2
McAdam testified that an opaque mass could mean a flammable
liquid, presenting a danger to the aircraft; and that, in such an
instance, airline policy allowed his supervisor to open the
package.
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asserting that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. A
supplement contended that he had "derivative standing to object to
the search" because the results would be used against him. The
district court, without addressing standing, denied the motion.
Crumpton and the Evanses pleaded guilty during trial in July
1988; Angela Evans and Crumpton testified. The jury found Pierce
guilty on both counts; his sentence included 262 months'
imprisonment. He appealed, including contending that the Los
Angeles search violated the Fourth Amendment. The government
countered that Pierce lacked standing to contest it. In United
States v. Pierce, 893 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1990), this court
affirmed, holding, inter alia, that the Fourth Amendment had not
been violated and, accordingly, declining to address standing. Id.at 674 n.2.
In May 1990, Pierce moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate,
set aside or correct his sentence, asserting 24 grounds for relief,
the majority of which were ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. The government's response included the standing challenge.
Without addressing standing, the magistrate judge, in a most
thorough and well-reasoned report, recommended denial; and the
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district court adopted the recommendation.3 Pierce timely
appealed.4
II.
Pierce limits the issues to the following: he was denied, on
several grounds, his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel; the government knowingly used perjured testimony and
misled the jury about benefits his co-conspirators would receive
for cooperating with the government; and the government's attorney
committed perjury in denying production of alleged Jencks Act
material to Pierce.5
3
The report, filed on October 18, stated that any written
objections were to be filed within 10 days after its receipt. It
was received at Pierce's prison on October 25, but not provided to
him until November 15. His written objections, allegedly mailed on
November 27, were filed on December 3. Three days before they were
filed, the district court adopted the report and entered judgment.
In mid-December, Pierce moved the district court to consider the
objections (maintaining that they were timely) and attached the
previously filed "unsworn declaration of statement" of Angela
Evans. Although the district court stated that the objections were
not timely, it ruled that the objections were without merit.
Pierce contends that his objections were timely, and that the
district court erred in failing to consider them, including Evans'
written statement. If objections are untimely, an aggrieved party
is not entitled to de novo review of the magistrate judge's
findings and recommendations, and appellate review of findings
accepted or adopted by the district court is only for plain error
or manifest injustice. E.g., Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275,
276-77 (5th Cir. 1988). The record reflects, however, that the
district court considered the objections; we treat them as timely.
4
After Pierce, pro se, filed affirmative and reply briefs,
counsel was appointed, filed a supplemental brief, and participated
in oral argument.
5
Pierce has narrowed the 24 issues in the § 2255 application to
14 here. Of course, issues presented in the application, but not
pursued on appeal, have been abandoned. E.g., Barrientos v. United
States, 668 F.2d 838, 840 n.1 (5th Cir. 1982).
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For a collateral attack under § 2255, "a distinction is drawn
between constitutional or jurisdictional errors on the one hand,
and mere errors of law on the other." United States v. Capua, 656
F.2d 1033, 1037 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981). See United States v.
Drobny, 955 F.2d 990, 994-95 (5th Cir. 1992).6 This is because,
"[a]fter conviction and exhaustion or waiver of any right to
appeal, ``we are entitled to presume that [the defendant] stands
Along that line, Pierce stated in his pro se affirmative brief
that, "[o]n appeal, petitioner abandons the [government's]
suborning perjury from American Airlines employees allegation",
raised in the application. (Emphasis by Pierce.) In a pro se
motion subsequent to all briefs being filed, however, Pierce claims
that he did not intend to abandon the issue, maintaining that "[a]s
a pro se litigant [he was] not cogniz[ant of] the legal implication
of using the term abandons." (Emphasis by Pierce.) His appointed
counsel advised, without briefing, that he did not object to the
issue being considered. This issue has been abandoned. In any
event, "[t]he ``contentions of the appellant with respect to the
issues presented, and the reasons therefor, with citations to the
authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on' must be
included in the appellant's brief." United States v. Abroms, 947
F.2d 1241, 1250 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(4)),
petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 20, 1992) (No. 91-1418).
Pierce has failed to comply; accordingly, "[i]t ``would be patently
unfair to the [government] for this court to consider this issue as
properly before it.'" Id. (bracket in Abroms) (quoting Cannon v.
Teamsters & Chauffeurs Union, 657 F.2d 173, 178 (7th Cir. 1981)).
6
Section 2255 provides in part:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a
court established by Act of Congress claiming the
right to be released upon the ground that the
sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or that
the court was without jurisdiction to impose such
sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the
maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject
to collateral attack, may move the court which
imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or
correct the sentence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255.
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fairly and finally convicted.'" United States v. Shaid, 937 F.2d
228, 231-32 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (quoting United States v.
Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164 (1982)), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 112 S.
Ct. 978 (1992). Accordingly, "[a] defendant can challenge his
conviction after it is presumed final only on issues of
constitutional or jurisdictional magnitude, and may not raise an
issue for the first time on collateral review without showing both
``cause' for his procedural default, and ``actual prejudice'
resulting from the error." Id. at 232 (citations omitted). "This
cause and actual prejudice standard presents ``a significantly
higher hurdle' than the ``plain error' standard that we apply on
direct appeal." Id. (quoting Frady, 456 U.S. at 166). Other types
of error may not be raised in a collateral attack, unless the
defendant demonstrates that "the error could not have been raised
on direct appeal, and if condoned, would result in a complete
miscarriage of justice." Id. at 232 n.7. See also Capua, 656 F.2d
at 1037.7
A.
Pierce's ineffective assistance of counsel claims are
obviously of constitutional magnitude and satisfy the cause and
actual prejudice standard. "Ineffective assistance of counsel ...
is cause for a procedural default." Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S.
7
For an excellent discussion of this subject, including the
government being required to raise the procedural bar in district
court in order to invoke it on appeal, see United States v. Drobny,
955 F.2d 990, 995 (5th Cir. 1992). Concerning Pierce, the
government raised the bar in the § 2255 district court proceeding
and here.
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478, 488 (1986). "[I]f [a] procedural default is the result of
ineffective assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment ... requires
that responsibility for the default be imputed to the [government],
which may not ``conduc[t] trials at which persons who face
incarceration must defend themselves without adequate legal
assistance.'" Id. (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344
(1980)). Moreover, "``[t]he general rule in this circuit is that a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be resolved on
direct appeal when the claim has not been raised before the
district court since no opportunity existed to develop the record
on the merits of the allegations.'" United States v. Munoz-Romo,
947 F.2d 170, 179 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Higdon,
832 F.2d 312, 313-14 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1075(1988)). Except in those rare instances where an adequate record
exists to evaluate such a claim on direct appeal, this court
generally declines to address it, without prejudice to it being
raised under § 2255. E.g., id.
Pierce maintains that his counsel was ineffective because
first, he failed to present, on direct appeal, a "controlling"
Fifth Circuit case concerning whether the airline employees were
acting as agents or instruments of the government, thereby
violating the Fourth Amendment by searching the package, and,
instead, relied on a Ninth Circuit standard; second, he failed to
investigate before trial, or present on appeal, whether the airline
search was required by federal regulations, thereby constituting
federal action for purposes of determining whether the search was
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conducted by a private party or by an agent or instrument of the
government; third, he failed to object, move for a mistrial, or
request limiting instructions when Pierce's co-conspirators' plea
agreements were introduced at trial; and fourth, he refused both to
cross-examine Angela Evans on whether the package (with money) she
received from Pierce -- before she sent the package (with cocaine)
addressed to Crumpton -- had been opened prior to receipt and to
question Pierce at the suppression hearing on this subject. "To
succeed on any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must show that: (1) the attorney's representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) there is a
reasonable probability that except for the attorney's
unprofessional errors, the results of the proceeding would have
been different." United States v. Kinsey, 917 F.2d 181, 183 (5th
Cir. 1990) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88,
694 (1984)). An insufficient showing of prejudice pretermits
addressing the adequacy prong. E.g., United States v. Fuller, 769
F.2d 1095, 1097 (5th Cir. 1985).
1.
The first two ineffective assistance contentions relate to
Pierce's claim that the search in Los Angeles was by instruments or
agents of the government and violated his Fourth Amendment rights.8
The government maintains that he lacks standing to challenge this
8
This claim possibly brings Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989), into play and was the
primary reason for our hearing oral argument. Our resolution of
the standing issue, however, moots the claim.
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search. Pierce responds, as he did in the § 2255 district court
proceeding, that the government has waived its right to contest
standing, because it did not do so in the trial court.9 Steagald
v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 209 (1981), holds that the
government "may lose its right" to raise Fourth Amendment standing
on appeal "when it has made contrary assertions in the courts
below, when it has acquiesced in contrary findings by those courts,
or when it has failed to raise such questions in a timely fashion
during the litigation."
Steagald involved the government's first-time assertion, after
grant of certiorari, that a defendant lacked standing to object to
the search of another's house. The Court noted that, in the
district court and this court, the government had failed to
challenge facts from which the defendant's standing could
reasonably have been inferred. In fact, it "ha[d] directly sought
to connect [the defendant] with the house, ha[d] acquiesced in
statements by the [trial and appeals] courts ... characterizing the
search as one of [the defendant's] residence, and ha[d] made
similar concessions of its own." 451 U.S. at 210. On appeal, the
government "never sought to correct" the district court's
characterizations of the defendant's Fourth Amendment claim, and,
in fact, "in its opposition to certiorari expressly represented
that the searched home was [the defendant's] residence." Id. at
9
Pierce also contends that, on direct appeal, this court found
standing, by implication, when it addressed his Fourth Amendment
claim. As noted, this court stated, instead, that it was not
necessary to reach standing. 893 F.2d at 674 n.2.
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209-10. Through its "assertions, concessions, and acquiescence",
the government lost its right to challenge standing. Id. at 211.
Cf. United States v. Amuny, 767 F.2d 1113, 1121-22, 1121 n.5 (5th
Cir. 1985) (government forfeited opportunity to challenge standing
on appeal where it not only failed to raise the issue in district
court, but expressly conceded standing, thereby inducing the
defendants to forego an opportunity to establish it).10
In this case, there is no conduct by the government, similar
to that in Steagald or Amuny, such as taking earlier contrary
positions or engaging in deliberate strategy shifts. Nor is this
the first time that standing has been raised. As noted, and as
discussed below, Pierce asserted prior to the suppression hearing
that he had standing, but never offered facts from which it might
reasonably have been inferred. Thereafter, the government
consistently contested standing -- on direct appeal, in the § 2255
proceeding in district court, and on this appeal. It is not barred
from doing so.
A defendant bears the burden of establishing standing to
challenge a search under the Fourth Amendment -- that he has "a
privacy or property interest in the premises searched or the items
seized which is sufficient to justify a ``reasonable expectation of
privacy' therein." United States v. Judd, 889 F.2d 1410, 1413 (5th
Cir. 1989) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1036 (1990).
Standing "is a personal right which cannot be asserted
10
For an example of standing being allowed to be raised on
appeal for the first time, see United States v. Cardona, 955 F.2d
976, 981-82 (5th Cir. 1992).
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vicariously." San Jacinto Sav. & Loan v. Kacal, 928 F.2d 697, 704
(5th Cir. 1991).
It is uncontested that the package (with cocaine) was neither
sent by, nor addressed to, Pierce. Arguably, a defendant who is
neither the sender nor the addressee of a package has no privacy
interest in it, and, accordingly, no standing to assert Fourth
Amendment objections to its search. See United States v. Koenig,
856 F.2d 843, 846 (7th Cir. 1988). And, it may well be that even
if Pierce claimed that he was the intended recipient of the
package, this would not confer a legitimate expectation of privacy,
because it was addressed to, and received by, another -- Hazel
Crumpton. See United States v. Givens, 733 F.2d 339, 341-42 (4th
Cir. 1984).11 See also United States v. Osunegbu, 822 F.2d 472, 480
n.23 (5th Cir. 1987) (defendants had no standing to challenge
examination by postal inspectors of unopened mail that was
addressed to, and intended for, someone other than defendants).
Here, before and during trial, Pierce continually attempted to
disassociate himself from the package. At a preliminary hearing,
a Tyler police officer testified that Pierce denied ownership of
the package and contended that it, and its contents, belonged to
Crumpton. Further, Pierce argued, at the same hearing, that he had
11
See also United States v. Richards, 638 F.2d 765 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1097 (1981), which involved a package
addressed to a company owned by the defendant; the company, "in
effect, was [the defendant]." Id. at 770. Here, the package was
not addressed to a fictitious entity, or to an alter ego of Pierce,
but to Crumpton. Although Crumpton may have had standing to raise
Fourth Amendment objections, this personal right could not be
asserted vicariously by Pierce.
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never been in possession of the package, and, at that hearing and
at trial, that his name was not "anywhere on that package". At no
point, including during this appeal, has Pierce ever attempted to
establish, much less prove, any privacy interest in the package.
See, e.g., Koenig, 856 F.2d at 846. Indeed, his "only [admitted]
interest in suppressing the package and its contents is to avoid
its evidentiary force against him", an interest not protected under
the Fourth Amendment. Id.Lacking standing to object to the search, Pierce cannot show
prejudice resulting from his counsel's performance concerning
issues related to it. Therefore, the first two ineffective
assistance claims must fail. See Fuller, 769 F.2d at 1097.
2.
Pierce contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing
to object, move for a mistrial, or request limiting instructions
when evidence of his co-conspirators' guilty pleas was introduced
through the testimony, including on redirect examination, of
Crumpton and Angela Evans and referred to during closing argument
by the government. However, "[a] witness-accomplice guilty plea
may be admitted into evidence if it serves a legitimate purpose and
a proper limiting instruction is given." United States v.
Marroquin, 885 F.2d 1240, 1247 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1079 (1990).
The record reflects that the government introduced Crumpton's
and Angela Evans' plea agreements, not as evidence of Pierce's
guilt, but to show that neither had received a "sweetheart deal" in
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exchange for her testimony. In fact, defense counsel attacked both
on cross-examination in an attempt to demonstrate that they
"hope[d] to gain some favor of some kind, some kind of benefit out
of saying this stuff in here today". Attempting to show that there
is no "sweetheart deal" between the government and an accomplice
witness is a legitimate reason for introducing a plea agreement.
Id. Indeed, "[c]ounsel presenting witnesses of blemished
reputation routinely bring out ``such adverse facts as they know
will be developed on cross-examination' in order to avoid even the
appearance of an ``intent to conceal.'" United States v. Borchardt,
698 F.2d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting United States v.
Aronson, 319 F.2d 48, 51 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 920(1963)).
Moreover, the district court gave limiting instructions,
including that "[t]he fact that a witness has entered a plea of
guilty to the offense charged in this indictment is not evidence in
and of itself of the guilt of any other defendant." Given that the
plea agreement was introduced for a legitimate purpose, and that
adequate limiting instructions were given, there was no error, and
therefore, no ineffective assistance.12
3.
As noted, just before shipping the package (with cocaine) to
Crumpton, Angela Evans picked up at the airport a package shipped
from Tyler, Texas. She testified that it was from Pierce and
12
Accordingly, Pierce's contention that these asserted failures
deprived him of a fair trial also fails.
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contained money in payment for cocaine. Pierce claims that his
counsel was ineffective for refusing, at Pierce's request, to
cross-examine Evans on whether the money package was open when she
received it. However, no contention had been made that this
package had been subjected to a search. Indeed, Pierce's motions
to suppress related solely to the cocaine package. To the extent
Pierce contends that this question is relevant to that search, we
have already determined that he lacks standing to assert Fourth
Amendment objections to it. Because no prejudice is demonstrated
from a refusal to ask this question, this ineffective assistance
claim is also without merit.13
B.
Pierce's remaining contentions fail to clear the procedural
hurdle for a collateral challenge.
1.
Pierce maintains that he was denied due process because DEA
agents gave perjured testimony concerning the Los Angeles search,
in an effort to avoid it being governmental, rather than private,
action, subject to the Fourth Amendment.14 Although this issue is
13
Citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987), Pierce contends
that his counsel's refusal to allow him to testify at the
suppression hearing about Angela Evans' statement to him regarding
the alleged open money package denied him his constitutional right
to testify on his own behalf. Even assuming that the testimony
would have been admissible, Pierce, as noted, has failed to
demonstrate the relevance of this issue, or any resulting
prejudice. Accordingly, this contention has no merit.
14
This contention stems from the district court finding, in
ruling on the motion to suppress, that DEA agents "lie[d]" at the
suppression hearing when they testified that Angela Evans was not
under their surveillance at that airport before the cocaine package
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advanced as one of constitutional magnitude, Pierce (who lacks
standing to challenge the search) fails to demonstrate either cause
for the procedural default (not raising the issue on direct appeal)
or actual prejudice.
2.
The final contentions are that the prosecution misled the jury
regarding benefits that Pierce's co-conspirators would receive from
cooperating with the government; and that the government's attorney
committed perjury in denying production of material to Pierce under
the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b). Pierce has not raised these
issues in the context of a constitutional violation, nor do we
construe them as such. He fails to demonstrate either why they
could not have been raised on direct appeal15 or why, assuming
error, condoning it would result in a complete miscarriage of
justice.16
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the denial of § 2255 relief is
AFFIRMED.
was opened. However, it also found that the deception was
unrelated to the search; that the surveillance "was reasonable
under the circumstances"; and that the agents were not involved in
the initial opening of the cocaine package. On direct appeal, this
court held that the latter finding was not clearly erroneous. 893
F.2d at 673.
15
On direct appeal, Pierce raised a Jencks Act contention about
the same incident; but, it did not include a perjury element. 893
F.2d at 675.
16
Because Pierce has not presented issues entitling him to §
2255 relief, his contention that the district court erred by not
holding an evidentiary hearing on his § 2255 claims is moot.
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