Six Flags Over Texas, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers , 143 F.3d 213 ( 1998 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-10841
SIX FLAGS OVER TEXAS, INC.,
Plaintiff-Counter Defendant-Appellee,
VERSUS
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL NO. 116,
(Affiliated with the AFL-CIO), Individually and on behalf of
Bobby H. Honea,
Defendant-Counter Claimant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of Texas
June 19, 1998
Before REAVLEY, DeMOSS, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
ROBERT M. PARKER, Circuit Judge:
The Appellee, Six Flags Over Texas, Inc. (“Six Flags”),
brought suit in federal district court against the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local No. 116 (“the Union”),
seeking to vacate an arbitration award in favor of the Union and
Honea. The Union appeals from a decision of the district court
ruling that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority under the
collective bargaining agreement by requiring Six Flags, and not the
Union, to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. After
reviewing the record and briefs on appeal, we reverse.
I.
Six Flags entered into a collective bargaining agreement
(“CBA”) with the Union whereby the parties agreed to submit
disputes arising under the CBA to a grievance and arbitration
procedure. If a violation of the CBA occurs, the complaining party
must file a written grievance. In the event the grievance is not
settled, the Union may refer such matter to an arbitration panel
selected in accordance with the CBA. The arbitration panel has
jurisdiction to decide grievances arising under the CBA, but has
“no authority to change, amend, add to, subtract from, or otherwise
alter or supplement this Agreement or any part thereof or any
amendment thereto.” Under the agreement, the party presenting the
grievance must show the correctness of its position beyond a
reasonable doubt. If either party believes the arbitration panel
has exceeded its jurisdiction, the award may be appealed to any
court of competent jurisdiction for interpretation and decision.
The Grievant, Bobby A. Honea, was employed by Six Flags for
fifteen years as an electrician and was covered by the terms of the
CBA. Six Flags terminated Honea for time card irregularities
because Honea claimed jury pay for two days when he in fact only
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served on a jury for one day.1 The Union filed a grievance
alleging that Six Flags did not have just cause to terminate Honea.
Six Flags denied the grievance and the matter was subsequently
presented to an arbitration panel pursuant to the CBA.
After finding that the Grievant had not deliberately falsified
his time card, the arbitrator concluded that Honea was terminated
without just cause and ordered that he be reinstated with full back
pay, seniority and benefits. Six Flags filed suit in federal
district court seeking to vacate the award. The district court
vacated the award, holding the arbitrator violated the terms of the
CBA by placing the burden of proof on Six Flags instead of the
Union.
II.
Where a party appeals a grant of summary judgment in a suit to
vacate an arbitration award, we review the district court’s ruling
under a de novo standard. See Houston Lighting & Power Co. v.
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 66, 71
F.3d 179, 181 (5th Cir. 1995). Our review of arbitration awards is
usually extremely limited. See Delta Queen Steamboat Company v.
District 2 Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass’n., 889 F.2d 599, 602
1
The time card reflected two entries for “Jury Duty” on the days
of March 22 and 23. The entries were handwritten and signed by
Bobby Honea. The Park Maintenance Manager called the courthouse to
verify Honea’s jury service and discovered that Honea had served
only one day of jury service on March 23.
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(5th Cir. 1989). The courts have no authority to reconsider the
merits of an award even though the parties may allege that the
award rests on errors of fact or on misinterpretation of the
contract. See United Paperworkers International Union, AFL-CIO v.
Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987). A court must affirm the
arbitration award “as long as the arbitrator is even arguably
construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of
his authority.” Id. at 38. Consequently, if the arbitrator’s
decision “draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement and the arbitrator is not fashioning his own brand of
industrial justice, the award cannot be set aside.” Id. (citing
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
597 (1960)).
Six Flags argues that the arbitrator erroneously placed the
burden of proof on the employer, in contradiction to the express
language of the CBA. As evidence of the arbitrator’s error, Six
Flags quotes language from the arbitration award which purports to
place the burden of proof on Six Flags. In reviewing the language
quoted by the district court as evidence of the arbitrator’s
departure from the CBA, it appears that the district court confused
the Union’s position on the burden of proof with the arbitrator’s
rationale in the discussion section. The arbitrator discussed the
burden of proof as follows:
The Company argues that the burden of proof is on the
grievant, and cites Article V, Section 2 . . . grievant must
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show the correctness of his position beyond a reasonable
doubt. That is not specifically however, what the agreement
states. Section 4 (page 6) states:
[A]nd it shall be up to the party presenting the
grievance to show the correctness of its position
beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
The Union advances an interesting argument in its post
hearing brief:
If indeed the Union, having filed and pursued every
grievance, were always to have the burden of
showing the correctness of its position beyond a
reasonable doubt . . . the parties certainly could
have so stated in their contract language.
Instead, the descriptive phrase used (party
presenting the grievance) is more generic, seeming
to contemplate that there will be times when it is
the Company, and not the Union, which must prove
the correctness of its position.
With regard to the particular case at bar, it seems
reasonable to conclude that the party presenting this
grievance is the Union. No testimony was offered, however,
which would have shed some light as to the negotiating history
of that particular language. By the same token, the Company is
bound by the terms of Article VII, which allows termination or
discipline for just cause.
Arbitration Award at 16-17.
After discussing the potential ambiguity of the term “party
presenting the grievance,” the arbitrator concludes that the Union
is the party presenting the grievance. Immediately following the
discussion of the party presenting the grievance, the arbitrator
mentions that Six Flags is bound by the “just cause” standard when
terminating an employee covered by the CBA. Six Flags contends
that mentioning the just cause standard at this point indicates
that the arbitrator required Six Flags to prove that it had “just
cause” in terminating Honea, in violation of the express terms of
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the agreement which places the burden of proof on the Union. At
worst, the award is ambiguous as to which party ultimately bore the
burden of proof. If an arbitration award is ambiguous, we resolve
all doubts in favor of arbitration. See Valentine Sugars, Inc. v.
Donau Corp., 981 F.2d 210, 213 (5th Cir. 1993)(citing Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. 1 (1983)). As this
court stated in Valentine Sugars, “If the award is rationally
inferable from the facts before the arbitrator, we must affirm the
award.” See Valentine Sugars, 981 F.2d 214.
The award can be rationally interpreted as placing the burden
of proof on the Union to prove that Six Flags terminated Honea
without just cause. It appears that the Union has proven to the
arbitrator that the grievant did not intend to deliberately deceive
his employer when filling out the time card. The arbitrator
concluded that at most Honea made an honest mistake. By not
recognizing a mistake as just cause, Six Flags contends that the
arbitrator violated the agreement because negligent acts are
covered by the definition of “just cause” included in the CBA;2
therefore, Six Flags had just cause in terminating Honea for his
mistake. In finding lack of just cause, the arbitrator highlights
2
In defining “just cause,” Article VII of the CBA provides:
It is the intent and purpose of this clause to include
within the term “just cause” not only willful or
negligent action or inaction but also action or inaction
attributable to the individual’s physical or mental
incapacity or lack of capacity.
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other incidents of time card irregularities which did not result in
termination. In light of this evidence, it was reasonable for the
arbitrator to conclude that a “mistake” in filling out a time card
did not rise to the level of negligence required to sustain a
charge of “just cause.” Consequently, the district court erred by
vacating the arbitration award.
Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court and reinstate the
arbitration award.
REVERSED.
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