Hamilton v. Rhodia Inc ( 1999 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 98-30548
Summary Calendar
_____________________
HENRY HAMILTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
RHODIA, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
USDC No. 97-CV-423-B-M1
January 21, 1999
Before KING, Chief Judge, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:1
Henry Hamilton appeals the summary judgment in favor of
Rhodia, Inc.2 We AFFIRM.
I.
Hamilton began work at Rhodia in 1979; his last day was 9
September 1991. He reported the next day that, six days earlier,
he had been injured on the job. He received, inter alia, 26 weeks
1
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
2
Hamilton filed his complaint against “Rhone-Poulenc Basic
Chemicals”, although the company’s name was actually “Rhone-
Poulenc, Inc.” Subsequently, Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. was succeeded by
“Rhodia, Inc.”, and it was substituted as the proper
defendant/appellee.
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of Accident and Sickness benefits. However, Hamilton never
returned to work at Rhodia; his employment was terminated in
September 1993.
While employed at Rhodia, Hamilton was enrolled in its
“Retirement Plan for Hourly Employees at the Basic Chemicals
Division of Rhone-Poulenc Inc. effective January 1, 1988" (the
Plan). The Plan provided for disability retirement benefits for
disabled employees over the age of 40 who had completed 10 years of
service.
In September 1995, Hamilton wrote to Rhodia’s Benefit Service
Department to request disability retirement. Approximately one
month later, a Senior Benefits Advisor wrote to Hamilton that his
request had been denied because such benefits were available only
to employees in active service at Rhodia at the time of the
request, and Hamilton’s employment had been terminated two years
prior to his request. This letter also informed Hamilton that he
could appeal the decision by submitting within 60 days a written
request, including supporting documents and/or records, to the
Benefits Committee (which administered the Plan). Hamilton wrote
a second letter to the Senior Benefits Advisor in January 1996
indicating his desire to file an appeal, but no documents or
medical records were received by Rhodia.
Hamilton’s first attorney wrote another letter to the Senior
Benefits Advisor in March 1996, requesting a copy of the Plan and
referring to Hamilton’s January 1996 letter as an appeal. Two
copies of the Plan were sent to that attorney, and Rhodia extended
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the 60-day appeal limit to allow Hamilton 60 days from 1 July 1996
to file an administrative appeal. That August, both Hamilton and
his attorney submitted letters to the Senior Benefits Advisor
indicating Hamilton’s desire to obtain benefits and to appeal;
however, no supporting documentation was provided.
In April 1997, Hamilton filed suit against Rhodia in Louisiana
state court, claiming breach of contract. Rhodia removed the
action to federal court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332,
based on diversity and on federal question jurisdiction, because
the Plan is governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (ERISA). By consent of the parties,
the case was transferred to a magistrate judge.
At an August 1997 scheduling conference, a discovery deadline
of 30 January 1998 was set; and, Rhodia also agreed to allow
Hamilton to file an untimely administrative appeal of the benefits
denial. But, subsequently, no appeal was ever submitted to Rhodia.
On 26 January 1998, Hamilton’s first attorney moved for leave
to withdraw. His motion was granted the next day. On 30 January
1998, the above-referenced deadline for discovery, Hamilton moved
for an extension of the deadline. The court denied the request;
and, in April 1998, it granted Rhodia’s unopposed motion for
summary judgment.
II.
Hamilton presents the following claims: (1) that the court
erred in allowing Hamilton’s attorney to withdraw three days before
the discovery deadline; (2) that the court abused its discretion in
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denying Hamilton’s request for a discovery extension; and (3) that
the court erred in granting summary judgment for Rhodia.
A.
We review for abuse of discretion a ruling on a motion by an
attorney to withdraw from a case. Matter of Wynn, 889 F.2d 644,
646 (5th Cir. 1989). Counsel’s motion and the information attached
to it indicate that he notified Hamilton of his intent to withdraw,
but Hamilton did not oppose the motion. Having reviewed the
record, we find no abuse of discretion in granting the motion.
B.
Further, we find no abuse of discretion in denying Hamilton’s
pro se request to extend discovery. (Post-entry of summary
judgment, Hamilton obtained counsel for this appeal.) Scheduling
orders are modified only “upon a showing of good cause”. FED. R.
CIV. P. 16(b). The record indicates that Hamilton did not
demonstrate what discovery he hoped to obtain through the
extension, nor does Hamilton do so now.
C.
Finally, Hamilton challenges the summary judgment. Of course,
we review a summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as
the district court. Freeman v. County of Bexar, 142 F.3d 848, 850
(5th Cir. 1998).
When a retirement plan subject to ERISA gives “the
administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine
eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan”, we
review the administrator’s decision for abuse of discretion.
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Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989);
Kennedy v. Electricians Pension Plan,IBEW No. 995, 954 F.2d 1116,
1121 (5th Cir. 1992). Here, the Benefits Committee was entrusted
with administration and interpretation of the Plan.
After reviewing the record, we find no genuine issue of
material fact regarding the legality of the Benefits Committee’s
decision to deny Hamilton benefits because he was not in service at
the time of his request; and we likewise find no evidence that the
Benefits Committee abused its discretion in making this
determination.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is
AFFIRMED.
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