Hart v. Byles Welding Tract ( 2002 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-30563
MAX HART, Etc.
Plaintiff,
VERSUS
BYLES WELDING & TRACTOR, INC., ET AL.,
Defendants,
BYLES WELDING & TRACTOR, INC.,
Defendant-Third Party Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
RONALD BRANDON,
Third Party Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Louisiana
99-CV-818
March 7, 2002
Before ALDISERT*, DAVIS and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:**
*
Circuit Judge of the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.
**
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Hart entered into an agreement with Appellant Byles Welding &
Tractor to repair Hart’s logging equipment. After Byles Welding was
unable to collect for the repairs from Hart’s insurer, it
unsuccessfully attempted to collect from Hart. Clauriste Byles
(“Byles”) hired Ronald Brandon, an attorney, to assist him in
collecting the payment. Attorney Brandon advised Byles that he
could legally advertise and sell Hart’s equipment at a private
sale. Following the advice, Byles advertised the equipment for
sale. Finding no other bidders, Byles purchased the equipment
himself for the amount of the repairs. Hart filed this suit on May
7, 1999, alleging that Byles had converted his property and
conducted a wrongful sale. Byles sought a second opinion on the
legality of the sale from retired state judge John S. Pickett, Jr.,
who wrote a letter to Byles on May 26, 1999 stating that he
believed that the sale was unlawful. Byles filed a complaint
alleging malpractice against Brandon on August 4, 2000. The
district court granted Brandon’s motion for summary judgment, and
denied Byles’ motion to add Conine, an attorney that represented
him in the suit brought by Hart.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the
same standards as the district court, while viewing all disputed
facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
2
nonmoving party.1 Summary judgment is appropriate only where there
is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.2
Louisiana law requires that all legal malpractice actions must
be brought within “one year from when the alleged negligence is or
should have been discovered or three years from the date of the
alleged negligence, regardless of when it was discovered.”3 The
district court held that Appellant knew or should have known that
malpractice may have been committed at the end of May, because it
was sued by Hart on May 7th and had received a letter from a
retired judge stating his belief that the sale was illegal. Because
Appellant filed the instant action over one year later, the
district court held that Appellant’s claim was time-barred.
Appellant argues that the principle of contra non valentem
precludes the operation of the Louisiana statute. The Louisiana
Supreme Court has already determined, however, that this principle
cannot apply to peremptive periods, of which La. R.S. 9:5605 is an
example.4 The Louisiana Supreme Court has also squarely rejected
Appellant’s contention that prescription does not begin to run
1
McClendon v. City of Columbia, 258 F.3d 432, 435 (5th Cir.
2001).
2
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(C).
3
Turnbull v. Thensted, 757 So. 2d 145, 149 (La. Ct. App.
2000).
4
Reeder v. North, 701 So. 2d 1291, 1298 (La. 1997).
3
until damage is sustained, holding that the “statute may seem
unfair in that a person’s claim may be extinguished before he
realizes the full extent of his damages, [but] the enactment of
such a statute of limitations is exclusively a legislative
prerogative.”5
Appellant also argues that the district court erred by
refusing to permit him to add another party to the suit. Although
leave to amend pleadings "shall be freely given when justice so
requires,"6 the decision to grant or deny a motion to amend is
within the district court’s discretion. The district court denied
Appellant’s motion because it was untimely, and “[w]e often have
affirmed denials of motions to amend when the motions have been
untimely filed.”7 The district court did not abuse its discretion.
Appellant’s claims are without merit, and the district court’s
decision is AFFIRMED.
5
Id. at 1296.
6
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a).
7
Avatar Exploration, Inc. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 933 F.2d
314, 321 (5th Cir. 1991).
4