Crouch v. Sanchez ( 2001 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________________________
No. 00-40797
_____________________________________
Chance Ladayde CROUCH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
Kim SANCHEZ; ET AL.,
Defendants,
Kim SANCHEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Texas
(B-98-CV-170)
__________________________________________________
November 14, 2001
Before DAVIS, GARWOOD, and MAGILL*, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:**
Chance Ladayde Crouch sued the Town of South Padre Island,
Texas (“the Town”), and Kim Sanchez, a former police officer
employed by the Town, in her individual and official capacity.
Crouch asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violations of
*
Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
**
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and also
various state law claims. Sanchez, in her individual capacity,
filed a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.
The district court granted the motion in part, dismissing the
claims against Sanchez under state law, but denied the motion as
to Crouch’s § 1983 claims. Sanchez now brings this interlocutory
appeal challenging the district court’s denial of her motion for
summary judgment based on qualified immunity with respect to the
§ 1983 claims. Because we conclude that Sanchez was entitled to
qualified immunity in this case, we reverse the judgment of the
district court and render judgment for Sanchez.
I.
This lawsuit arises from Sanchez’s arrest of Crouch for
driving while intoxicated (“D.W.I”) on November 13, 1996. The
summary judgment evidence establishes the following facts. On
November 13, 1996, Sanchez received a telephone call from
Crouch’s wife, Cynthia Crouch. Ms. Crouch informed Sanchez that
her husband had been out drinking all night, was intoxicated, and
was driving his automobile. Ms. Crouch stated that she was
afraid her husband would get into an accident and hurt someone.
After speaking with Ms. Crouch, Sanchez observed Crouch’s vehicle
parked at Padre Island Pizza, Crouch’s place of business, which
is located across the street from the police department. At
about ten o’clock in the morning, Sanchez was advised that
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Crouch’s vehicle had left Padre Pizza and was traveling
northbound on Padre Boulevard. Sanchez advised other officers
and then proceeded in her unmarked patrol unit in pursuit of
Crouch. Sanchez observed Crouch driving erratically;
specifically, Crouch pulled out in front of her, requiring her to
brake suddenly. Crouch then reversed direction and headed south.
The vehicle then made an abrupt left turn, without signaling, and
entered the Padre Island Pizza parking lot. Crouch exited the
vehicle and quickly walked inside. Sanchez followed Crouch and
entered the establishment through the restaurant’s front door,
which was unlocked.
Once inside the pizza parlor, Sanchez observed Crouch using
the telephone. Crouch presented the affidavit of J.J. Avila,
Crouch’s friend, with whom Crouch was speaking on the telephone
when Sanchez entered the restaurant. Avila states that he heard
a voice in the background state, “You are under arrest for
driving with a suspended license.” Avila states he then heard
Crouch reply, “My driver’s license isn’t suspended!” According
to Avila, the voice then stated, “Well, you are under arrest for
D.W.I.. Please step outside.” Sanchez denies that she made any
statement concerning a suspended license.
The rest of the events are undisputed. Sanchez then asked
Crouch to come out from behind the counter, explaining that she
had received a report that Crouch had been drinking. Crouch
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stated, “My wife called you, didn’t she?” Sanchez observed
Crouch to have glassy eyes, dilated pupils, and she smelled
alcohol on his breath. Two other officers, Harris and Alvarado,
arrived on the scene. Crouch became argumentative and refused to
participate in field sobriety tests. Sanchez then advised Crouch
that he was under arrest for DWI. Crouch raised the phone as if
to strike Sanchez, but the other officers moved in, handcuffed
Crouch, and took him to the police department. There, Crouch
refused to take the intoxilizer test, but was administered and
failed the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. The district attorney
declined to prosecute Crouch on the D.W.I. charge.
II.
Crouch filed this action against the Town and Sanchez, in
her official and individual capacity, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment, and
also under Texas law. Sanchez then moved for summary judgment
based on qualified immunity. In opposition to Sanchez’s motion,
Crouch presented affidavits of Crouch, his former wife Cynthia
Crouch, and Avila, as well as part of the transcript from
Crouch’s trial for resisting arrest. The district court refused
to consider the affidavits of Crouch and his former wife, on the
grounds that the affidavits did not state that they were based on
personal knowledge, and thus, were not competent summary judgment
evidence. Crouch does not assert that the district court erred
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in disqualifying this evidence. The district court nevertheless
denied Sanchez’s motion for summary judgment with respect to
Crouch’s § 1983 claims. Sanchez now appeals this ruling.
III.
Before reaching the merits of this case, we first must
consider whether this court has jurisdiction over this appeal.
Federal courts have jurisdiction of “appeals from all final
decisions of the district courts.”1 “[A] district court’s denial
of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on
an issue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a
final judgment.”2
This court reviews de novo the denial of a motion for
summary judgment predicated on qualified immunity.3 Summary
judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.”4 We review the “evidence and inferences to
be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving
1
28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985).
3
See Hayter v. City of Mount Vernon, 154 F.3d 269, 274
(5th Cir. 1998).
4
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
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party.”5
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government
officials performing discretionary functions from civil liability
if their conduct violates no “clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.”6 A determination of whether a police officer is entitled
to qualified immunity from liability under § 1983 involves a two-
step analysis. First, the court must determine whether the
plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly established
constitutional right.7 A constitutional right is “clearly
established” for qualified immunity purposes if “[t]he contours
of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”8
Second, even if the first prong is satisfied, the official is
nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity if her conduct was
objectively reasonable.9
Crouch alleges two related constitutional violations in his
§ 1983 action: (1) Sanchez’s entry into Crouch’s place of
business to effect his arrest violated Crouch’s Fourth Amendment
5
Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1995), quoting
Fraire v. Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1273 (5th Cir. 1992).
6
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
7
See Hayter, 154 F.3d at 274.
8
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
9
See Hayter, 154 F.3d at 274.
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rights; and (2) Sanchez lacked probable cause to arrest Crouch at
all, and therefore, violated his Fourth Amendment rights. We
address each of these arguments in turn in light of the summary
judgment and qualified immunity standards set forth above.
A.
Crouch first argues that Sanchez violated his Fourth
Amendment rights when she entered Crouch’s place of business and
arrested him. The Fourth Amendment prohibits police officers
from entering a person’s home to conduct a search or an arrest
without a warrant, absent exigent circumstances.10 Warrantless
arrests based on probable cause are lawful when conducted in a
public place, however.11
In this case, Sanchez followed Crouch into Padre Island
Pizza, Crouch’s place of business, to arrest Crouch at about ten
o’clock on a Wednesday morning. The doors of the pizza parlor
were unlocked. Sanchez saw Crouch enter the pizza parlor after
Crouch parked his car in its parking lot. Sanchez then
approached the front door, opened it, and entered the restaurant,
where Crouch was behind the front counter using the telephone.
The summary judgment evidence does not suggest that the pizza
parlor was closed to the public at the time of Crouch’s arrest.
Based on the summary judgment evidence in this case, therefore,
10
See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980).
11
See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976).
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the restaurant is a public place for Fourth Amendment purposes.
The Fourth Amendment did not require “exigent circumstances” for
Sanchez to enter the restaurant and make the arrest without a
warrant. Therefore, as a matter of law, Crouch has not asserted
the violation of a clearly established right with respect to
entry into the pizza parlor. Thus, we conclude that Sanchez is
entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity
on this issue.
B.
Crouch next argues that Sanchez violated his Fourth
Amendment rights because Sanchez did not have probable cause to
arrest him for D.W.I.. The Fourth Amendment requires that
warrantless arrests be made with probable cause.12 Probable
cause is a single, flexible, fact-based standard.13 It is
analyzed in terms of what a reasonable officer would conclude
from the information in her possession.14 The probable cause
analysis considers why the officer believed the individual
committed the offense and whether, on the information available,
a reasonable person would come to the same objective
conclusion.15
12
See Hinshaw v. Doffer, 785 F.2d 1260, 1266 (5th Cir.
1986).
13
See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959).
14
See id.
15
See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959).
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Where an individual asserts a claim for wrongful arrest,
qualified immunity will shield the defendant officer from suit if
“‘a reasonable officer could have believed [the arrest at issue]
to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the
information the [arresting] officers possessed.’ Even law
enforcement officers who ‘reasonably but mistakenly conclude that
probable cause is present’ are entitled to immunity.”16
The summary judgment evidence considered by the trial court
in this case establishes that Sanchez received a phone call from
Crouch’s wife, Cynthia, who informed Sanchez that her husband was
intoxicated and was driving his automobile. Sanchez observed
Crouch driving erratically on South Padre Boulevard. Once inside
the restaurant, Sanchez observed Crouch to have glassy eyes,
dilated pupils and smelled alcohol on Crouch’s breath. Crouch
was argumentative and hostile. Sanchez then informed Crouch he
was under arrest for D.W.I.. No evidence accepted by the
district court as appropriate summary judgment evidence
contradicts these facts. This court has found probable cause
under closely analogous facts.17 We conclude that this
uncontroverted evidence establishes, as a matter of law, that
16
See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (quoting
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641).
17
See, for example, Gibson, 44 F.3d 274 (reversing trial
court’s denial of qualified immunity to police officer in a § 1983
wrongful arrest claim on basis of summary judgment evidence similar
to this case).
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Sanchez was objectively reasonable in believing she had probable
cause to arrest Crouch. Therefore, Sanchez is entitled to
summary judgment based on qualified immunity on this issue as
well.18
IV.
For the reasons stated above, we REVERSE the judgment of the
district court and RENDER summary judgment for Sanchez, in her
individual capacity, on the basis of qualified immunity.
REVERSED AND RENDERED.
18
Based on the transcript of the April 20, 2000, summary
judgment hearing, the district court apparently found that the
affidavit of Avila, Crouch’s friend, presented a genuine issue as
to probable cause for the arrest. Indeed, the Avila affidavit
contains the only factual dispute in all the summary judgment
evidence considered by the district court. In his affidavit, Avila
claims that he overheard a voice, presumably Sanchez’s, stating
that Crouch was under arrest for driving with a suspended license.
When Crouch replied that his license was not suspended, Avila
states that the voice replied, “Well, you are under arrest for
D.W.I.. Please step outside.” This exchange, even if true, is
immaterial to the issue of whether Sanchez had probable cause to
arrest Crouch for D.W.I..
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