Lebron v. United States ( 2002 )

Revised January 21, 2002
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 00-51101
_______________________
ANTONIO LEBRON, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,
Defendants,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
_________________________________________________________________
January 15, 2002
Before DAVIS and JONES, Circuit Judges, and BARBOUR,* District
Judge.
EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:
Carmen and Antonio Lebron sued the United States
individually and as next friends of their daughter, Karina, under
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et
seq., for damages suffered as a result of an Army doctor’s medical
malpractice at Fort Hood, Texas. The doctor’s negligent delivery
*
District Judge of the Southern District of Mississippi,
sitting by designation.
of Karina left her with severe, permanent brain damage. The
Government admitted liability but contested damages. After a bench
trial, the district court awarded the plaintiffs $32,676,410 in
all: $20,647,488 for Karina; $4,320,000 each to Carmen and Antonio
for medical and attendant care for Karina until her age of
majority; an additional $1,783,156 to Carmen; and an additional
$1,605,766 to Antonio.1 The court also awarded the plaintiffs
costs, including fees for services rendered by Karina Lebron’s
guardian ad litem (GAL).
The Government appeals on three grounds, contending (1)
that the “maximum recovery rule” requires a reduction of $9.4
million in certain intangible damages awarded to the three
plaintiffs; (2) that because the $20.6 million in damages awarded
to Karina exceeds the $20 million specified in the amended
administrative claim that the Lebrons filed on her behalf, the
$20.6 million should be reduced to $20 million; and (3) that the
cost of certain legal services provided by the GAL, who is an
1
Karina Lebron’s $20.6 million award included about $10.6
million for medical and attendant care after her eighteenth
birthday and about $1 million for her loss of earning capacity,
plus the following noneconomic damages:
$ 1.5 million for past and future pain/suffering,
2.0 million for past and future mental anguish,
2.5 million for past and future physical impairment,
2.0 million for past and future mental impairment,
1.0 million for past and future disfigurement
$ 9.0 million - total
Each parent received certain economic damages plus $1.5 million
apiece for loss of consortium resulting from Karina’s injuries.
2
attorney, should have been deducted from Karina’s recovery and
should not have been taxed as costs to be paid by the Government.
The Government does not contest any other damages awards.
We conclude as follows. (1) The maximum recovery rule
requires a reduction in the awards contested by the Government, and
a remand is necessary to clarify whether portions of Karina’s
medical expenses award are duplicative. (2) Because the Lebrons
have not met the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b) for obtaining
damages exceeding the amount stated in the administrative claim,
Karina cannot recover more than $20 million. (3.) The district
court erred in failing to determine what part of the services
rendered by the GAL are legal fees to be awarded out of the
recovery. On remand, the court must make this determination.
3
(1) Whether the “Maximum Recovery Rule”
Requires a Reduction of $9.4 Million in
Certain Intangible Damages2
A district court’s damages award is a finding of fact,
which this court reviews for excessiveness using the clear error
standard. Douglass v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 897 F.2d 1336, 1339
(5th Cir. 1990). Put otherwise, “[w]e do not reverse a verdict for
excessiveness except on the strongest of showings, but when a
jury’s award exceeds the bounds of reasonable recovery, we must
suggest a remittitur ourselves or direct the district court to do
so.” Dixon v. Int’l Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573, 590 (5th Cir.
1985). “[W]hen this court is left with the perception that the
verdict is clearly excessive, deference must be abandoned.” Eiland
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 58 F.3d 176, 183 (5th Cir. 1995). This
2
The Lebrons preliminarily suggest that the Government
waived its arguments on this issue by failing to raise them in a
motion for new trial or in some other post-judgment motion.
Ordinarily “there can be no appellate review of allegedly excessive
or inadequate damages if the trial court was not given the
opportunity to exercise its discretion on a motion for a new
trial.” Bueno v. City of Donna, 714 F.2d 484, 493-94 (5th Cir.
1983). Yet we agree with the Eleventh Circuit that “[w]here, as
here, damages are set by the judge instead of a jury, issues raised
during trial and ruled on by the trial court need not be raised
again in a motion for new trial in order to preserve them for
review on appeal.” Johnson v. United States, 780 F.2d 902, 907
(11th Cir. 1986) (vacating FTCA award). The record shows that the
Government raised the issue of how to avoid excessive damages
awards in a pre-trial memorandum that cited and applied this
circuit’s maximum recovery rule. In its memorandum and order
setting forth findings of facts and conclusions of law pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), the district court responded to the
Government’s invocation of the rule. This court, therefore, will
consider whether the damages awards were excessive.
4
court’s power to grant a remittitur of excessive damages is the
same as the district court’s. Dixon, id.
“[W]e apply the loosely defined ‘maximum recovery rule’
when deciding whether a remittitur is in order. This judge-made
rule essentially provides that we will decline to reduce damages
where the amount awarded is not disproportionate to at least one
factually similar case from the relevant jurisdiction.” Douglass,
897 F.2d at 1344 (emphasis in original).3 The rule applies
regardless of whether the award was made by a jury. Id. at 1337,
1339 n.3, 1344. The rule “does not necessarily limit an award to
the highest amount previously recognized in the state;” indeed, the
rule “does not become operative unless the award exceeds 133% of
the highest previous recovery in the [relevant jurisdiction]” for
a factually similar case. Id. at 1344 n.14. Because the facts of
each case are different, prior damages awards are not always
controlling; a departure from prior awards is merited “if unique
facts are present that are not reflected within the controlling
caselaw.” Id. at 1339. See Wheat v. United States, 860 F.2d 1256,
1260 (5th Cir. 1988); Wakefield v. United States, 765 F.2d 55, 59-60
(5th Cir. 1985).
3
A number of other circuits employ a maximum recovery rule
in reviewing damages awards. See, e.g., Shockley v. Arcan, Inc.,
248 F.3d 1349, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Koster v. Trans World
Airlines, 181 F.3d 24, 36 (1st Cir. 1999); Spesco, Inc. v. General
Elec. Co., 719 F.2d 233, 240-41 (7th Cir. 1983).
5
The district court applied the maximum recovery rule in
this case by relying on a number of state and federal cases
applying Texas law in which larger aggregate sums were awarded than
the total amount that the court decided to award in this case.4
None of these awards is officially reported, except for one that
was reversed on appeal in a reported decision, on which we
therefore do not rely. The same is true of some of the decisions
cited by the plaintiffs.5 We decline to use unreported decisions
as benchmarks for this purpose. Unreported decisions generally
lack precedential value. See, e.g., Tex. R. App. P. 47.7; 5th Cir.
R. 47.5.4; Exxon, Co., U.S.A. v. Banque De Paris Et Des Pays-Bas,
889 F.2d 674, 675 (5th Cir. 1989) (“under Texas law an unreported
opinion is not precedential”). Our court has not previously
considered unreported decisions when invoking the maximum recovery
rule. See In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La. on July
9, 1982, 767 F.2d 1151, 1156 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing “highest
reported” awards in relevant jurisdiction); Hansen v. Johns-
4
Texas law controls the measure of damages in this case.
See Ingraham v. United States, 808 F.2d 1075, 1081 (5th Cir. 1987);
Wakefield, 765 F.2d at 58 (“The components and measure of damages
in FTCA cases are taken from the law of the state where the tort
occurred.”).
5
One of the unreported state court decisions cited by the
plaintiffs was affirmed on appeal in a published decision, but (1)
the appellate court’s decision states only the plaintiffs’
aggregate damages awards, without distinguishing between pecuniary
and non-pecuniary components; and (2) each of these aggregate
awards is lower than the corresponding aggregate amount for which
the Government argues in this case.
6
Mansville Prods. Corp., 734 F.2d 1036, 1047 (5th Cir. 1984) (award
was “substantially greater than any we have discovered in other
reported cases”) (emphasis added). And from a practical
standpoint, the comparability of unreported decisions is hard to
judge from the records available. The Lebrons offer a mix of
summary reports of verdicts from an unofficial publication, The
Blue Sheet of Texas, and attorney affidavits. Use of such hearsay
would create more problems than it would solve by provoking
irrelevant disputes over the comparability of unreported decisions.
The Government argues for two particular applications of
the maximum recovery rule. We address them in turn.
A. Award to Parents for Loss of Consortium
First, the Government argues that the court’s award to
Carmen and Antonio Lebron for loss of consortium should be reduced
from $3 million ($1.5 million each) to $2 million ($1 million
each). In Ingraham v. United States, 808 F.2d 1075, 1078, 1081-82
(5th Cir. 1987), an FTCA case that arose in Texas, a parent was
awarded $750,000 for loss of society and other losses arising from
severe brain injuries suffered by her child. This court rejected
the Government’s argument that the $750,000 award was so excessive
as to warrant correction on appeal. Id. at 1082. This is the
highest award we have found in a reported case for loss of
consortium awarded to a parent for non-fatal injuries to his or her
child. Cf. Wellborn v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 970 F.2d 1420, 1427
7
n.13, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1992) (rejecting challenge to $1.275 million
total award to parent under Texas law, arising from death of child
in accident, where award included $612,500 award for loss of
companionship and society).
The Government, treating Douglass as if that case
formulated a rigid cap on application of the maximum recovery rule,
suggests we add 33% to the Ingraham award for each parent. This
would result in $1 million to each parent. We disagree with the
Government’s characterization of Douglass because it framed a
guideline for invoking rather than a formula for capping recoveries
under the rule. Douglass, 897 F.2d at 1343, n.14 (the “rule does
not become operative unless the award exceeds 133% of the highest
previous recovery in the State”) (emphasis added). Nevertheless,
the Government’s concession is generous, and we agree that the
Lebrons’ award is too high. We adopt the Government’s suggestion
to reduce the Lebrons’ total loss of consortium award to $2
million.6
6
We express no view on whether this amount is unreasonably
high in relation to the intangible damages award that we approve
for Karina, who indisputably suffered the greater loss. Because
the Government has conceded that Carmen and Antonio Lebron’s
intangible damages award should be reduced to no less than $2
million, the Government has forfeited its opportunity to argue that
the award should be lower when considered in relation to their
daughter’s award for intangible damages. Cf. Roberts v.
Williamson, 52 S.W.3d 343, 350-52 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 2001)
(affirming awards of $1.235 million to child and parents for
intangible losses suffered by child and award of $75,001 to parents
for loss of consortium), petition for review filed (Aug. 20, 2001),
motion to dismiss denied (Nov. 1, 2001).
8
B. Awards to Karina for Various Intangible Injuries
Second, the Government argues, relying on St. Paul Med.
Ctr. v. Cecil, 842 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. Civ. App.-- Dallas 1992), and
Pipgras v. Hart, 832 S.W.2d 360 (Tex. Civ. App.–- Ft. Worth 1992),
that the court’s award to Karina Lebron for intangible injuries
should be reduced from $9 million to $600,000. In Cecil, a case
involving serious brain injuries caused to an infant during his
delivery, the jury awarded the plaintiffs $25,000 for past physical
pain and mental anguish, $50,000 for future physical pain and
mental anguish, $25,000 for past physical impairment, and $50,000
for future physical impairment: $150,000 in all for intangible
damages. 842 S.W.2d at 811. In Pipgras, a case involving
seemingly less serious brain injuries to a four-year-old child, the
court rejected challenges to awards of $50,000 for future physical
impairment and $250,000 for physical pain and mental anguish. 832
S.W.2d at 365-67.
The intangible awards in Cecil and Pipgras are not
precisely analogous to the intangible awards in this case, which
were made for categories of injury that overlap with or otherwise
differ from the categories of harm articulated by the trial court
here. Cf. Douglass, 897 F.2d at 1345. And in neither Cecil nor
Pipgras is there an award for disfigurement, a category of
noneconomic damages that clearly applies to Karina. Jones v. Wal-
9
Mart Stores, Inc., 870 F.2d 982, 990 (5th Cir. 1989).7 Moreover,
the injuries at issue at least in Pipgras are significantly less
severe than the injuries suffered by Karina. With all these
qualifications, however, the awards in Cecil and Pipgras permit
some comparison.
The $600,000 aggregate figure requested by the Government
is based solely on comparison with Cecil and Pipgras. A recent
Texas case, however, supports a higher award and undercuts the
Governments’ proposed reduction, though not the general principle
of comparison. In Roberts v. Williamson, 52 S.W.3d 343, 347, 350-
51 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2001), petition for review filed (Aug. 20,
2001), motion to dismiss denied (Nov. 1, 2001), the court rejected
challenges to awards for the benefit of a child amounting to $1.235
million in non-pecuniary damages -- $335,000 for past and future
physical impairment, $850,000 for physical pain and mental anguish,
and $50,000 for disfigurement -- arising from brain injuries
analogous to those sustained by Karina in this case. In Williamson
as in this case, the brain injuries were sustained in the first
days of the child’s life. Williamson represents by far the highest
reported judgment we have found applying Texas law to comparable
facts.
7
The disfigurement in this case is severe. As the
district court found, the Government’s physician fractured Karina’s
skull, creating a fist-size cavity filled with tissue and cerebral
fluid, and crushed her right eye socket. This damage will never
heal. Her posture is slouched, and she is prone to drool because
her jaw uncontrollably hangs open.
10
The intangible damages in Williamson are many times as
high as those in Pipgras and Cecil, yet the intangible damages
awarded by the district court here outstrip the verdict in
Williamson by a factor of seven. The purpose of the maximum
recovery rule is to bring rough consistency into comparable damages
awards. Whether Karina’s award is viewed on an item-by-item
comparison of specific noneconomic damages components or on an
aggregate basis, it is grossly excessive. Horrible as are the
facts underlying the judgment, they are not dissimilar to the facts
in Cecil and Williamson, and “we find no novel grounds for such a
grand departure” in the award of damages. Douglass, 897 F.2d at
1345. While recognizing that a court-ordered remittitur
necessarily involves a subjective component, Caldarera v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 705 F.2d 778, 784 (5th Cir. 1983), we conclude that
a reduction of Karina’s total noneconomic damages award from $9
million to $1.25 million satisfies the maximum recovery rule.
One additional contention raised by the Government
requires a response. Noting that the district court failed to
explain the reasoning for its specific awards, the Government
argues that the district court’s noneconomic damages award may have
been duplicative of its medical expenses award. In Sosa v. M/V
Lago Izobal, 736 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1984), this court concluded
that to the extent that certain rehabilitative items were not
medical expenses but devices to alleviate physical suffering or
11
mental anguish, they duplicated a separate award for “pain and
suffering, bodily injury, mental anguish, and loss of the capacity
for the enjoyment of life.” Id.8 This court remanded for a
determination of which items were compensable medical expenses and
which duplicated the award for pain and suffering. See id.
As in Sosa, we cannot determine from the trial court’s
opinion in this case whether part of the medical expense award may
duplicate part of the awards for intangible harms. For instance,
the former award included equestrian and aquatic therapy, which the
court described in terms suggesting that it was at least in part
compensating for the emotional harms caused by the defendant’s
negligence. We therefore remand for a determination of which items
were compensable medical expenses and which duplicated the
intangible awards.
If the district court concludes on remand that the
medical expense award and intangible injuries awards are not
duplicative, then our remittitur will remain intact. If the
district court concludes that the awards are duplicative, it must
make appropriate reductions in the awards.
8
The district court had awarded the plaintiff a sum for
rehabilitation expenses consisting of “39 items, such as a speaker
telephone service, an electric toothbrush, and a beverage holder,
that will allow Sosa to perform certain simple tasks on his own and
‘make him more comfortable despite his severe injuries.’” Sosa,
736 F.2d at 1034 (quoting district court).
12
(2) Whether FTCA § 2675(b) Requires That the
$20.6 Million Award to Karina Lebron Be
Reduced to the $20 Million Sought in Her
Administrative Claim
In May 1996, the Lebrons filed an administrative claim
seeking $14 million on behalf of Karina. In April 1998, they filed
an amended administrative claim for Karina seeking $20 million. In
their original complaint, filed in May 1999, they sought an
unspecified amount. After the Army denied the administrative
claim, they moved in February 2000 to amend their complaint to seek
$55 million for Karina. The United States opposed the motion,
arguing that the Lebrons had not met the standard set out in 28
U.S.C. § 2675(b), which provides that an FTCA action
shall not be instituted for any sum in excess of the
amount of the claim presented to the federal agency,
except where the increased amount is based upon newly
discovered evidence not reasonably discoverable at the
time of presenting the claim to the federal agency, or
upon allegation and proof of intervening facts, relating
to the amount of the claim.
The district court granted the Lebrons’ motion. The court
ultimately awarded Karina about $20.6 million.
On appeal, the Government argues that the district court
erred in allowing the Lebrons to seek damages in excess of the $20
million specified in her amended administrative claim. In light of
§ 2675(b), this contention is correct. Karina’s award can be no
more than $20 million.9
9
The Government’s brief might be read to suggest that even
if our application of the maximum recovery rule, supra, ultimately
13
The plaintiff in an FTCA suit who seeks to exceed his
administrative claim has the burden to show that the addition is
based on newly discovered evidence or intervening facts within the
meaning of § 2675(b). See, e.g., Michels v. United States, 31 F.3d
686, 689 (8th Cir. 1994); Spivey v. United States, 912 F.2d 80, 85
(4th Cir. 1990). To satisfy this burden, the plaintiff must show
that the evidence was not “reasonably capable of detection at the
time the administrative claim was filed.” Low v. United States,
795 F.2d 466, 470 (5th Cir. 1986). In other words, “the information
must not have been discoverable through the exercise of reasonable
diligence.” Id.
In Low, the plaintiff sought $1,275,000 in her
administrative claim for injuries done to her son Brian during
childbirth. In court, she later sought $12 million for the same
injuries. The district court awarded the plaintiff $3.5 million,
asserting that the plaintiff had presented newly discovered
evidence or intervening facts under § 2675(b) concerning “the
extent of Brian’s condition, the prospects for his recovery, the
results in an aggregate damages award for Karina of $20 million or
less, Karina’s damages award must be reduced by an additional
$647,488. We reject any such contention. Section 2675(b) merely
caps Karina’s aggregate damages award. If the award has been
reduced below the cap for other reasons, § 2675(b) does not require
reducing an award any further. See Reilly v. United States, 863
F.2d 149, 173 n.19 (1st Cir. 1988). Cf. Martinez v. United States,
780 F.2d 525, 530 (5th Cir. 1986) (reading § 2675(b) “to allow
plaintiffs to prove damages in excess of the administrative claim,
but to forbid the actual recovery to exceed the amount of the
administrative claim”).
14
limited extent of any recovery, and . . . his life expectancy.”
Id. at 470. This court disagreed with the district court’s reading
of the requirements of § 2675(b). We concluded that the evidence
cited by the district court did not meet these requirements because
it went only to the precision with which the severity of Brian’s
injury could have been known.
The [new] evidence does not alter the fact . . . that
when the administrative claim was filed Mrs. Low already
knew that Brian had cerebral palsy, a seizure disorder,
and was blind, deaf, and mentally retarded. There is no
evidence that these conditions became worse or that other
conditions developed after the claim was filed. . . .
This is not a case in which the claimant did not know or
reasonably could not have known the basic severity of
Brian’s handicap; it was indubitably of grave severity
and of unknown -- perhaps permanent -- duration. . . .
[I]f the exact nature, extent and duration of each
recognized disability must be known before § 2675(b) will
be given effect, that section will be rendered useless;
and the government will be unable to evaluate any claim
made against it without the threat that, if it does not
settle, its liability may increase substantially. Such
matters are of their nature dubious, partaking of the
uncertainties of life itself in which unexpected deaths
and equally unexpected recoveries occur.
Id. at 471. This court remanded for a reduction of the damages
award to $1.275 million.
Low makes clear that new information cannot surmount the
bar created by § 2675(b) if the information merely concerns the
precision with which the nature, extent, or duration of a
claimant’s condition can be known. Information can be newly
discovered evidence or an intervening fact, however, if it sheds
new light on the basic severity of the claimant’s condition -- that
15
is, if it materially differs from the worst-case prognosis of which
the claimant knew or could reasonably have known when the claim was
filed. See, e.g., Fraysier v. United States, 766 F.2d 478, 481
(11th Cir. 1985), cited in Low, 795 F.2d at 470. Requiring the
plaintiff to guard against a worst-case scenario in preparing his
claim gives the Government full notice of its maximum potential
liability in the case. This encourages settlement of FTCA cases in
accordance with the statute’s purposes. See Low, 795 F.2d at 470-
71; Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 172-73 (1st Cir. 1988).
In this case, the district court concluded that when the
administrative claim was filed, “it was impossible to determine the
nature and extent of [Karina’s] injuries because reliable cognitive
and motor/sensory tests could not be conducted until Karina was
four to five years old.” The court pointed to evidence that a life
care plan could not be drafted for Karina until she was about five.
Citing tests and an examination conducted after the filing of the
claim, the court concluded that “Karina’s condition was
significantly worse than believed when the administrative claim was
filed. . . . Karina’s needs and the care and treatment she will
require will cost nearly twice what was previously expected. It is
not just the valuation of those needs, but the kind and frequency
of care that have increased.”
This court rejected similar reasoning in Low, a case that
is practically indistinguishable. Karina’s original administrative
16
claim shows that the Lebrons knew that Karina’s condition was
“indubitably of grave severity and of unknown -- perhaps permanent
-- duration” and that they expected additional impairments to
develop. Low, 795 F.2d at 471. The claim enumerates a number of
serious injuries sustained during Karina’s “traumatic” delivery,
including skull fractures, hemorrhages, and brain contusions;
states that she “developed seizures at four hours of life” and
“suffers from spasticity, poor head control and . . . developmental
delay;” and predicts “additional permanent physical and mental
impairments.” In sum, in this case, “as in Low, the basic severity
of the child’s condition was known and recited in the claim form.”
Reilly, 863 F.2d at 172. Compare United States v. Alexander, 238
F.2d 314, 318 (5th Cir. 1956), cited in Low, 795 F.2d at 470. A
reasonable worst-case prognosis would have predicted what actually
came to pass. It follows that § 2675(b) barred the Lebrons from
seeking damages in excess of the $20 million stated in the
administrative claim.10
10
Because this conclusion is required by what the Lebrons
knew or reasonably could have known at the time Karina’s original
administrative claim was filed, it is unnecessary to decide the
merits of the Lebrons’ contention that under § 2675(b), the
relevant question is what they knew or reasonably could have known
at the time they “present[ed]” the claim, not what they knew or
could have known at the time they filed suit (or at some other
moment in the “administrative phase” of this litigation). See,
e.g., Husovsky v. United States, 590 F.2d 944, 954 & n.24 (D.C.
Cir. 1978). But see Spivey, 912 F.2d at 83, 85-86. Even if this
contention is correct, it would not affect the outcome of this
appeal.
17
(3) Whether the District Court Erred in
Awarding All of the Guardian Ad Litem’s
Fees as Costs Taxable to the Government
Karina’s GAL, Gary Zausmer, is an attorney and a
shareholder in a large and well-known law firm who has experience
in litigation concerning brain injuries. In August 2000, Zausmer
submitted a report and fee application seeking $260,000 for past
and future services. According to the district court, the services
provided by Zausmer included “monitoring depositions; reviewing
pleadings, medical records and evidence; meeting with Karina
Lebron’s doctors; preparing for examination of witnesses; drafting
responses to certain government motions; and preparation for
trial.”11 Zausmer’s report stated that Zausmer had already spent
between 170 and 200 hours of time on the matter, “including
approximately 75 hours in combined trial preparation and
participation in a four day trial,” and that “additional
proceedings in this action, including appellate work, may
approximate and conceivably exceed 100 hours.” The report also
11
Zausmer’s report indicates that his services also
included preparing for and conducting examination and cross
examination of witnesses, as well as “provid[ing] argument to the
Court to protect the interests of Karina Lebron.”
The report also indicates that Zausmer regarded some or
all of his services as legal work not much different from legal
work that he performed on behalf of clients other than Karina.
“Substantial hours and efforts, in lieu of the performance of other
legal work on behalf of other clients, were devoted to pre-trial
preparation, depositions, mediations, . . . etc. and ultimately
trial -- all as the court-appointed Guardian ad litem for Karina
Lebron.” (Emphasis added.)
18
stated that over “75 hours of additional time has been devoted by
legal assistants and associates of this law firm to assist the
undersigned.” The report did not include the documentation then
required by local court rules to support claims for attorney’s
fees. The district court approved the application, concluding that
the entire expense of Zausmer’s services should be taxed against
the Government as costs.
The district court did not distinguish which part of
Zausmer’s fees were costs and which part were legal fees to be
subtracted from the recovery. The court acknowledged that many of
Zausmer’s services were “legal or quasi-legal” in nature, yet the
court concluded that Zausmer had provided them “as an officer of
the Court and not as an attorney.” Any GAL would have provided the
services, the court said, even if the GAL had not been a licensed
attorney. The court did not explain how a person who was not a
lawyer could have provided Karina with legal services.
When the same person acts “as both a minor’s guardian ad
litem and as his attorney ad litem, only the person’s expenses in
the former role are taxable as costs under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d).”
Gibbs v. Gibbs, 210 F.3d 491, 506 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing duPont v.
Southern Nat’l Bank, 771 F.2d 874, 882 (5th Cir. 1985)). “His fees
and expenses in the role of attorney ad litem would be treated as
any other attorneys’ fees.” Id. Under the American Rule, “the
prevailing litigant ordinarily may not collect attorney's fees from
19
the loser.” Sanchez v. Rowe, 870 F.2d 291, 293 (5th Cir. 1989)
(affirming denial of attorney’s fees to plaintiff in FTCA action).
Thus Zausmer’s expenses as attorney ad litem must be paid from
Karina’s recovery. See Gibbs, 210 F.3d at 506. To apply this rule
correctly, the district court was obliged to determine which of the
GAL’s expenses related to his role as GAL and which related to his
role as legal counsel for the children. See id. at 507-08
(remanding for such a determination); duPont, 771 F.2d at 882 &
n.7, 888 (same); Franz v. Buder, 38 F.2d 605, 607-08 (8th Cir. 1930)
(same).
This rule applies even though Zausmer was not formally
named Karina’s attorney ad litem. When a GAL provides legal
services to his ward, they should be treated the same as if they
had been provided by any other attorney.
The guardian ad litem is frequently not an attorney and
if legal services are required, he must seek and employ
counsel. Counsel obtained thereby on behalf of a ward or
incompetent is in no different circumstance from counsel
for any other litigant. An attorney who serves as both
legal counsel and guardian ad litem does not thereby
acquire any greater right to recover his fees than have
his brethren who are hired directly by a litigant.
Gibbs, 206 F.3d at 507 (citations omitted) (quoting Kollsman v.
Cohen, 996 F.2d 702, 706 (4th Cir. 1993)). For the same reason, it
makes no difference that Karina had separate retained counsel in
this case. Were it otherwise, a GAL could get the expenses of his
legal work reimbursed as costs rather than fees by the simple
expedient of hiring a second attorney to serve as nominal outside
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counsel. The question is not one of titles; it is whether the GAL
provided the minor with “the ordinary services of an attorney.”
duPont, 771 F.2d at 882. At least some of Zausmer’s services
appear to have been legal.
District courts have discretion in determining which
expenses fall on which side of the line between costs and legal
fees in any particular case. Cf. Gibbs, 210 F.3d at 506-08. In
this case, however, the district court overlooked that the work
done by Zausmer and other attorneys at his law firm went far beyond
work reimbursable as costs that is done to assess a minor’s claims
and to decide among possible courses of action on behalf of the
minor. See id. at 507 (GAL’s initial task in ordinary case is “to
assess his wards’ potential claim of entitlement and decide what
course of action should be taken on behalf of his wards, i.e.,
litigate, settle or waive their claim”); id. (“The guardian ad
litem's presence is necessitated by the litigation and it is his
duty to determine policy regarding litigation.”) (quoting Kollsman,
996 F.2d at 706).
Because Zausmer was successful in his efforts to obtain
recovery for Karina, compensation for his legal services chargeable
as fees should be awarded from her recovery. Gibbs, 210 F.3d at
506. The district court must re-evaluate which of Zausmer’s
expenses are chargeable as fees and which are chargeable as costs.
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CONCLUSION
We VACATE in part and REMAND, directing the district
court in accordance with this opinion (1) to reduce certain of the
damages awards in the manner specified above; (2) to clarify
whether portions of the medical expenses award are duplicative;
(3) to apply a cap of $20 million to Karina’s aggregate recovery;
and (4) to award Zausmer fees and costs anew after calculating
compensation due for Zausmer’s legal services.
VACATED and REMANDED with instructions.
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