Dawson v. City of Baton Rouge ( 1998 )


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  •                  IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    ____________________
    No. 97-30316
    Summary Calendar
    ____________________
    WALTER DAWSON,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    CITY OF BATON ROUGE; METROPOLITAN COUNCIL,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ___________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Louisiana
    (96-CV-3365-B)
    _________________________________________________________________
    January 7, 1998
    Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Plaintiff-appellant Walter Dawson appeals the district court’s
    grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees the City
    of Baton Rouge and the Metropolitan Council on his claim that the
    abolition of the Baton Rouge City Council and the creation of the
    Metropolitan Council were illegal.    We affirm the judgment of the
    district court.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
    47.5.4.
    I.   FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    On June 23, 1982, the Parish Council of East Baton Rouge
    Parish (“Parish Council”) approved Resolution No. 19075
    (“Resolution”).    The Resolution sought to amend the Plan of
    Government of the City of Baton Rouge and East Baton Rouge Parish
    (“Plan of Government”) to create the Metropolitan Council and
    concurrently to abolish the then existing separate city and
    parish councils.
    While a majority of the members of the Parish Council of
    East Baton Rouge Parish (“Parish Council”) voted in favor of the
    Resolution, a majority of the members of the Baton Rouge City
    Council (“City Council”), all of whom also sat on the Parish
    Council, voted against it.     Once the Parish Council approved the
    Resolution, it was submitted to the voters of East Baton Rouge
    Parish for approval.     In a special election held on September 11,
    1982, a majority of those voting in East Baton Rouge Parish voted
    to approve the amendments to the Plan of Government contained in
    the Resolution.
    Fourteen years later, on July 11, 1996, plaintiff-appellant
    Walter Dawson filed suit in the 19th Judicial District Court for
    the Parish of East Baton Rouge seeking a declaratory judgment
    that the creation of the Metropolitan Council and the abolition
    of the City Council was “illegal, unconstitutional, and
    therefore, void and unenforceable.”1     He also sought an
    1
    Dawson originally filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus
    seeking an order directing the City of Baton Rouge and the
    Metropolitan Council to call elections for the City Council. The
    2
    injunction restraining the City of Baton Rouge from maintaining
    the Metropolitan Council and an order from the court requiring
    the reinstatement of the City Council as it existed prior to June
    23, 1982.     Finally, he sought injunctive relief prohibiting any
    future elections of Metropolitan Council members to represent the
    City of Baton Rouge.    Defendants-appellees the City of Baton
    Rouge and the Metropolitan Council (“Defendants”) thereafter
    removed the case to federal district court.2       The parties each
    submitted motions for summary judgment, and the district court
    granted Defendants’ motion and dismissed the case with
    prejudice.3
    II.   STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the
    same criteria that the district court used in the first instance.
    Kemp v. G.D. Searle & Co., 
    103 F.3d 405
    , 407 (5th Cir. 1997).         We
    consult the applicable law in order to ascertain the material
    factual issues, and we then review the evidence bearing on those
    issues, viewing the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in
    state court ordered Dawson to file an amended petition seeking a
    declaratory judgment rather than mandamus, and the claims in the
    current suit arise from that petition.
    2
    The Federal district court consolidated this case with
    two other cases challenging the metropolitan form of government
    of East Baton Rouge Parish on the ground that it violates Section
    2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
    3
    Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), the
    district court explicitly stated that its judgment of dismissal
    applied only to the instant case, and the court simultaneously
    vacated its order consolidating this case with the two Voting
    Rights Act cases.
    3
    the light most favorable to the nonmovant.                   King v. Chide, 
    974 F.2d 653
    , 656 (5th Cir. 1992).             Summary judgment is appropriate
    only “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
    and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
    show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
    that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
    law.”    FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
    III.    DISCUSSION
    Dawson contends that the Resolution illegally abolished the
    City Council because a majority of the City Council did not
    approve it.    In support of his argument, Dawson relies on the
    Plan of Government, which states that amendments to it must be
    made by “special election in the same manner as is provided for
    the calling and holding of elections on bond issues.”                   PARISH   OF
    EAST BATON ROUGE & CITY   OF   BATON ROUGE, LA., PLAN   OF   GOVERNMENT § 11.09
    (1979).    Dawson interprets this language to require strict
    adherence to sections 1281 through 1295 of Title 18 of
    Louisiana’s Revised Statutes, which govern bond elections.
    Section 1284 states, in pertinent part, that “[t]he election
    shall be ordered by a resolution of the governing authority of
    the political subdivision.”             LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1284(A) (West
    1979).    Dawson contends that because the Parish Council was not
    the governing body of Baton Rouge, it was not authorized to call
    a special election regarding the Resolution.                  He therefore argues
    that the special election was unauthorized and that the
    Metropolitan Council is an unauthorized governmental body.                   This
    4
    argument lacks merit.
    The Louisiana Constitution states that existing Home Rule
    Charters, such as the Plan of Government at issue in this case,
    “may be amended, modified, or repealed as provided therein.”                          LA.
    CONST. art. VI, § 4; see also City of Baton Rouge v. Williams, 
    661 So. 2d 445
    , 447 (La. 1995) (stating that the Plan of Government
    is an existing home rule charter as defined by the Louisiana
    Constitution of 1974).          Section 11.09 of the Plan of Government
    states that amendments to it “may be proposed by majority vote of
    all the members elected to the Parish Council.”                  PARISH   OF   EAST
    BATON ROUGE & CITY   OF   BATON ROUGE, LA., PLAN   OF   GOVERNMENT § 11.09 (1979)
    (emphasis added).         It further states that in order to become
    effective, the proposed amendment must be approved by a majority
    of the votes cast in a special election that is open to all who
    are eligible to vote in East Baton Rouge Parish.                  Id.; see also
    City of Baton Rouge v. Blakely, 
    699 So. 2d 1053
    , 1057 (La. 1997)
    (“Section 11.09 specifically provides for the amendment of the
    Plan of Government by a majority vote in favor of the amendment
    when submitted to the qualified voters of the parish.”).                       Thus,
    it is clear that it was the special election approving the
    amendment to the Plan of Government, not the Parish Council’s
    approval of the Resolution proposing the amendment, that
    abolished the City Council and created the Metropolitan Council.
    Relying on sections 1283 and 1284, Dawson nonetheless
    contends that the approval of the City Council was required
    5
    before the amendment could lawfully become effective.4
    Section 11.09 makes no mention of any requirement that the City
    Council approve amendments to the Plan of Government.                   PARISH   OF
    EAST BATON ROUGE & CITY   OF   BATON ROUGE, LA., PLAN   OF   GOVERNMENT § 11.09
    (1979).   Moreover, as the district court correctly determined,
    section 11.09’s reference to the bond election statutes indicates
    that the special election should be conducted in the manner in
    which bond elections are conducted, not that the requirement of
    City Council approval should be imported into the Plan of
    Government’s amendment process.              
    Id. (“The Parish
    Council shall
    call and hold such special election in the same manner as is
    provided for the calling and holding of elections on bond
    issues.” (emphasis added)).           Indeed, while section 11.09 never
    mentions the City Council in its discussion of the amendment
    process, in other sections, the Plan of Government does recognize
    the role of the City Council as the governing body of the City of
    Baton Rouge.    Compare 
    id. § 11.09
    with 
    id. § 2.01(a).
                    Thus, it
    is clear that if the drafters of the Plan of Government had
    intended for the City Council to play a role in the amendment
    process, they would have done so explicitly.
    Dawson has failed to present any legal authority for his
    contentions, and the plain language of the Plan of Government
    4
    In support of his argument, Dawson cites Liter v. City
    of Baton Rouge, 
    245 So. 2d 398
    (La. 1971), and Lathan v. City of
    Baton Rouge, 
    258 So. 2d 615
    (La. App. 1972). These cases do not
    address the Parish Council’s authority to propose amendments to
    the Plan of Government, nor do they support Dawson’s contention
    that the consent of the City Council is required before such an
    amendment can become effective.
    6
    allows the Parish Council to propose amendments and directs that
    such amendments will become effective if approved by a majority
    of the votes cast in an election open to those eligible to vote
    in East Baton Rouge Parish.    We therefore conclude that Dawson’s
    claim that approval of the City Council was required in order to
    amend the Plan of Government is meritless.
    IV.    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
    district court.
    7