Carranza v. Medellin ( 2001 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-11185
Summary Calendar
ELOY CARRANZA,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
ANTHONY MEDELLIN, Etc; ET AL.,
Respondents,
ANTHONY MEDELLIN, Warden, BSCC Airpark Unit,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 1:00-CV-102
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April 4, 2001
Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Eloy Carranza, federal prisoner # 06541-051, appeals the
denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 federal habeas petition, arguing
that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing his
petition for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies and
that the district court erred in dismissing his claim without
considering his due process, equal protection, and ex post facto
claims. Because Carranza did not follow the proper procedures
for requesting administrative relief, he has not shown that the
district court abused its discretion in dismissing his petition
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 00-11185
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for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Fuller
v. Rich, 11 F.3d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1994). However, because the
district court dismissed the action for the reasons stated in the
respondent’s motion to dismiss, which addressed both failure to
exhaust and the merits of Carranza’s claims, we will address the
merits of Carranza’s claims.
The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) did not violate Carranza’s due
process or equal protection rights in denying him a 12-month
sentence reduction after his completion of a residential drug
treatment program because 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) contains
discretionary language; the BOP’s regulation expressly provides
that inmates subject to Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) detainers are ineligible for such a sentence reduction; and
the BOP’s exclusion of INS detainees from the community-based
portion of the program is rationally related to the legitimate
governmental interest of preventing INS detainees from fleeing.
See Rublee v. Fleming, 160 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1998). The
BOP did not violate Carranza’s rights under the Ex Post Facto
Clause by placing the INS detainer against him after he had
completed the drug program because the INS detainer is not a law
which retroactively placed him at risk of increased punishment
for his conspiracy offense, and the BOP’s determination that he
was not eligible for the community-based portion of the drug
program did not make his sentence more onerous than it was under
the law in effect at the time he committed the conspiracy
offense. See Warren v. Miles, 230 F.3d 688, 692-93 (5th Cir.
2000). The district court did not err in dismissing his petition
No. 00-11185
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without conducting an evidentiary hearing because the record was
sufficient to resolve Carranza’s claims. See Lawrence v.
Lensing, 42 F.3d 255, 259 (5th Cir. 1994).
AFFIRMED.