Robertson v. Bowles ( 2001 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-11102
Summary Calendar
THOMAS S. ROBERTSON,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JIM BOWLES, Dallas County Sheriff,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(3:99-CV-288-T)
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March 26, 2001
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges
PER CURIAM:*
Defendant-Appellant Jim Bowles has appealed the district
court's order denying his motion for summary judgment, asserting
the defense of qualified immunity. We review an order denying
summary judgment de novo, examining the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Abbott v. Equity Group, Inc.,
2 F.3d 613, 618-19 (5th Cir. 1993). The moving party must
establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Campbell v.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Sonat Offshore Drilling, Inc., 979 F.2d 1115, 1119 (5th Cir. 1992);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Our first inquiry in examining a defense of qualified immunity
asserted in a motion for summary judgment is whether the plaintiff
has alleged “the violation of a clearly established constitutional
right.” Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991). We apply
“currently applicable constitutional standards to make this
assessment.” Rankin v. Klevenhagen, 5 F.3d 103, 106 (5th Cir.
1993). Our second inquiry is “whether the defendant’s conduct was
objectively reasonable” in light of the legal rules clearly
established at the time of the incident. Spann v. Rainey, 987 F.2d
1110, 1114 (5th Cir. 1993).
In his complaint, Plaintiff-Appellee Thomas Robertson
contended that he was detained illegally in the Dallas County Jail
for a period of 77 days. Sheriff Bowles responds that Robertson
was detained pursuant to valid legal process. Only illegal
detention of a prisoner in the form of false imprisonment is a
cognizable "constitutional tort" under § 1983. See Sanchez v.
Swyden, 139 F.3d 464, 469 (5th Cir. 1998); Douthit v. Jones, 619
F.2d 527, 532 (5th Cir. 1980).
Sheriff Bowles has not shown that Robertson was held pursuant
to valid legal process. The Sheriff contends that, even if the
subject detention were illegal, he cannot be held responsible for
the actions of his subordinates under a theory of vicarious
liability, and that there is no evidence that he had any subjective
knowledge that Robertson was being illegally detained. "To be
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liable under section 1983, a sheriff must be either personally
involved in the acts causing the deprivation of a person's
constitutional rights, or there must be a causal connection between
an act of the sheriff and the constitutional violation sought to be
redressed." See Lozano v. Smith, 718 F.2d 756, 768 (5th Cir.
1983). "A causal connection may be established . . . where the
sheriff wrongfully breaches an affirmative duty specially imposed
upon him by state law, and as a result thereof, the complained of
constitutional tort occurs." Id. (internal citation omitted;
citing Douthit v. Jones, 641 F.2d 345, 346 (5th Cir. 1981)). As
the law of Texas imposes such a duty on county sheriffs in Texas,
"[a] Texas sheriff can be held liable under section 1983 if his own
sufficiently wrongful failure to supervise the jail causes
constitutional injury." Id. (construing Tex. Rev. Stat. Ann. art.
5116); see Tex. Loc. Gov. Code § 351.041 (West 1999).
A sheriff may satisfy his duty to incarcerate only those
persons whom he has lawful authority to imprison by "adopting
reasonable internal procedures to ensure that only those persons
are incarcerated for whom the sheriff, or the deputy to whom he
delegates such responsibilities, has a good faith belief based upon
objective circumstances that he possesses valid legal authority to
imprison." Douthit, 641 F.2d at 346-47. Sheriff Bowles's
conclusional statement in his affidavit that jail policy requires
that all inmates be detained pursuant to valid legal process is
insufficient to establish that reasonable internal procedures had
been adopted by the Sheriff to prevent persons from being falsely
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imprisoned. See Douthit, 641 F.2d at 347. Accordingly, we agree
with the conclusion of the district court that Sheriff Bowles has
failed to show that he had an objective basis for concluding that
detainees were incarcerated pursuant to valid legal process. As
Sheriff Bowles has failed to show that he is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law, the district court's order denying the motion
for summary judgment is
AFFIRMED.
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