United States v. Shakur ( 2003 )


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  •                                                        United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS             May 29, 2003
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 02-50932
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    KHALEEL NA’IM SHAKUR, also known as
    Khaleel Shakur,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. W-02-CR-66-1
    --------------------
    Before KING, Chief Judge, and DEMOSS and BENAVIDES, Circuit
    Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Khaleel Shakur challenges his guilty-plea conviction and
    sentence for conspiring to make, utter, or possess a counterfeit
    security of an organization.   He asserts for the first time on
    appeal that the factual basis was insufficient to establish that
    he had agreed to join a conspiracy.    He has not shown that the
    district court committed plain error in accepting his guilty
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 02-50932
    -2-
    plea, as Shakur’s admissions establish the elements of a
    conspiracy.     See United States v. Angeles-Mascote, 
    206 F.3d 529
    ,
    530 (5th Cir. 2000).
    Shakur contends, also for the first time on appeal, that
    during his rearraignment proceeding the district court violated
    FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 in three separate instances.   He maintains
    that the court did not explain the nature of the charge to him,
    in violation of FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1); did not adequately
    explain the effect and operation of supervised release, pursuant
    to FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1); and did not ask him whether his
    willingness to plead guilty resulted from discussions between his
    attorney and the Government, pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d).
    He has not established that these omissions constituted plain
    error.   See United States v. Vonn, 
    535 U.S. 55
    , 
    122 S. Ct. 1043
    ,
    1046 (2002).
    Shakur maintains that the district court abused its
    discretion in departing upward at sentencing to impose a sentence
    of 60 months.    The district court concluded that the upward
    departure was warranted based upon the underrepresentation of
    Shakur’s criminal history and the likelihood that he would commit
    more crimes in the future.     See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, p.s.   The
    court’s explanation of its reasons for departure includes an
    implicit explanation for the rejection of intermediate
    categories.     See United States v. Lambert, 
    984 F.2d 658
    , 663 (5th
    Cir. 1993)(en banc).    The degree of the departure was reasonable.
    No. 02-50932
    -3-
    See United States v. Daughenbaugh, 
    49 F.3d 171
    , 174-75 (5th Cir.
    1995).   The district court did not abuse its discretion in
    departing upward.    See United States v. McKenzie, 
    991 F.2d 203
    ,
    204 (5th Cir. 1993).   Consequently, the judgment of the district
    court is AFFIRMED.