United States v. Oveal ( 2003 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-20168
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DELTON JUDE OVEAL,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(H-01-CR-292-1)
_________________________________________________________________
January 22, 2003
Before BARKSDALE, DEMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Delton Oveal appeals his jury conviction for being a felon in
possession of a firearm. He contends: (1) the evidence was
insufficient to support a finding that he possessed the firearm;
(2) the evidence was insufficient to establish that his possession
of the firearm affected interstate commerce and 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1) is an unconstitutional extension of Congress’s Commerce
Clause powers; (3) the district court abused its discretion by not
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
giving Oveal’s requested jury instruction and by instructing the
jury as it did; and (4) his wife’s testimony about her 1990 credit-
card-abuse conviction was erroneously admitted and prejudiced his
defense.
In reviewing an insufficient evidence claim, we must determine
“whether any reasonable trier of fact could have found that the
evidence established guilt of the essential elements of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt”. United States v. Jones, 133 F.3d 358,
362 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1144 (1998). Viewing the
evidence, the inferences therefrom, and credibility determinations
“in the light most favorable to the ... verdict”, see id., there
was sufficient evidence that Oveal knew of the firearm’s presence
in his vehicle and that he had access to the firearm. See United
States v. Ybarra, 70 F.3d 362, 365 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
517 U.S. 1174 (1996); see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
Oveal’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence of the
interstate-commerce element of his offense and to the
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) are without merit. See
United States v. Cavazos, 288 F.3d 706, 712 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 123 S. Ct. 253 (2002); United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d
513, 518 & n.12 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1150(2002).
The refusal to provide a requested jury instruction is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. E.g., United States v.
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Pankhurst, 118 F.3d 345, 350 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S.
1030 (1997). Oveal’s requested jury instruction (concerning effect
of firearm on interstate commerce) was an incorrect statement of
law. See United States v. De Leon, 170 F.3d 494, 499 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 863 (1999). The district court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to give it; nor was there error
with the instruction given to the jury. Id.; Cavazos, 288 F.3d at
712.
There may have been error in the admission of the wife's
testimony about her 1990 conviction. See FED. R. EVID. 609; United
States v. Lopez, 979 F.2d 1024, 1033 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
Ramirez v. United States, 508 U.S. 913 (1993). Oveal was not
prejudiced by the testimony, however; the error was harmless. See
United States v. Williams, 957 F.2d 1238, 1242 (5th Cir. 1992)
(“Unless there is a reasonable possibility that the improperly
admitted evidence contributed to the conviction, reversal is not
required.”) (internal quotations omitted); United States v.
McDonald, 905 F.2d 871, 876 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1002(1990).
AFFIRMED
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