United States v. McQueen ( 1996 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    __________________
    No. 96-40356
    Summary Calendar
    __________________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    WILLIE LELAND McQUEEN, also known as
    Will, and ORLANDO TYRE AUSTIN, also
    known as Lance,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    - - - - - - - - - -
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:95-CR-33-2
    - - - - - - - - - -
    October 23, 1996
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Codefendants-appellants Willie Leland McQueen and Orlando
    Tyre Austin appeal their convictions and sentences for collection
    of extension of credit by extortionate means, possession of
    cocaine base with intent to distribute, and conspiracy to possess
    cocaine base with intent to distribute, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
    § 894 and 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846.    We have reviewed the
    arguments and the record and find no reversible error as to
    * Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule
    47.5.4.
    No. 96-40356
    -2-
    McQueen’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his
    conspiracy conviction.     See United States v. Bermea, 
    30 F.3d 1539
    , 1551 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 
    115 S. Ct. 1113
    (1995);
    United States v. El-Zoubi, 
    993 F.2d 442
    , 445 (5th Cir. 1993).
    The district court did not clearly err in imposing a Sentencing
    Guidelines enhancement based on a finding that the appellants had
    “abducted” one of their victims in committing the collection-of-
    credit offenses.     See United States v. Dumpson, No. 95-50106,
    slip op. at 10 (5th Cir. Oct. 19, 1995) (unpublished); U.S.S.G.
    § 2E2.1(b)(3)(A).    The district court also did not clearly err in
    finding that Austin was a “leader” in the offense and that
    McQueen was a “manager.”     See United States v. Musquiz, 
    45 F.3d 927
    , 932-33 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    116 S. Ct. 54
    (1995);
    U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), (b).    Austin’s contention that the district
    court violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 32 in adopting factual statements
    in his presentence report is meritless.     See United States v.
    Whitlow, 
    979 F.2d 1008
    , 1011 (5th Cir. 1992).    McQueen’s argument
    that the district court issued a jury instruction on the
    collection-of-credit offense that was at variance with, or
    constructively amended, the superseding indictment is also
    without merit.     See United States v. Haymes, 
    610 F.2d 309
    , 310-11
    (5th Cir. 1980).
    Austin’s pro se motion to relieve his appointed appellate
    counsel of his duties is DENIED.
    AFFIRMED.
    No. 96-40356
    -3-