Miller v. Southwestern Bell ( 2002 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    ____________________
    No. 01-21318
    Summary Calendar
    ____________________
    MICHAEL L. MILLER,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY,
    Defendant-Appellee
    _________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    No. H-00-1869
    _________________________________________________________________
    October 7, 2002
    Before KING, Chief Judge, and WIENER and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Plaintiff-Appellant Michael L. Miller appeals from the
    district court’s decision granting summary judgment to Defendant-
    Appellee Southwestern Bell Telephone Company (“SWBT”) on Miller’s
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
    47.5.4.
    claims for disability discrimination and retaliation under the
    Americans with Disabilities Act, 
    42 U.S.C. § 12101
     (1994) (“the
    ADA”).   For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the district
    court’s grant of summary judgment to SWBT.
    I.   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Plaintiff-Appellant Miller is a fifty-three year-old male
    who has been employed by SWBT since 1974.    Miller began his
    career at SWBT as a cable splicer’s helper and, by 1998, had
    advanced within the company ranks to the position of customer
    service technician, or “CST.”    Also by 1998, Miller had developed
    a condition called spondylolisthesis, which is the displacement
    of vertebrae, as well as arthritis in both of his knees.    In
    addition to these maladies, Miller suffered from a heart
    condition that required surgery in 1994, 1996, and 1998.
    While working at SWBT, Miller received disciplinary action
    from his employer on several occasions.    On January 11, 1993,
    SWBT suspended Miller for one day, with pay, for shopping at an
    Academy Store during a period of time in which he should have
    been working.   In May 1997, SWBT gave Miller a written reprimand
    for failing to allot the actual amount of time he worked on his
    time report.
    The record indicates that Miller’s case of spondylolisthesis
    and arthritis of the knees did not impede his ability to perform
    in his occupational capacity at SWBT.    After undergoing heart
    2
    surgery, Miller returned to his CST position in September 1998.
    Following his return to work, Miller’s physician provided Dale
    Dugas, Miller’s immediate supervisor, a written note indicating
    the limitations of Miller’s post-operation work schedule.
    According to physician’s orders, Miller was permitted to work
    forty hours per week plus ten hours of overtime without physical
    restriction, but only under the condition that Miller received
    two consecutive days off per week.    When Miller initially
    returned to work, Dugas scheduled Miller to work six days
    (excluding Sundays), but altered the schedule to allow him to
    work no longer than fifty hours with two consecutive days off per
    week.   Miller concedes that SWBT fully accommodated the
    physician’s proposed work schedule.
    On November 10, 1998, SWBT fired Miller for misrepresenting
    his time reports because, according to SWBT, he indicated on his
    reports that he performed work that he never performed.    SWBT
    eventually replaced Miller with a fifty-six year-old male.
    Miller maintains that he did not falsify his time report on
    September 21, 1998, but instead designated the time taken for
    travel, cleaning, and gassing his vehicle, on his time report.
    On October 21, 1999, Miller filed a charge with the Equal
    Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), claiming that he was
    discriminated against on account of his age and disability.
    Miller received a right to sue letter from the EEOC on April 20,
    2000.   Miller filed the instant action in the United States
    3
    District Court for the Southern District of Texas on June 5,
    2000, alleging, inter alia, (1) that SWBT violated the Age
    Discrimination in Employment Act, 
    29 U.S.C. § 621
     et seq.(1994)
    (“ADEA”) because age was a motivating factor and made a
    difference in the decision to replace Miller with a person that
    was younger and less-qualified; (2) that SWBT violated the ADA by
    discriminating against and treating Miller in a light less
    favorable than its non-disabled workers; (3) that SWBT retaliated
    against Miller because he had informed SWBT of his disability and
    asserted his rights under the ADA; (4) that SWBT acted
    intentionally or with reckless disregard to cause Miller severe
    emotional distress; and (5) that Miller violated the Fair Labor
    Standards Act, 
    29 U.S.C. § 201
     et seq. (1994) (“FLSA”).
    In response to Miller’s complaint, SWBT moved for summary
    judgment on August 31, 2001, arguing (1) that Miller’s ADA and
    ADEA claims should be dismissed because he could not establish a
    prima facie case of discrimination; (2) that SWBT had provided a
    legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for dismissing Miller; and
    (3) that Miller could not show that SWBT’s legitimate, non-
    discriminatory reason for his dismissal was a pretext for
    discrimination.   SWBT also urged summary judgment on Miller’s
    infliction of emotional distress claims, asserting that he could
    not provide evidence of either severe emotional distress or
    intentional or reckless conduct.
    4
    In its Memorandum and Order of October 22, 2001, the
    district court awarded summary judgment in favor of SWBT on all
    claims, finding that Miller had not demonstrated a prima facie
    case of discrimination or retaliation under either the ADA or the
    AEDA, and that he had failed to adduce evidence of extreme and
    outrageous conduct supporting the intentional infliction of
    emotional distress or FLSA claims.     The district court then
    dismissed Miller’s case with prejudice.
    Miller timely appeals the district court’s grant of summary
    judgment on his disability discrimination and retaliation claims
    under the ADA.1
    II.   STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
    SWBT de novo, applying the same standards as the district court.
    Rivers v. Cent. & S.W. Corp., 
    186 F.3d 681
    , 683 (5th Cir. 1999).
    Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine issue of material
    fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
    matter of law.    See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).   A factual dispute is
    genuine when a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
    1
    This court need not address whether plaintiff raised a
    genuine issue of material fact regarding his claims for
    discrimination under the ADEA, infliction of emotional distress,
    and violation of the FLSA. Miller waived review of these issues
    by not incorporating them into the Argument of his Brief. See,
    e.g., Sherrod v. Am. Airlines, 
    132 F.3d 1112
    , 1119 n.5 (5th Cir.
    1998) (citing cases and FED. R. APP. P. 28).
    5
    non-moving party.    Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    ,
    248 (1986).
    The substantive law dictates which facts are material,
    Stewart v. Murphy, 
    174 F.3d 530
    , 533 (5th Cir. 1999), and an
    issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of
    the action,   Anderson, 
    477 U.S. at 248
    .    Moreover, in summary
    judgment proceedings, the record is considered in the light most
    favorable to the non-moving party.     Dupre v. Charter Behav.
    Health Sys. of Lafayette, Inc., 
    242 F.3d 610
    , 613 (5th Cir. 2001)
    (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
    475 U.S. 574
    , 587-66 (1986).    Summary judgment is ultimately
    appropriate if the non-movant fails to establish facts supporting
    an essential element of his prima facie claim.     Mason v. United
    Air Lines, 
    274 F.3d 314
    , 316 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Celotex
    Corp. v. Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 322 (1986)).
    III. MILLER’S ADA CLAIM BASED ON REGARDED DISABILITY
    The ADA prohibits discrimination by private employers
    against any qualified individual with a disability.     See, e.g.,
    Dupre, 
    242 F.3d at 613
    .    When claiming discrimination based on
    disability, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) he was disabled;
    (2) he was none-the-less qualified to do the job; (3) an adverse
    employment action was taken against him; and (4) that he was
    replaced by or treated less favorably than non-disabled
    employees.    E.g., 
    id.
       If a plaintiff can assert a prima facie
    6
    case for disability discrimination, the burden shifts to the
    employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
    for the adverse employment action; should the employer succeed in
    doing so, the burden the shifts back to the plaintiff to
    establish that the articulated reason was merely a pretext for
    discrimination.   McInnis v. Alamo Cmty. Coll. Dist., 
    207 F.3d 276
    , 282 (5th Cir. 2000).
    An individual qualifies as disabled under the ADA if he
    demonstrates: (1) he has a physical or mental impairment that
    substantially limited one or more of his major life activities;
    (2) he has a record of such impairment; or (3) he is regarded as
    having such an impairment.   E.g., Aldrup v. Caldera, 
    274 F.3d 282
    , 286 (5th Cir. 2001); McInnis, 
    207 F.3d at 279-80
    .
    When asserting a regarded disability, a plaintiff such as
    Miller is required to demonstrate that his employer mistakenly
    believed that either (1) he had a physical impairment that
    substantially limited one or more major life activities; or (2)
    he had an actual, non-limiting impairment that substantially
    limits one or more major life activities.   Aldrup, 
    274 F.3d at
    287 (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, 
    527 U.S. 471
    , 489
    (1999)).   Under each of these scenarios, an employer must
    “entertain some misperception regarding the individual—either
    that he has a substantially limiting impairment that he does not
    have or the impairment is not so limiting as believed.”      
    Id.
    7
    On appeal, Miller insists that his employer regarded him as
    suffering a physical impairment that substantially limited a
    major life activity.2   Hence, the key inquiry is whether SWBT
    mistakenly perceived that Miller had an impairment that
    substantially limited his major life activity of “working.”3     The
    Supreme Court recently reemphasized that when working is the
    major life activity under consideration, the statutory phrase
    “substantially limits” requires a plaintiff to allege that he was
    unable to work in a broad range or class of jobs, rather than one
    specific job.   Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 
    534 U.S. 184
    , - - -, 
    122 S. Ct. 681
    , 692 (2002) (quoting Sutton, 
    527 U.S. at 491
    ).   Combining the relevant analytical criteria yields the
    following standard, which is directly applicable to the instant
    case: To demonstrate that SWBT regarded him as disabled, Miller
    must produce evidence that SWBT mistakenly believed that he had
    2
    Miller does not argue that SWBT had the mistaken
    perception that he had a substantial, non-limiting impairment.
    3
    The Supreme Court has defined major life activity as
    those activities that are “of central importance to daily life.”
    Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 
    534 U.S. 184
    , - - -,
    
    122 S. Ct. 681
    , 691 (2002). Examples of major life activities
    include speaking, breathing, learning, and working. E.g.,
    Aldrup, 
    274 F.3d at 286
    . Throughout this litigation, Miller has
    asserted only that his major life activity of working has been
    implicated. Had Miller asserted another major life activity, the
    analysis on substantial limitation would be drastically
    different. Williams, 
    122 S. Ct. at 693
    . (“Sutton did not suggest
    that a class-based analysis should be applied to any major life
    activity other than working.”).
    8
    an impairment that made him unable to work in a broad class or
    range of jobs, as opposed to one specific job.
    In granting summary judgment to SWBT, the district court
    determined that Miller had not met the requirements for being
    regarded as having a disability.       The trial court found that
    Miller had not offered sufficient evidence to raise any inference
    that SWBT believed that Miller’s impairments would substantially
    limit him in the major life activity of working.       This precluded
    Miller from successfully asserting his prima facie case for
    disability discrimination.   The court also concluded that even
    had Miller established a prima facie case, he still would not
    have been able to advance a viable claim that SWBT’s legitimate,
    non-discriminatory reason was a mere pretext for discrimination.
    We find it unnecessary to discuss whether SWBT’s proffered reason
    was nondiscriminatory because it is quite clear that Miller did
    not fulfill his initial burden of meeting his prima facie case
    for disability discrimination.
    Miller asserts that he can fulfill his summary judgment
    burden by demonstrating that SWBT did regard him as being
    disabled prior to his termination.4      He offers the following
    4
    In his Brief, Miller asserts that he can “clearly meet
    at least two” of the factors, i.e., that he had a substantially
    limiting physical impairment (actually disabled) and that he was
    regarded as such, that would qualify him as disabled. However,
    he offers no real support for this contention. The district
    court recognized that Miller did not contend that he was actually
    disabled, but only that SWBT regarded him as disabled, and
    therefore did not rule on the actual disability. Further, on
    9
    arguments for consideration: that it was only after he returned
    from six-week disability leave that SWBT began the process of
    dismissing him; that he was substantially limited because he was
    restricted as to the duration he could work under the physician’s
    orders, and his work schedule was thus cut from eighty-four hours
    per week to fifty; and that three weeks afer his return from
    disability leave, upon his request for rest and medication, he
    was suspended and then fired.
    On the other hand, SWBT contends that the summary judgment
    evidence established that SWBT did not regard Miller as having an
    impairment that substantially limited a major life activity.
    SWBT also asserts that an employer should not be held liable
    under the ADA for “regarding” an individual with having a
    disability where the employer merely relies upon restrictions
    placed upon the employee by the employer.   It argues further that
    Miller was allowed to work as a fully functioning CST without any
    restrictions beyond those prescribed by his doctor.
    Viewing any factual disputes in the light most favorable to
    the nonmoving party, we will assume that all of Miller’s
    appeal, Miller states that he “may have had no impairment at all
    but Defendant treated him as having a substantial limiting
    impairment.” Given this statement, it appears that Miller is not
    taking his claim of actual disability very seriously; but in the
    unlikely circumstance that he were, this argument cannot be
    asserted for the first time on appeal since Miller’s initial
    argument on the issue was insufficient for the district court to
    rule on it. See, e.g., Brown v. Ames, 
    201 F.3d 654
    , 663 (5th
    Cir. 2000).
    10
    allegations are true.   However, even in the light most favorable
    to him, Miller’s contentions fall short of raising a genuine
    issue of fact.   Initially, Miller fails to adduce evidence to
    support a claim that SWBT believed that he was unable to
    participate in a broad range of jobs.   He does not even appear to
    introduce evidence that SWBT believed that he was unable to
    participate in one specific job, as he was allowed to continue
    working as a CST subsequent to his return from disability leave.
    Moreover, Miller’s supervisor Dugas testified that it was his
    understanding that Miller had difficulty with his knees if he
    squatted for too long and his back hurt if he sat for long
    periods of time.   Miller does not dispute the additional
    testimony in which Dugas indicated that these kinds of complaints
    were not unusual from members on his crew, and therefore he did
    not perceive these physical ailments as significantly limiting.
    The fact that Miller was terminated weeks after his return
    and that he was suspended after his request for rest and
    medication does not sufficiently establish that SWBT believed
    that he was unable to work a broad range of jobs.   While his
    termination may (merely in a circumstantial sense) indicate that
    SWBT believed that he was unable to be employed as a CST, this
    does not sufficiently raise a genuine issue as to whether SWBT
    believed that Miller was unable to work in a range of
    occupational positions.   See Dupre, 
    242 F.3d at 616
     (denying
    plaintiff’s regarded disability claim even though defendant fired
    11
    plaintiff because “an employer does not necessarily regard an
    employee as having a substantially limiting impairment simply
    because it believes the employee is incapable of performing a
    particular job”).
    Miller’s assertion that he suffered a substantial limitation
    on his ability to work because instead of laboring for his usual
    eighty-four hour week, he had to work fifty, is equally
    problematic.    When evaluating the traditional forty-hour work
    week, courts have determined that the inability to work overtime
    is not a substantial limitation on the ability to work under the
    ADA.    E.g., Cotter v. Ajilon Servs., Inc., 
    287 F.3d 593
    , 598-99
    (6th Cir. 2002) (citing cases); see also Brennan v. Nat’l Tel.
    Directory Corp., 
    850 F. Supp. 331
    , 343 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (“The
    inability to work overtime hardly makes a plaintiff
    handicapped.”).    In addition, this argument does not address the
    critical issue of whether Miller’s supervisors regarded him as
    being unable to work a broad range of jobs.    Indeed, the
    uncontroverted evidence indicates that Miller’s supervisor
    believed that he could and would, despite his physician’s
    directions, exceed his allotted work time.
    Further, SWBT cannot be considered to have regarded Miller
    as being disabled simply because of its receipt of the note from
    Miller’s physician.    Significantly, Miller forgets that the
    standard for regarded disability hinges on the mistaken belief of
    impairment.    “[I]f the employer’s belief [about the employee’s
    12
    condition] corresponds to the employee’s or his physician’s
    description of his limitations, the employer cannot be viewed as
    improperly regarding him as disabled.”   Eber v. Harris County
    Hosp. Dist., 
    130 F. Supp. 2d 847
    , 863 (S.D. Tex. 2001).   Even
    assuming arguendo that this evidence satisfactorily raises the
    issue of SWBT’s belief of his impairment, Miller’s introduction
    of the doctor’s note is ultimately counterproductive to his cause
    because it suggests that SWBT was correct, i.e., not mistaken, to
    assume some sort of impairment.
    Because Miller has not demonstrated that SWBT regarded his
    physical condition to substantially limit his ability to perform
    the major life activity of working during his tenure at SWBT, a
    reasonable jury could not find that he was qualifiedly disabled.
    Miller’s failure to introduce facts supporting this essential
    element of his prima facie claim of disability discrimination
    indicates that the trial court acted properly in granting summary
    judgment to SWBT on Miller’s claim of disability discrimination.
    IV.   MILLER’S CLAIMS BASED ON RETALIATION
    Miller also asserts that he suffered unlawful retaliation
    for participating in an act protected by the ADA.   On this claim,
    we find it important to delve into issues that are more
    procedural in nature than those discussed by the district court.
    SWBT has asserted both at the trial level and on appeal that
    Miller failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to his
    13
    claim for retaliation.   Throughout the course of this litigation,
    Miller, for reasons unknown to this court, has completely
    disregarded this line of argument.   Miller’s failure to
    articulate some modicum of rebuttal argument on this point proves
    injurious to his cause, as the failure to exhaust administrative
    remedies serves as an independent basis to affirm summary
    judgment.   See Randel v. United States Dep’t of Navy, 
    157 F.3d 392
    , 395 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that a plaintiff asserting
    racial discrimination must exhaust his administrative remedies on
    the claim before seeking review in federal court).
    The trial court did not rule on this issue, instead opting
    to evaluate the substantive requirements of Miller’s retaliation
    claims, concluding eventually that he failed to raise a genuine
    issue of material fact on one element of his prima facie case.
    Since we conclude that the district court lacked jurisdiction to
    consider Miller’s retaliation claim on the merits, we need not
    address the merits.
    The jurisdictional problem here relates to the fact that in
    the charge Miller filed with the EEOC, he did not check the box
    corresponding with “retaliation,” but did so for “age” and
    “disability.”   From a procedural standpoint, SWBT argues, Miller
    only properly raised allegations of intentional discrimination
    under the ADA and the ADEA.   Citing a number of cases, SWBT
    asserts that because the alleged retaliation in the instant case
    occurred before Miller filed the initial EEOC charge, Miller
    14
    should have exhausted his administrative remedies on that claim
    prior to filing.
    Given this argument, directly at issue is whether Miller’s
    failure to fill in the appropriate box for retaliation, when he
    already marked the box for disability and age discrimination,
    compels the conclusion that he failed to exhaust his
    administrative remedies before filing a lawsuit under the ADA.      A
    review of this case using the same standards as the lower court
    produces the same exact outcome, but on a dissimilar basis:
    Summary judgment is appropriate because Miller failed to exhaust
    his administrative remedies on his claim for retaliation.
    There are several reasons why we believe this the correct
    outcome in this matter.   First, the federal anti-discrimination
    statutes, most notably, Title VII have consistently required
    claimants to fill in the appropriate corresponding boxes when
    filing their claim for unlawful employment action.     See, e.g.,
    Price v. Harrah’s Md. Heights Operating Co., 
    117 F. Supp. 2d 919
    ,
    921-22 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (granting summary judgment on failure to
    exhaust administrative remedies grounds for employer because
    plaintiff did not check the box for retaliation and did not
    specifically allege retaliation in the text of the charge);
    McCray v. DPC Indus., Inc., 
    942 F. Supp. 288
    , 294 (E.D. Tex.
    1996) (informing that when asserting a claim for discrimination
    under Title VII, it is necessary for the appropriate box be
    15
    checked in the EEOC claim).5      By simply checking the box
    corresponding to the alleged basis for unlawful employment
    action, a plaintiff sufficiently exhausts his administrative
    remedies prior to a Title VII lawsuit.       See, e.g., 
    id.
    Second, the same procedural requirements for Title VII have
    been interpreted to apply to EEOC charges filed under the ADA as
    well.       This court has also held that the ADA incorporates by
    reference the administrative procedural requisites found in Title
    VII,       Dao v. Auchan Hypermarket, 
    96 F.3d 787
    , 789 (5th Cir.
    1996), and that adherence to these prerequisites is necessary
    prior to commencing an ADA action in federal court against an
    employer, 
    id.
           Although this court has not addressed the issue of
    whether an ADA case cab be dismissed for failure to fill in the
    appropriate box, other courts encountering this issue support the
    granting of summary judgment.       See, e.g., Talbot v. U.S.
    Foodservice, Inc., 
    191 F. Supp. 2d 637
    , 640 (D. Md. 2002) (“Where
    a litigant has neither checked the box for discrimination, nor
    mentioned disability discrimination or the ADA anywhere in his
    5
    It is well-established that summary judgment may be
    granted against a non-movant solely on the basis of failure to
    exhaust administrative remedies. E.g., Inst. for Tech. Dev. v.
    Brown, 
    63 F.3d 445
    , 447 (5th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court has
    held that a plaintiff may not bring claims in a lawsuit that were
    not included in the filed EEOC charge. Alexander v. Gardner-
    Denver Co., 
    415 U.S. 36
    , 47 (1974). This requirement serves to
    enhance the administrative enforcement process by ensuring that
    the EEOC can conduct a full investigation while also providing
    the employer with advanced notice of the claim and an opportunity
    to resolve the dispute. See Harper v. Godfrey Co., 
    45 F.3d 143
    ,
    148 (7th Cir. 1995).
    16
    charge of discrimination, the EEOC cannot reasonably have been
    expected to have investigated disability discrimination.”); cases
    cited infra.   Hence, the “box filling” requirement cited by SWBT
    appears to arise in the ADA context as well as the Title VII
    context.
    Third, one of our sister circuits has indicated that in the
    ADA context, a plaintiff’s failure to fill in the appropriate box
    in the filed charge, coupled with the inability to describe the
    general nature of the claim in the narrative section of the
    charge, forms a sufficient basis for summary judgment.      The
    Seventh Circuit decided that when a plaintiff fails to mark the
    appropriate box for “retaliation” but continues to seek relief
    for disability discrimination and retaliation, the plaintiff has
    nevertheless failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to
    the retaliation claim.     Cable v. Ivy Tech State College, 
    200 F.3d 467
    , 477 (7th Cir. 1999).6    The Cable court observed that the
    body of the plaintiff’s EEOC charge did not even “hint at
    retaliation, much less develop [a] factual basis for the claim.”
    
    Id.
       Even when viewed in the light most favorable to the
    plaintiff, the statement of discrimination did not implicate the
    behavior that plaintiff asserted to be the basis of his
    retaliation claim.   
    Id.
       The Seventh Circuit deemed the
    6
    In his EEOC charge, Cable checked the “Other” box only,
    but did not write in the narrative portion of the claim that he
    was discriminated against on the basis of his disability.
    17
    plaintiff’s narrative to have given insufficient indication to
    the EEOC or the employer that he was also seeking redress for
    unlawful retaliation.       
    Id.
    In affirming summary judgment on plaintiff’s retaliation
    claim, the Cable court found that there was no indication from
    the EEOC charge boxes, narrative, or supplemental material that
    the plaintiff sought redress for the retaliation claim, or even,
    for the matter, that the alleged retaliation “was like or
    reasonably related to” his statutory rights stemming from the
    ADA.       Id.; see also Thompson v. KN Energy, Inc., 
    177 F. Supp. 2d 1238
    , 1254-55 (D. Kan. 2001) (granting summary judgment against
    plaintiff for failing to exhaust administrative remedies under
    the ADA when marked boxes for “sex” and “disability” but not
    “retaliation”).      The similarity between Cable and the instant
    case is marked, particularly with the absence of narrative or
    other supplemental EEOC materials indicating that Miller was
    seeking redress for unlawful retaliation.       The information, or
    lack thereof,7 included on Miller’s filed EEOC charge creates a
    7
    The entirety of Miller’s narrative reads as follows:
    I.     On or about November 10, 1998, I was discharged
    from the position of Customer Services Technician.
    Respondent is public telephone system.
    II.    On or about November 10, 1998, Ernie Carey,
    Division Manager, Installation and Repair,
    informed me that I was discharged for allegedly
    falsifying a time report and a form called 6218,
    trouble ticket.
    18
    strong presumption in favor of a finding of failure to exhaust
    administrative remedies.
    Further compounding the difficulty for Miller is the timing
    of the alleged retaliation and his filing of the complaint.
    Miller would be able to file a supplemental or additional charge
    if the retaliation claim, in the parlance of this court, “grow[s]
    out” of his claims for disability.    Gupta v. E. Tex. State Univ.,
    
    654 F.2d 411
    , 414 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981).   SWBT is correct
    to emphasize that the alleged adverse employment action prompting
    Miller’s claim for retaliation occurred prior to the filing of
    his discrimination charge.   Since the alleged retaliation
    occurred prior to his filing of the complaint, Miller was well
    aware of the conduct and actions that would give rise to his
    claim of retaliation under the ADA.   Given these factual
    circumstances, Miller’s retaliation cause of action would not
    fall under the Gupta exception; thus he is precluded from filing
    a new EEOC charge based on disability. See 
    id.
    Despite the trial court’s disregard of this issue, SWBT
    persisted in its failure to exhaust administrative remedies
    argument.   This court concludes that because Miller did not check
    III.    I believe that I was discriminated against because
    of my age, 48, in violation of the Age
    Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.
    Worth noting is that there was no continuation sheet for this
    narrative filed, nor a supplemental document of any kind in the
    trial record.
    19
    the check the correct box on the EEOC complaint form or otherwise
    disclose his retaliation claim and thereby exhaust its
    administrative remedies, he is procedurally precluded from
    asserting a retaliation claim under the ADA.
    V.   CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
    district court.
    20