Couch v. Clayton Williams ( 2002 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
__________________________
Case No. 01-50245
__________________________
IRENE COUCH
Plaintiff - Counter Defendant - Appellant - Cross-Appellee,
THE ALLAR COMPANY
Intervenor - Plaintiff - Counter Defendant - Appellant -
Cross-Appellee
v.
CLAYTON WILLIAMS ENERGY, INC. ET AL
Defendants
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK, OF DALLAS
Defendant - Counter Claimant - Appellee - Cross-Appellant
___________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
(W-00-CV-92)
___________________________________________________
October 23, 2002
Before KING, Chief Judge, and JONES and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM*:
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
1
This case centers on a dispute regarding ownership of the
mineral estate of property known as the “Scott Place,” in Robertson
County, Texas. On January 27, 1925, H.G. Easterwood granted the
mineral estate of the Scott Place to Defendant Federal Reserve Bank
of Dallas (“FRBD”). On January 28, 1925, Lillie Easterwood granted
the surface estate of the Scott Place to the Sanger Brothers.
Then, on February 16, 1925, H.G. Easterwood granted all of his
right, title and interest in the Scott Place to the Sanger
Brothers.2
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
2
The Sanger Brothers' deed provides, in relevant part:
[H.G. Easterwood] . . ., for and in
consideration of the sum of One Dollar, to us
in hand paid by Sanger Bros., . . . and for
the further consideration of perfecting title
to the hereinafter described property, which
is conveyed by deed executed by Lillie I.
Easterwood, a feme sole, to said Sanger
Bros., do, by these presents[,] Bargain,
Sell, Release and Forever Quit-Claim unto the
said Sanger Bros., its successors and
assigns, all of our right, title and interest
in and to that certain tract or parcel of
land . . . .
Defendant–Appellee’s Record Excerpts at Tab 5 (emphasis added).
The Sanger Brothers' deed concludes with the following habendum
clause:
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises,
together with all and singular the rights,
privileges and appurtenances thereto in any
manner belonging unto the said Sanger Bros.,
its successors and assigns forever, so that
neither the said grantors herein, nor their
heirs, nor any person or persons claiming
under them or either of them shall at any
2
For the reasons stated in the district court’s Memorandum
Opinion and Order, Couch v. Clayton Williams Energy, Inc., No. W-
OO-CA-092, slip op. at 10-11 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 2001), the
quitclaim deed at issue did not operate to cut off FRBD’s mineral
interest evidenced by a subsequently recorded deed.3 A quitclaim
deed simply cannot support the claim of a bona fide purchaser
except to the extent of the grantor’s interest in the property.4
Here, when H.G. Easterwood granted, by quitclaim deed, the mineral
estate to the Sanger Brothers, The Allar Company’s predecessor in
title, he did not have a mineral estate in the Scott Place to grant
time hereafter have claim or demand any right
of title to the aforesaid premises or
appurtenances, or any part thereof.
Id.
3
The district court correctly characterized this deed as
a quitclaim deed. See, e.g., Threadgill v. Bickerstaff, 29 S.W.
757, 759 (Tex. 1895)(interpreting language that is virtually
identical to the language in the Sanger Brothers’ deed to signal
a quitclaim deed); Porter v. Wilson, 389 S.W.2d 650, 654-57 (Tex.
1965); Simonds v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 114 S.W.2d 226, 234-35
(Tex. 1938); Straus v. Shamblin, 120 S.W.2d 598, 600-01 (Tex.
Civ. App.–Amarillo 1938, writ dism’d w.o.j.).
4
See Taylor v. Harrison, 47 Tex. 454 (1877) (concluding
that a purchaser of a quitclaim deed is not a “subsequent
purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice,” as
required by the Texas recording statute, and, thus, a quitclaim
deed cannot protect the grantee against unrecorded deeds executed
by the grantor); Wallace v. Crow, 1 S.W. 372, 374 (Tex. 1886)
(holding that a purchaser who receives a quitclaim deed is
presumed to take the property with notice of defects in the
title); Threadgill v. Bickerstaff, 29 S.W. 757, 759 (Tex. 1895)
(stating that purchaser of a quitclaim deed takes with
constructive notice of any unrecorded deed under which another
party claims title to the property).
3
because he had previously granted the mineral estate to FRBD.
We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.
4