U.S. v. Thomas ( 1992 )


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  •                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 91-8581
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    ROBERT BRUCE THOMAS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    For the Western District of Texas
    ( June 2, 1992)
    Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, SMITH and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
    POLITZ, Chief Judge:
    Having pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute
    marihuana, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and money-laundering, 18 U.S.C.
    §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), 2, and sentenced to concurrent 72-month and
    60-month terms followed by three years supervised release, Robert
    Bruce Thomas appeals his sentence, contending that the district
    court erred in calculating his base offense level and by refusing
    to decrease his offense level for minor or minimal participation.
    Finding no error, we affirm.
    Background
    Thomas was charged in three counts of a 44-count indictment
    involving 29 defendants accused of operating an international drug
    ring.   Pursuant to a plea agreement he entered guilty pleas to
    possession     with   intent      to     distribute     marihuana       and   money-
    laundering.      The charges were based on his involvement in a
    45-kilogram     marihuana      transaction.           The   presentence        report
    recommended, however, that Thomas's sentencing level be calculated
    using the l50 kilograms of cocaine equivalency attributed to the
    full conspiracy.       Thomas objected and argued at the sentencing
    hearing that his involvement was limited to the single marihuana
    transaction and was minimal or minor.             U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.       The court
    granted a two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility but
    declined to     decrease    the     offense    level    for     minor   or    minimal
    participation.        The   court      found   that    Thomas    was    an    average
    participant.     Refusing to impute the entire drug ring volume to
    Thomas, the court estimated that the amount of drug activity
    reasonably foreseeable by Thomas was double the amount of his
    45-kilogram marihuana transaction, thus placing him at the level of
    80 to 100 kilograms of marihuana. He was sentenced accordingly and
    timely appealed.
    Analysis
    2
    Thomas's challenge to the district court's application of the
    sentencing guidelines is reviewed de novo.                    United States v.
    Glavan-Revuelta, 
    958 F.2d 66
    (5th Cir. 1992).                The court's factual
    findings in sentencing are reviewed under the clearly erroneous
    standard.     United States v. Lokey, 
    945 F.2d 825
    (5th Cir. 1991).
    Our review requires that we determine from the record whether the
    sentence "(1) was imposed in violation of law; (2) was imposed as
    a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines;
    or (3) is outside the applicable guideline range. . . ."                   18 U.S.C.
    § 3742(e).
    Thomas    maintains    that    his      base   offense    level      should    be
    determined    including    only    the    amount     involved      in    the   single
    transaction for which he pleaded guilty.                 In controlled substance
    convictions, however, the sentence is based not only on the amount
    involved in the offense for which the defendant was convicted, but
    also on the contraband involved in "acts . . . that were part of
    the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense
    of conviction."      U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2).                Conspirators may be
    sentenced on the basis of the conduct of coconspirators taken in
    furtherance    of   the   conspiracy         if   that   conduct   was     known    or
    reasonably foreseeable.        U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 comment (n.1).                     The
    sentencing court is to make an approximation of the controlled
    substance reasonably foreseeable by the defendant.                      See U.S.S.G.
    § 2D1.4 comment (n.2); United States v. Puma, 
    937 F.2d 151
    (5th
    3
    Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 
    112 S. Ct. 1165
    (1992).1            In arriving at
    this estimate the court may consider any information that has
    "sufficient   indicia    of   reliability     to   support    its    probable
    accuracy."    U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3, p.s.; United States v. Angulo, 
    927 F.2d 202
    (5th Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Singleton, 
    946 F.2d 23
    (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 
    112 S. Ct. 1231
    (1992)
    (hearsay expressly sanctioned).
    The court a`` quo considered the factual resume of the guilty
    plea and the presentence report.        Drug trade ledgers reflect that
    Thomas was assigned a code number and had bought substantial
    quantities of cocaine over a period of time.                 Regarding the
    money-laundering count, Thomas used the $20,000 he received to
    purchase more marihuana. The district court's quantitative finding
    in the instant case is not clearly erroneous.          We previously have
    observed   that   an   individual   dealing   in   a   sizable      amount   of
    controlled substances ordinarily would be presumed to recognize
    that the drug organization with which he deals extends beyond his
    universe of involvement.      United States v. Devine, 
    934 F.2d 1325
    (5th Cir. 1991).
    Thomas also contends that he is entitled to a decrease in his
    offense level computation for his minor or minimal participation in
    1
    Section 2D1.1 is the guideline applicable to Thomas's
    conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). The comments to this section
    direct that "[i]f the amount seized does not reflect the scale of
    the offense, see Application Note 2 of the Commentary to § 2D1.4."
    U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 comment (n.12). See United States v. Angulo, 
    927 F.2d 202
    (5th Cir. 1991) (outlining the application of the
    guideline provisions).
    4
    the     conspiracy     because     the       volume    of     controlled    substance
    attributed to him was a small fraction of the operation's total
    drug trade and because others with whom he worked had more active
    roles.     See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.             A minimal participant is "plainly
    among the least culpable of those involved in the conduct of the
    group."     U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 comment (n.1).                  "[A] minor participant
    means    any   participant       who    is    less    culpable    than     most   other
    participants, but whose role could not be described as minimal."
    U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 comment (n.3).                  Even if other codefendants were
    more culpable, that does not automatically qualify Thomas for
    either    minor   or    minimal        status.        Each    participant    must    be
    separately assessed.        See United States v. Mueller, 
    902 F.2d 336
    (5th Cir. 1990).       A defendant's participation is not minor unless
    he is "substantially less culpable than the average participant."
    U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 comment (n.3).
    We are not persuaded that either classification applies to
    Thomas. He had been selling large amounts of controlled substances
    to the conspiracy leader for several years and regularly appeared
    on the drug-trade ledgers along with the other distributors.                        The
    record contains ample support for the court's factual finding that
    Thomas was an average participant.                    We will not disturb that
    finding.
    For the reasons assigned, the decision of the district court
    is AFFIRMED.
    5