Li v. Agagan ( 2006 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
March 14, 2006
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
)))))))))))))))))))))))))) Clerk
No. 04-40705
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GUANG QIU LI,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
CONRAD AGAGAN, ET AL.,
Respondents-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 5:04-CV-28
Before JONES, Chief Judge, and WIENER and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:1
Petitioner Guang Qiu Li appeals the district court’s dismissal
of his petition for writ of habeas corpus and his requests for
injunctive relief and mandamus. Because we find that the district
court lacked jurisdiction to hear any of Appellant’s claims, we
VACATE and DISMISS.
1
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
I. Background
In 1989, Li, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of
China, entered the United States. Although Appellant applied for
political asylum in 1996, because the application was withdrawn, the
Immigration Court allowed him to depart voluntarily before April 26,
1998.
On January 15, 1998, Appellant married Chui Fong Chan, a
permanent resident of the United States, who became a citizen in
November 1998. On March 5, 1998, Chan filed a Petition for Alien
Relative. In light of this petition, Appellant requested an
extension of his voluntary departure date. The Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) District Director denied his request.
Because Appellant failed to depart the United States prior to
April 26, 1998, his voluntary departure order was transformed into
an order of deportation. On April 28, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”)
denied as untimely Appellant’s request to reopen his immigration
proceedings.
After Chan’s Petition for Alien Relative was approved,
Appellant filed an application to adjust his status to that of a
lawful permanent resident on June 30, 1999, which is still pending.
On September 17, 1999, an IJ denied Appellant’s second motion to
reopen his immigration proceedings.
In December 2003, ICE took Appellant into custody. Appellant
requested a stay of deportation which was denied by an ICE officer
on February 4, 1999. Appellant remains in ICE custody and has not
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been deported because he is currently awaiting a travel document.
In the district court, Appellant sought to enjoin his
deportation until his attorney could obtain a response to his
Freedom Of Information Act request to complete an investigation into
the effectiveness of the lawyer who handled his 1996 asylum
petition. Appellant also sought release from detention and work
authorization while his claims were pending. Finally Appellant
asked the court to either adjudicate his application for adjustment
or to order the Department of Homeland Security (formerly the INS)
to adjust his status.
While Appellant asserted that the district court had
jurisdiction to consider his claims under the habeas corpus
statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255, the general federal question
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the mandamus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1361,
and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq., the
court found that it only had jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s
petition for writ of habeas corpus. Addressing the merits of that
claim, the court denied the petition. This appeal followed.
II. Standard of Review
Whether a district court has subject matter jurisdiction to
hear a case is a question of law that we review de novo. Gandy
Nursery, Inc. v. United States, 318 F.3d 631, 636 (5th Cir. 2003).
III. Discussion
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Appellant submits two arguments: (1) the district court had
jurisdiction to consider his petition for writ of habeas corpus, and
should have granted the writ; and (2) the district court had
jurisdiction to address his request for mandamus or affirmative
injunctive relief to order the Department to adjudicate his
application for adjustment of status. We will address each claim
in turn.
A. Writ of Habeas Corpus
With regard to his petition for writ of habeas corpus,
Appellant asserts that being held without bond violates the Due
Process clause of the Fifth Amendment because the INS has not
adjudicated his application for adjustment of status. Additionally,
in light of the possibility that his previous counsel might have
been ineffective, he challenges the legality of the deportation
order against him. Appellees contend that the court’s jurisdiction
was precluded on three separate grounds: (1) 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)
precludes jurisdiction because Appellant was actually seeking review
of the decision to execute a removal order; (2) habeas review is
unavailable because Appellant has an adequate remedy by petition for
review in this Court; and (3) review of discretionary decisions in
deportation proceedings is outside of the scope of habeas review.
The district court, however, based its jurisdiction to consider
Appellant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus on 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(1), which permits courts to issue writs to prisoners “in
custody under or by color of the authority of the United States.”
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Congress and the courts have devoted much attention to the
extent of jurisdiction in immigration cases. In October 1996,
Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration
Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”), 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996), which
substantially limits judicial review of the Attorney General’s
immigration decisions. See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 486 (1999) (“[M]any provisions
of the IIRIRA are aimed at protecting the Executive’s discretion
from the courts-- indeed, that can fairly be said to be the theme
of the legislation.”). Title 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), which serves as
a starting point for our inquiry into jurisdiction in this case,
reads:
Except as provided in this section and
notwithstanding any other provision of law, no
court shall have jurisdiction to hear any
cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien
arising from the decision or action by the
Attorney General to commence proceedings,
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders
against any alien under this chapter.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).2 In Reno, the Supreme Court explained that
§ 1252(g) was not a general bar on jurisdiction, but rather limited
judicial review to a narrow class of discretionary executive
decrees, decisions or actions to commence proceedings, adjudicate
2
This provision became effective on April 1, 1997 and
“appl[ies] without limitation to claims arising from all past,
pending, or future exclusion, deportation, or removal
proceedings.” IIRIRA § 306(c)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
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cases, or execute removal orders.3 525 U.S. at 483 (1999). The
Court opined that the provision was included “to give some measure
of protection to ‘no deferred action’ decisions and similar
discretionary determinations, providing that if they are reviewable
at all, they at least will not be made the bases for separate rounds
of judicial intervention outside the streamlined process that
Congress has designed.” Id. at 485.
The process for obtaining an adjustment of status is delineated
in the Code of Federal Regulations. The Code of Federal Regulations
provides that an alien who is in deportation or removal proceedings
shall have his application for adjustment of status considered only
in those proceedings. 8 C.F.R § 245.2(a)(1). Moreover, “[t]he
[Legal Immigration and Family Equity] LIFE Act Amendments contain
no special provisions for reopening cases under Section 245(i) of
the Act (8 U.S.C. 1255(i)) where an alien already is the subject of
a final order of removal, deportation or exclusion.” 66 F.R. 16383
at 16386. Hence, motions to reopen based on Section 245(i) are
governed by the Department of Justice’s rules which contain time and
numerical limitations on the filing of such motions. See 8 C.F.R.
3
Because the IIRIRA changed the language of immigration
orders, orders of deportation and orders of exclusion are both
now referred to as “orders of removal.” See IIRIRA § 309(d)(2),
110 Stat. 3009 (1996) ( “[A]ny reference in law to an order of
removal shall be deemed to include a reference to an order of
exclusion and deportation or an order of deportation.”).
Therefore, we use the words “removal” and “deportation”
interchangeably.
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§§ 3.23(b)(1) and 3.2(c)(2)(now codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.23 and
1003.2).
Appellees cite Cardoso v. Reno, 216 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. 2000),
to buttress their argument that § 1252(g) stripped the district
court of jurisdiction over Appellant’s habeas claim. In Cardoso,
we affirmed the district court’s application of § 1252(g) to
dismiss aliens’ requests to compel the Attorney General to adjust
their immigration status, permit them to remain in the United
States, and provide them with work authorization. Id. at 513. We
found that regardless of how the plaintiffs characterized their
claims, they were seeking to prevent the Attorney General from
executing orders of removal. Id. at 516. We recognized that,
although their prayers might have been different, the plaintiffs’
claims were, in essence, an attempt to compel the Attorney General
to allow them to remain in the country. Id. Therefore, this Court
reasoned that if the plaintiffs had been successful, permitting
“such challenges would ‘lead to the deconstruction, fragmentation,
and hence prolongation of removal proceedings at which the Supreme
Court concluded that § 1252(g) is directed.’” Id. (quoting Alvidres-
Reyes v. Reno, 180 F.3d 199, 205 (5th Cir. 1999).
We find Appellant’s situation analogous to the circumstances
of the plaintiffs in Cardoso notwithstanding the fact that the
plaintiffs in Cardoso had all been denied adjustments of status, and
Appellant’s application has never been adjudicated. Appellant
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essentially seeks review of the decision to execute a removal order
against him, a request which § 1252(g) precludes the court from
exercising jurisdiction. Because Appellant had a final order of
deportation, his only avenue for adjustment of status was by
reopening his proceedings. Appellant’s adjustment of status has not
been adjudicated because Immigration Judges have denied two of his
motions to reopen. In other words, there is a process for adjusting
the status of an alien in Appellant’s position. Because Appellant
has been unsuccessful at reopening his deportation proceeding, the
April 26, 1998 order of removal entered against Appellant has not
been vacated. By confining Appellant until a travel document for
his deportation arrives, the agency is executing a valid removal
order. Even if Appellant couches his claim as a request for
adjustment of status, he is actually seeking review of the decision
to execute a removal order against him. Hence, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)
precludes jurisdiction.
Assuming arguendo that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) did not preclude the
district court from exercising jurisdiction, habeas jurisdiction
does not extend to review of discretionary matters like the one at
issue here. “The decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen is
purely discretionary.” Altamirano-Lopez v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 547,
550 (5th Cir. 2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1)(iv). We have
acknowledged that federal habeas jurisdiction does not extend to
review of discretionary determinations made by agencies. See, e.g.,
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Bravo v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 590, 592-93 (5th Cir. 2003). Hence,
because Appellant’s petition depends on relief within the agency’s
discretion, and because jurisdiction is precluded by § 1252(g), the
district court lacked jurisdiction over Appellant’s habeas claims.4
B. Writ of Mandamus
Appellant also asserts that the district court erred by not
addressing his request for mandamus or affirmative injunctive relief
to order the INS to adjudicate his application for adjustment of
status. Appellant argues that this is a case of unreasonable delay,
and that the agency should be forced to adjudicate his claim for
adjustment. The district court found that it lacked jurisdiction
to issue an affirmative injunction or a writ of mandamus ordering
the agency to adjust Appellant’s status.
The test for whether jurisdiction lies pursuant to the Mandamus
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, is “whether mandamus would be an appropriate
means of relief.” Jones v. Alexander, 609 F.2d 778, 781 (5th Cir.
1980). “Three elements must exist before mandamus can issue: (1)
the plaintiff must have a clear right to the relief, (2) the
defendant must have a clear duty to act, and (3) no other adequate
remedy must be available.” Id.Taking Appellant’s allegations at face value, we find that the
4
We also note that aliens should seek review of deportation
orders in this Court. “[F]ailure to pursue [direct review]
before filing [a] habeas petition in the district court” will
trigger denial on jurisdictional grounds. Salazar-Regino v.
Trominski, 415 F.3d 436, 445 (5th Cir. 2005).
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district court lacked jurisdiction over Appellant’s request for a
writ of mandamus. As with Appellant’s habeas claim, because
Appellant had a final order of deportation, and although Appellant
characterized his claim as a request for adjustment of status, he
is actually seeking review of the decision to execute a removal
order against him. Hence, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) precludes
jurisdiction.
Assuming arguendo that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) did not strip the
district court of jurisdiction, Appellant failed to establish a
clear, nondiscretionary duty owed by the agency, a requirement for
exercising jurisdiction pursuant to the mandamus statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1361. Although Appellant attempts to frame his request as an
action against the agency for unreasonable delay, 8 C.F.R §
245.2(a)(1) provides that an alien who is in deportation or removal
proceedings shall have his application for adjustment of status
considered only in those proceedings. Appellant’s only avenue for
relief is through a motion to reopen. As discussed above, this type
of relief is discretionary. Therefore, a writ of mandamus should
not issue because Appellees did not owe Appellant a clear,
nondiscretionary duty. See Dunn-McCambell Royalty Interest, Inc.
v. Nat’l Park Serv., 112 F.3d 1283, 1288 (5th Cir. 1997)(holding
that in order for mandamus to issue, the party seeking the writ had
to demonstrate a “legal duty that is a specific, ministerial act,
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devoid of the exercise of judgment or discretion.”).5
IV. Conclusion
Because we find that the district court lacked jurisdiction to
hear any of Appellant’s claims, we VACATE and DISMISS.
5
Additionally, we note that Appellant implicitly
acknowledged the existence of another remedy, under section 706
of the Administrative Procedures Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).
This, too, would foreclose mandamus jurisdiction which requires
that the party seeking the writ has no other adequate remedy.
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