Guillory v. Chater ( 1996 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-31195
Summary Calendar
Nelson Guillory,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
Shirley S. Chater,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Louisiana
94-CV-830
June 18, 1996
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHÉ, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
The extraordinary and unnecessarily tortured procedural
history of this case is described in full in the opinion by the
magistrate judge below. Reduced to its essence, this case is
simple one. The plaintiff, Nelson Guillory, at various times
sought a ruling from the Administrator that he was entitled to
retroactive disability benefits calculated in accordance with a
1983 onset date. On May 23, 1991, he was successful. An
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
administrative law judge found that he was “entitled to a period of
disability commencing August 27, 1983, and to disability insurance
benefits under sections 216(i) and 223, respectively, of the Social
Security Act.” This ALJ decision has not been reviewed or
challenged in any way, shape, or form.
Despite the ALJ decision, the Administrator sent plaintiff
notice that it intended to pay him retroactive benefits in an
amount calculated with an onset date of 1989. The record and
briefs do not disclose why the Administrator sought to readdress an
issue the ALJ had apparently already decided. When plaintiff
requested reconsideration of this notice, the Administrator sat on
the request for reconsiration for 33 months, despite several
letters from plaintiff’s counsel. Despairing of further action,
plaintiff filed suit.
We affirm the order of the court below on the ground that the
plaintiff has shown no irreparable harm, at least not yet. The
plaintiff is currently receiving benefits and therefore will not
suffer the type of irreparable harm normally considered sufficient
to support the imposition of a “waiver” of the exhaustion
requirement upon the Administrator. Unlike Bowen v. City of New
York, 476 U.S. 467, 483 (1986), upon which Guillory principally
relies, there is no specter that the plaintiff will suffer the
irreparable harms associated with having the benefits upon which he
depends for life’s basic necessities wrongfully cut off. Cf.
Schoolcraft v. Sullivan, 971 F.2d 81, 86 (8th Cir. 1992). Nor is
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there any allegation that the Administrator’s actions in this case
spring from a “systemwide, unrevealed policy.” 476 U.S. at 485.
We cannot ignore the extraordinary nature of the
Administrator’s treatment of this case. Although we express no
view on whether the plaintiff has met the waiver requirement that
his claim be collateral to the merits of his application for
benefits, we note that Guillory does not argue in this litigation
that the relevant regulations entitle him to benefits dating back
to 1983. Rather, his argument in this litigation is that the ALJ
already decided that issue, and that the Administrator has failed
to abide by that decision, which Guillory labels final and binding.
If Guillory is right, we are confident that the Administrator
will reach the correct decision with greater dispatch than she has
shown thus far, since an examination of Guillory’s medical
condition would be unnecessary. If Guillory is incorrect, then the
Adminstrator will have to look once again into Guillory’s condition
and the relevant regulations, and further proceedings before the
Administrator will be valuable. Thus, at this time, we also affirm
on the ground that exhaustion would not be futile.
We conclude by noting that the Administrator cites no case,
and we have found none, holding that we are powerless to find the
requirements of the waiver doctrine satisfied solely on the grounds
of astonishing delay. We note also that, at least in other
contexts, the federal courts are open to those alleging that an
agency decision has been delayed so long as to merit the
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extraordinary relief of a writ of mandamus directing the agency to
resolve the issue with dispatch. See, e.g., Telecommunications
Research & Action Center v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The
plaintiff has not sought such a remedy on this appeal, and so we do
not address this issue. We are confident that the Administrator
will process the plaintiff’s claims with the speed to which he is
by now surely entitled.
AFFIRMED.
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