Af-Cap Inc v. Republic of Congo ( 2007 )


Menu:
  •                                                              United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    March 5, 2007
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    Nos. 06-50200,
    06-50202
    Summary Calendar
    AF-CAP, INC.,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    REPUBLIC OF CONGO,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Western District of Texas
    1:01-CV-321
    Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    This    litigation   has   a   long   history,   as   summarized    most
    recently in Af-Cap, Inc. v. Republic of Congo, 
    462 F.3d 417
    (5th
    Cir. 2006) (Af-Cap III).        The dispute centers around Af-Cap’s
    attempt to collect on a judgment against the Republic of Congo.
    Af-Cap attempted to garnish several companies’ obligations to
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the Court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R.
    47.5.4.
    render oil to the Congo.      The district court found that Texas
    garnishment law does not authorize the garnishment of nonmonetary
    obligations because they are not garnishable “effects.”1   In Af-Cap
    III, we agreed with the district court that Texas law does not
    allow for the garnishment of nonmonetary obligations and affirmed
    the dissolution of garnishment writs targeted at the companies’ oil
    obligations.
    Af-Cap now appeals two district court orders that were not
    directly at issue in Af-Cap III, one denying a motion for contempt
    sanctions and the other refusing to enter new garnishment writs.
    These appeals were held in abeyance while Af-Cap III was pending
    because they require us to answer the same question addressed in
    that appeal: Does Texas law permit the garnishment of nonmonetary
    obligations?    Our opinion in Af-Cap III answered that question in
    the negative.    Aware that our answer dooms their appeal of the
    orders presently before us, Af-Cap now requests a second bite at
    the apple and invites us to certify the question already decided in
    Af-Cap III to the Texas Supreme Court.   We decline the invitation.
    The sole basis of Af-Cap’s appeal is to ask us to certify a
    question that we have already answered as between these very
    1
    The Congo had the option of receiving royalty payments in
    cash or “in kind” oil, and elected to receive them in kind.
    Because the district court found that the oil obligations could
    not be garnished, it issued a turnover order that would have
    required the Congo to receive its payments in cash. We vacated
    that order in Af-Cap 
    III. 462 F.3d at 425
    –28.
    2
    parties. While the Texas Constitution allows this court to certify
    questions to the Texas Supreme Court, certification is not “a
    proper avenue to change our binding precedent.”       Jefferson v. Lead
    Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 
    106 F.3d 1245
    , 1247 (5th Cir. 1997).           After
    “this Court has settled on the state law to be applied in a
    diversity case, the precedent should be followed by other panels
    without regard to any alleged existing confusion in state law,
    absent a subsequent state court decision or statutory amendment
    which makes this Court's decision clearly wrong.”          Lee v. Frozen
    Food Express, Inc., 
    592 F.2d 271
    , 272 (5th Cir. 1979).
    Af-Cap has not even attempted to point to a change in Texas
    law since Af-Cap III that might call its holding into question.       We
    are therefore bound by Af-Cap III’s conclusion that nonmonetary
    obligations are not garnishable under Texas law and find that
    certification   is   inappropriate     where   we   have   authoritative
    precedent on this precise issue.
    IT IS ORDERED that appellant’s motion to certify a question to
    the Texas Supreme Court is DENIED and, because it raises no issues
    independent of its motion to certify, its appeal is DISMISSED.2
    2
    We note the district court’s recent colloquy expressing
    hesitance to render a final judgment after we remanded this case
    “for proceedings consistent with [an] opinion.” Af-Cap 
    III, 462 F.3d at 430
    . That language was used out of deference to the
    district court’s familiarity with this prolonged dispute and
    should not be read to imply that unresolved issues necessarily
    remain.
    3