Leverton v. Pope , 100 F. App'x 263 ( 2004 )


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  •                                                        United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS           June 2, 2004
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 03-40631
    Summary Calendar
    DAVID RAY LEVERTON,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    JEFFREY POPE, Etc.; ET AL.,
    Defendants,
    JEFFREY POPE, Lieutenant, Mark W. Stiles Unit;
    JIMMI PITTS, Lieutenant, Mark W. Stiles Unit;
    PATRICK ARNETT, SR., Police, Port Arthur Texas;
    RUSSELL MCDONALD, Doctor of Osteopathy, Mark W.
    Stiles Unit; ROBERT ASHWORTH, #1 FRANK CARPENTER,
    #3, BRANDON NOLAN, #4,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Texas
    USDC No. 1:97-CV-397
    --------------------
    Before JONES, BENAVIDES, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    David Ray Leverton, Texas prisoner number 373652, appeals
    from the July 19, 2001, denial of a Rule 60(b) motion in which he
    sought relief from an order granting summary judgment in favor of
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 03-40631
    -2-
    Russell McDonald.   He also appeals from the magistrate judge’s
    conclusion that his motion pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 59, filed
    more than ten days after the entry of final judgment, must be
    construed as a motion pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 60.   Finally, he
    appeals the denial of the of FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) motion
    following a jury verdict for the defendants in this 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     suit.   Also pending before this court is Leverton’s motion
    to supplement the record on appeal.
    If necessary, this court must examine the basis of its
    jurisdiction on its own motion.     Mosley v. Cozby, 
    813 F.2d 659
    ,
    660 (5th Cir. 1987).   A timely notice of appeal is a prerequisite
    to the exercise of jurisdiction by this court.     Dison v. Whitley,
    
    20 F.3d 185
    , 186 (5th Cir. 1994).    On April 24, 2003, Leverton
    filed a notice of appeal from the July 19, 2001, denial of a Rule
    60(b) motion in which Leverton sought relief from the grant of
    summary judgment in favor of defendant Dr. Russell McDonald.
    This notice of appeal, filed nearly two years after the denial of
    the motion and the August 14, 2001, entry of the final judgment,
    was untimely, and this court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal.
    See Dison, 
    20 F.3d at 186
    .
    Leverton complains that the magistrate judge erred in
    construing his FED. R. CIV. P. 59 motion for a new trial as a
    motion for relief from the judgment pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P.
    60.   Motions pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 59 must be filed within
    10 days of entry, not service, of the judgment.     See FED. R. CIV.
    No. 03-40631
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    P. 59(a), (b), (e).      Although Leverton filed a motion to extend
    time to file a motion for a new trial, a district court is not
    authorized to extend the time for filing such a motion.         See FED.
    R. CIV. P. 6(b).   Finally, Leverton’s motion for a new trial did
    not extend the time for filing a notice of appeal, as it was not
    filed within ten days of the entry of the final judgment.            See
    FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(v)-(vi).
    Because Leverton did not file a timely notice of appeal from
    the final judgment, this court will not address his contentions
    regarding non-final orders and matters that do not fall under
    FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).    FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) allows the district
    court to relieve a party from a final judgment or order.         A
    decision is final when it “ends the litigation on the merits and
    leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.”
    Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 
    437 U.S. 463
    , 467 (1978) (internal
    quotations and citation omitted).     Because a Rule 60(b) motion is
    not a substitute for a timely appeal, this court declines to
    address the issues Leverton raises that do not readily fit under
    one of the grounds enumerated in Rule 60.      See Halicki v.
    Louisiana Casino Cruises, Inc., 
    151 F.3d 465
    , 471 (5th Cir.
    1998).   The matters Leverton raises in his brief that this court
    declines to address include the denials of the: motion for
    appointment of counsel, motion for a protective order, motion for
    a restraining order, motion to withdraw consent to proceed before
    No. 03-40631
    -4-
    a magistrate, and motion to supplement the witness list.      See
    Coopers & Lybrand, 
    437 U.S. at 467
    ; Halicki, 
    151 F.3d at 471
    .
    Leverton complains that the magistrate judge abused his
    discretion in denying his August 31, 2001, motion for a new
    trial.   Leverton has not met the requirements under FED. R. CIV.
    P. 60(b)(2) for relief from the judgment based upon newly-
    discovered evidence that he demonstrate (1) that he exercised due
    diligence in obtaining the information and (2) that the evidence
    is material and controlling and clearly would have produced a
    different result if presented before the original judgment.      See
    Government Fin. Servs. One Ltd. Partnership v. Peyton Place,
    Inc., 
    62 F.3d 767
    , 770-71 (5th Cir. 1995).
    Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(3), Leverton must show by
    clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the defendants engaged in
    fraud or other misconduct and (2) that the misconduct prevented
    him from fully and fairly presenting his case.   See 
    id. at 772
    .
    He has not shown that the defendants’ actions in delaying his
    operation rose to a level of fraud or misconduct where the record
    showed that he could walk normally, his knee was not swollen or
    “grinding,” the joint had a full range of motion, and X-rays
    detected no abnormalities.    See 
    id.
    Finally, the magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion
    in refusing to grant the motion pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P.
    60(b)(6).   FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6) allows a district court to “do
    justice in a particular case when relief is not warranted by the
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    preceding clauses.”   Government Fin. Servs., 
    62 F.3d at 773-74
    .
    The “extraordinary circumstances” required to grant a FED. R. CIV.
    P. 60(b)(6) motion are not present in this case.   See 
    id.
    Finally, despite Leverton’s assertion to the contrary, the
    magistrate judge was not required to provide Leverton with notice
    of either the consequences of summary judgment or the right to
    submit opposing affidavits.   See Martin v. Harrison County Jail,
    
    975 F.2d 192
    , 193 (5th Cir. 1992).
    Leverton’s motion to supplement the record on appeal is
    GRANTED.
    DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART; MOTION GRANTED.