Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Dunbar Diagnostic Services Inc. , 92 F. App'x 83 ( 2004 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS February 19, 2004
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III
_____________________ Clerk
Nos. 03-20292 & 03-20500
_____________________
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
DUNBAR DIAGNOSTIC SERVICES INC.;
VILLAGE ULTRASOUND CLINIC INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
__________________________________________________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas, Houston
USDC No. H-02-CV-555
_________________________________________________________________
Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) brought
this action against Dunbar Diagnostic Services, Inc. (“Dunbar”), on
behalf of Leticia Gonzalez for discrimination and retaliation in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e et seq. (West 2004). In this consolidated appeal the EEOC
challenges the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of
law (“JMOL”) in favor of Dunbar on both causes of action and its
award of attorneys’ fees to Dunbar. We REVERSE.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
"[J]udgment as a matter of law is proper after a party has
been fully heard by the jury on a given issue, [when] there is no
legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to have
found for that party with respect to that issue." Klumpe v. IBP,
Inc., 309 F.3d 279, 287 (5th Cir. 2002); FED. R. CIV. P. 50. In
deciding a motion for JMOL, the court must review the record as a
whole, draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party and do so without weighing the evidence or making credibility
determinations. Delano-Pyle v. Victoria County, 302 F.3d 567, 572
(5th Cir. 2002).
With respect to the EEOC’s discrimination claim, the district
court’s grant of JMOL was improper. First, given the minimal
burden, the EEOC put forth sufficient evidence of its prima facie
case to preclude JMOL: (1) Gonzalez is a member of a protected
group; (2) she was qualified for the health insurance benefits; (3)
these benefits were denied; and (4) this denial was differentially
applied to Gonzalez because all other eligible employees were
offered benefits. See Rubinstein v. Administrators of Tulane
Educational Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 399 (5th Cir. 2000).
Second, the EEOC also produced evidence that Dunbar’s non-
discriminatory reason for not providing benefits to Gonzalez --
that she failed to ask for them -- was false. Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000). This evidence of
falsity, coupled with the EEOC’s prima facie case, was sufficient
to preclude JMOL with respect to the EEOC’s discrimination claim.
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Dunbar’s contention that, because Gonzalez would not have
opted for insurance coverage, she was not damaged, is also
contested on this record. Although Gonzalez was receiving free
insurance from Medicaid, she testified that she would have signed
up for coverage under the more comprehensive Dunbar policy had it
been offered. Moreover, because the EEOC brought this claim,
prospective injunctive relief relating to Dunbar’s future conduct
also could be available. E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S.
279, 287 (2002).
Finally, with respect to the EEOC’s retaliation claim, the
district court’s grant of JMOL was similarly improper. Initially,
it is clear that Gonzalez engaged in protected activity -- filing
a discrimination charge against Dunbar. Fabela v. Socorro Indep.
School Dist., 329 F.3d 409, 414 (5th Cir. 2003). Although
Gonzalez’s termination was termed by Dunbar as a resignation, the
EEOC produced evidence that Gonzalez was, in fact, discharged --
which is an adverse employment action. Hernandez v. Crawford Bldg.
Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 531 (5th Cir. 2003).
Gonzalez testified that she was involuntarily terminated. And
the letter sent by Dunbar to Gonzalez stated that her threatening
a lawsuit “resulted in [her] resignation.” This letter could be
interpreted by a jury as an involuntary resignation or termination,
or that “a causal connection exists between that protected activity
[hiring a lawyer and threatening a lawsuit] and the adverse
employment action.” Id.
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Dunbar nevertheless argues that Gonzalez cannot recover for
retaliation because, in being unable to attend work, she was not
“qualified” for her job. (Her doctor had prescribed temporary
bedrest to help with pregnancy complications.) In this respect,
Dunbar urges this panel to apply Holtzclaw v. DSC Communications
Corp., 255 F.3d 254 (5th Cir. 2001), which held, under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (West 2004),
that a plaintiff who sought re-employment was required to prove
that he was qualified for his position. Id. at 259-60.
Holtzclaw involved a failure to rehire claim brought by a
plaintiff who was on long-term disability and, according to earlier
determinations, was “unable to work at all” and “would never be
able to return to work.” Id. at 257. In this case, however, the
EEOC is bringing a claim for wrongful discharge. There has been no
determination that Gonzalez suffers from a long-term disability, or
that she was not qualified. (Indeed, Dunbar implicitly admitted
that Gonzalez was qualified by offering her clerical work in lieu
of medical leave -- and then terminated her before her reply.)
In short, whether Gonzalez was terminated because she was not
“qualified” or for some impermissible reason -- the central issue
of the retaliation claim -- remains an issue for the trier of fact.
We therefore decline Dunbar’s invitation to extend the Holtzclaw
requirements to this particular case, and find that JMOL was
inappropriate.
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Accordingly, the district court’s grant of Dunbar’s motion for
JMOL with respect to the EEOC’s discrimination and retaliation
claims is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED such that a jury may
consider the evidence on both sides of both claims.
Further, because Dunbar is no longer a prevailing party, the
district court’s award of attorneys’ fees is REVERSED. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000e-5(k) (West 2004). Similarly, because the EEOC’s appeal was
not frivolous, Dunbar’s request for fees in prosecuting this appeal
is DENIED. FED. R. APP. P. 38.
This panel also DENIES the EEOC’s request to reassign the case
to another district judge on remand. Although the trial judge may
have been disapproving toward the EEOC and Gonzalez, this fact is
not sufficient to rise to the extraordinary standard required for
reassignment. Liteky v. U.S., 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994).
Finally, we hold that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing Village Ultrasound Clinic, Inc.
(“Village”), as a party because Dunbar conceded that it has
sufficient employees to be considered an “employer” under Title
VII. Williams v. Hoyt, 556 F.2d 1336, 1341 (5th Cir. 1977). In
this respect only the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Based on the above, we REVERSE the district court’s grant of
JMOL and attorneys’ fees to Dunbar; AFFIRM the district court’s
dismissal of Village; DENY Dunbar’s request for appellate
attorneys’ fees and the EEOC’s request for reassignment; and REMAND
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the action for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED.
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