Marlowe v. SBC Pension Plan ( 2004 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
March 5, 2004
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-41151
Summary Calendar
SANDRA MARLOWE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SBC PENSION PLAN,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:02-CV-111
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Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Sandra Marlowe appeals the district court’s order granting
the motion for summary judgment filed by the SBC Pension Plan
(“Plan”), the plan administrator for her former employer, SBC
Communications, Inc. (“SBC”), in Marlowe’s action under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 28 U.S.C. §
1101 et seq. Marlowe contends that the Plan erred in denying her
enhanced pension benefits under the SBC Enhanced Pension and
Retirement Program (“EPR Program”), when it determined that,
under the EPR Program’s language, she had been “assigned full
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 03-41151
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time to projects” for wireless-affiliated companies as of
September 7, 2000. She argues that the record establishes that
she continued to perform non-wireless payroll work for SBC
following that date.
The standard of review following the district court’s order
granting summary judgment is de novo. Whittaker v. BellSouth
Telecommunications, Inc., 206 F.3d 532, 534 (5th Cir. 2000);
see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A denial
of ERISA benefits by a plan administrator that is vested with the
authority to make a final and conclusive determination of claims
is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989); Meditrust Financial Servs.
Corp. v. Sterling Chem., Inc., 168 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1999).
The EPR Program granted SBC’s Benefit Plan Committee (“BPC”)
“full and exclusive authority and discretion to grant and deny
claims for benefits” under the Program, “including the power to
interpret the EPR Program and determine the eligibility of any
individual to receive benefits pursuant to the EPR Program.” The
EPR Program excluded from eligibility employees who, as of
September 7, 2000, had been “assigned full time to projects” for
wireless entities affiliated with SBC, and such status was to be
“determined by such Eligible Employee’s Participating Company.”
In denying Marlowe EPR Program benefits, the BPC determined that
Marlowe had been “assigned full time to projects” for wireless
entities as of September 7, 2000, because Marlowe’s Participating
Company had determined that she was “Wireless-dedicated” as of
that time, regardless of the fact that Marlowe was still
No. 03-41151
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performing some non-wireless payroll work after that time.
Contrary to Marlowe’s contention, the phrase “assigned full time
to projects” was not “unambiguous” within the context of the EPR
Program, and a de novo standard is not applicable. The abuse-of-
discretion standard applies. We have reviewed the record and
briefs submitted by the parties and conclude that the BPC did not
abuse its discretion in determining that Marlowe had been
“assigned full time to projects” for non-wireless entities as of
September 7, 2000. The record reflects that in May 2000 Marlowe,
along with approximately 1500 other SBC employees, was placed on
a list of employees who were being designated as “work[ing]
solely on behalf of the wireless entities that are currently
being paid by a non-wireless entity.” It is not disputed that
these employees were effectively being deemed essential to an SBC
joint venture that would ultimately result in the formation of
Cingular Wireless. A review of the EPR Program reflects and
other evidence in the record shows that, in the context of these
events, the BPC’s interpretation of the phrase “assigned full
time” was “legally correct” and was not an “abuse of discretion.”
See MacLachlan v. ExxonMobil Corp., 350 F.3d 472, 481 (5th Cir.
2003); Gosselink v. American Tel. & Tel., Inc., 272 F.3d 722, 726
(5th Cir. 2001).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.