Brown v. Cain ( 2000 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 98-31155
_____________________
GEORGE B BROWN
Petitioner - Appellant
v.
BURL CAIN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary
Respondent - Appellee
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
(97-CV-12)
_________________________________________________________________
May 31, 2000
Before KING, Chief Judge, and GARWOOD and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Petitioner-Appellant appeals from the district court’s
denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254. This court granted a certificate of appealability
on the sole issue of whether the evidence was sufficient to
sustain Petitioner-Appellant’s conviction for second-degree
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
murder in Louisiana state court. For the reasons stated below,
we AFFIRM the district court’s decision.
I.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On the evening of May 7, 1987, Brett Fontenot and Randall
Johnson discovered Sheri Lynn Daigle’s (“Daigle”) body partially
submerged in a septic tank some distance behind an abandoned
house at 10443 Siegen Lane. The police subsequently arrested
Petitioner George B. Brown (“Brown”) for Daigle’s murder. Brown
was indicted for second-degree murder by an East Baton Rouge
Parish grand jury. See State v. Brown, 549 So.2d 323, 324 (La.
Ct. App. 1989) (“Brown I”), rev’d by 562 So.2d 868 (La. 1990).
Brown entered a plea of not guilty, and the case went to trial.
See id.A. Evidence Adduced at Trial
Because Brown challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we
summarize it here.
1. Acquaintance with the Victim
Several witnesses testified that they saw Brown talking to
Daigle at the apartment complex at 609 Spanish Town Road in Baton
Rouge, Louisiana at about 5:30 p.m. on May 6, 1987. Michael
Hood, with whom Daigle had been staying for the past two days,
testified that he asked Daigle if she would get her hibachi grill
so that Hood could barbecue some chicken for dinner. Daigle
replied in the affirmative. Hood did not see Daigle leave. Hood
2
remained in his apartment for the rest of the evening with
friends, but he did not see Daigle again after that conversation.
Hood, whose relationship with Daigle had a sexual aspect, also
testified that he had seen Daigle speaking with Brown the
previous day. When Hood asked Daigle what Brown had said to her,
she replied that Brown wanted to have sex with her but that she
wanted nothing to do with Brown.1
Brown and Daigle were also seen by Kimberly Cagle, Brown’s
next door neighbor in the apartments at 605 Spanish Town Road.2
Cagle testified that she had spoken to Brown at their apartment
complex about an hour and a half before she saw him at the 609
Spanish Town Road apartments. She had asked him at that time how
he was doing, and he replied that he “needed a woman.” Brown
also told her that he had broken up with his girlfriend. Brown
seemed restless, but not violent or agitated.
Deputy Sheriff Derrick M. Foxx testified that he saw Daigle
and Brown at the Prescott Place Apartments, sometime between 5:30
and 6:30 p.m.3 Brown was seated in a parked car in the parking
1
This hearsay statement was the basis for the Louisiana
First Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision to overturn Brown’s
conviction in Brown I.
2
Brown and Daigle were also seen by Jacqueline Haydel, a
neighbor of Hood’s, around 5:30 p.m.
3
Until May 4, Daigle had been living at this apartment
complex with Paul Beatty.
3
lot of the apartment complex.4 He moved his car because he was
blocking Foxx’s parking space, and he told Foxx that he was
waiting for Daigle. Foxx then saw Daigle descending a stairwell,
carrying a hibachi grill. She was wearing a red tank top and
blue jeans. Daigle put the grill in the back seat of Brown’s
car, and then got in the front seat. According to Foxx, she did
not seem frightened, and Brown seemed neither nervous nor
evasive. Foxx watched them drive out of the parking lot.
Vince Fender and Robin Holt, who were acquainted with both
Daigle and Brown, saw Brown and Daigle driving just before 7
p.m.5 Daigle did not appear frightened, and in fact waved at
Fender and Holt, who were sitting with some other friends on
Holt’s porch, as the car passed. They did not see Brown drive
back along the same road, or see Daigle again after that.
2. Familiarity with the Crime Scene
Roy Skiba testified that he had previously resided at 10443
Siegen Lane (“Siegen Lane house”) with his sister, Dawn Harding,
their mother, and another brother. He stated that the house was
not visible from Siegen Lane. He also said that Brown had been
romantically involved with Harding during the time that he lived
4
Foxx stated that Brown was driving a Ford Grand Torino,
but identified the car in the state’s exhibits, Brown’s 1974
Mercury Montego, as the car he had seen Brown driving on May 6.
5
Fender testified that the car was driving in the opposite
direction from Brown’s apartment complex.
4
at the Siegen Lane house.6 During that time, Brown visited
Harding at the house every few days. Brown generally stayed at
the house for a few hours at a time or overnight. Brown stopped
coming to the house when he and Harding moved into an apartment
together. Skiba also testified that Brown knew where the septic
tanks were located at the Siegen Lane house, and had actually
once attempted to fix a clogged line.
Laura Cramer, who stated that she had an “on-again, off-
again relationship” with Brown, testified that she had both
dropped Brown off and picked him up at the Siegen Lane house
around August or September 1986. Brown had also once given
Cramer’s father directions to the Siegen Lane house.
3. Presence at the Crime Scene
Elgin Campbell testified that he saw a car driving away from
the Siegen Lane house in the early morning hours of May 7.
Campbell, who lives across the street from the Siegen Lane house,
was standing at the end of his driveway. It was not yet light
outside, and the car’s headlights were off. However, he could
distinguish the general outline of the car, which had a long hood
and distinctive trunk. Campbell, who was familiar with cars,
identified the car as a 1977 or 1978 model, and as either a
Cougar or a Montego. He noticed that the car was loud, and
6
Skiba was uncertain about when the relationship occurred,
but he stated that Brown’s visits took place some time after
January 1986. Brown was apparently incarcerated in Texas until
the summer of 1986, however.
5
surmised that the noise was caused by a faulty muffler or exhaust
system.
Once Brown’s car had been taken to the police crime lab,
Campbell identified it as the car he had seen on the morning of
May 7 at Siegen Lane. Campbell also examined the underside of
the car muffler, and concluded that it had a “bad” exhaust
system. However, Campbell never heard the car run, and thus
could not compare the sound of Brown’s car to that of the car he
had seen in Siegen Lane.
4. Physical Evidence
The individuals who discovered Daigle’s body, Fontenot and
Johnson, testified that they were looking for redwood planks on
the evening of May 7. On Fontenot’s suggestion, they ventured
onto the land surrounding the abandoned Siegen Lane house, which
is heavily wooded and surrounded by a tall wooden fence. They
noticed a trail through the overgrown weeds behind the house.
When they proceeded along this trail, they came upon a pool of
fresh-looking liquid blood about eight to twelve inches in
diameter. The trail led to three septic tanks. Fontenot noticed
that the lid of the middle septic tank was ajar. When he removed
the lid, he observed Daigle’s feet protruding from the water
inside the septic tank. Fontenot and Johnson left the area, went
to a nearby fire station, and called for help.7
7
The East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Department undertook the
investigation.
6
Deputy Sheriff Randy Walker testified that he answered the
call, and accompanied Johnson and Fontenot to the crime scene.
He stated that the trail that led to the septic tanks appeared to
have had something dragged along it, and looked fresh. The
ground was damp, and the puddle of blood was liquid and darker in
the center.8 Deputy Walker noticed a fresh tire track on the
gravel road that led from the Siegen Lane house to the main road,
which resembled a car tire rather than a truck tire, and roped
the area off with evidence tape. He also noticed several items
of clothing, including a pair of blue men’s shorts, and two bath
towels. Deputy John Maranto testified that he and other deputies
took photographs of the crime scene, made a cast of the tire
track, and collected the clothes and towels. Other deputies
testified that a hibachi grill was found in the weeds, some
distance from the septic tanks, on May 11. The hibachi was later
identified as the grill owned by Paul Beatty and taken from
Beatty’s apartment by Daigle on the evening of May 6.
Lt. Randy Keller testified that he and Chuck Smith, the
deputy coroner, extracted Daigle’s body from the septic tank.
Smith estimated that the water in the septic tank was about 70
degrees, and that the body had stiffened. The body was clad in a
red tank top and blue jeans, but the blue jeans were unzipped and
pulled down to expose the pubic area. Lt. Keller found two
8
Lt. Randy Keller and Deputy Coroner Chuck Smith confirmed
this description of the trail and the blood.
7
pieces of paper in the left front pocket of Daigle’s jeans. A
phone number was written on one of the pieces of paper. He and
the other detectives then left the crime scene to begin their
investigation.
Dr. Alfredo Suarez, the coroner, testified regarding the
results of the autopsy he performed on Daigle’s body. Suarez
testified that the cause of death was inhalation of septic tank
fluid. He found eight lacerations on the top of the head, which
corresponded to multiple skull fractures and bleeding sufficient
to have caused death. Suarez stated that the wounds would have
bled profusely, but would not have gushed or spurted blood. He
found another laceration and multiple contusions on Daigle’s
chin, which appeared to have been caused by a blunt instrument
about the size of a fist. Suarez conceded, however, that the
injuries to Daigle’s chin could have occurred when she was placed
head-first in the septic tank. Suarez examined the contents of
Daigle’s stomach, and detected only 30 cc’s or so of an
unidentifiable brownish liquid.9 Smith, assisting Suarez, later
removed several small metal glitter-like flakes from Daigle’s
head wounds.
Based on photographs showing the degree of rigor mortis at
the time the body was found, Suarez estimated that Daigle had
died between six and twenty-four hours, but probably closer to
9
Suarez stated that it generally takes about 30 minutes
for liquid to be completely absorbed by the stomach.
8
twenty-four hours, prior to her body being found. He also stated
that the skin on Daigle’s hands was wrinkled from having been in
the septic tank fluid for some period of time. Finally,
regarding the puddle of blood found at the crime scene, Suarez
testified that blood would probably appear fresh if it lay in a
humid, moist area, even if it had been there for some time.
Charles Guarino, a forensic serologist, testified that he
tested a vaginal swab taken from Daigle’s body, but detected no
seminal fluid. Guarino also checked for blood, tissue, or fibers
under Daigle’s nails but found none that incriminated Brown.
Guarino later tested the interior of Brown’s car, as well as the
clothes and tools found in the trunk, for blood and semen stains
but found neither. A stain on the passenger’s seat, said by
Scott Fisher, Brown’s roommate, to have been liquid on the night
of May 6, was not found to consist of either blood or semen. No
weapon consistent with Daigle’s head wounds was found in the car.
Furthermore, Guarino specifically searched the interior of the
car for metal flakes similar to those found in Daigle’s head
wounds, but found none.
Guarino also testified that he tested some articles of
clothing taken from Brown’s apartment. There was a bloodstain on
one of Brown’s T-shirts, but the stain was so faded that a blood
type could not be ascertained. The towels and clothing taken
from the crime scene were also tested, but were neither
identified as Brown’s nor found to contain blood or semen stains.
9
Furthermore, no blood, tissue, or fingerprints were detected on
the hibachi.
In addition, Jim Churchman, a Louisiana State Police Crime
Laboratory forensic scientist, testified that one tire on Brown’s
car was virtually identical to the tire that left the track at
the crime scene. He compared the tires on Brown’s car to the
cast of the track left at the Siegen Lane house. He found that
the tread design of the back left tire was identical to the tire
that made the cast. The tire was almost worn out, as was the
tire that made the cast. Churchman found no technical difference
between the general size, shape, and pattern of the tire that
made the cast and the left rear tire. However, he could not find
the exact segment of Brown’s tire that made the track shown in
the cast.
5. Brown’s Demeanor
Lt. Keller testified that he and the other detectives went
to Brown’s apartment looking for Brown during the early morning
hours of May 8. Brown’s roommate, Scott Fisher, denied knowing
Brown, and the detectives left.10 They returned some time later,
and informed Fisher that they were investigating the homicide of
Sheri Lynn Daigle. When they left for a second time, Fisher told
Brown what the detectives had said. Fisher testified that he and
10
Fisher testified that he panicked because he had just
returned from a bar where he had purchased cocaine. He had
borrowed Brown’s car to make the purchase.
10
Brown panicked, and that Brown began acting “like a caged
animal.” Brown explained that he had had trouble with a female
probation officer. The officers knocked a third time, and asked
Fisher to come outside and identify Brown’s car. When Fisher
returned to the apartment, his bedroom window was open and Brown
was not in the apartment.
Lt. Keller also testified that, at about 10:30 p.m. on May
8, Brown went voluntarily to the Sheriff Department’s detective
bureau. After being advised of his rights, Brown made an oral
statement.11 Lt. Keller testified that Brown made a series of
false statements in the course of the questioning that ensued.
First, Brown stated that Michael Hood and Daigle had argued, and
thus that Hood, not Brown, must have killed her. Brown admitted
that he had taken Daigle to collect the hibachi grill, and said
that he and Daigle went back to Brown’s apartment after the grill
was retrieved. Brown said that Hood was waiting outside Brown’s
apartment, that the three of them went inside, and that Hood and
Daigle subsequently argued about whether Hood was the father of
Daigle’s child before Hood and Daigle left together in Brown’s
car.12 When Lt. Keller informed Brown that Hood had been
11
Brown was arrested for Texas parole violations at 7 a.m.
on May 9. He remained in custody, and subsequently made a taped
statement on May 11. At the conclusion of his taped statement,
he was arrested for Daigle’s murder.
12
Lt. Keller brought Hood into the detective bureau to
confront Brown during the early morning of May 9. Upon seeing
Hood, Brown jumped up and asked why Hood had killed Daigle.
11
incarcerated at the time the child was conceived, Brown changed
his story to indicate that the argument “might have been” about
the paternity of Daigle’s child. In Brown’s later taped
statement, he claimed that he knew that Hood could not have been
the father of Daigle’s child, and instead maintained that the
argument between Hood and Daigle concerned Hood’s wanting the
baby.
Next, Brown denied that he was familiar with the Siegen Lane
house. Lt. Keller stated that he asked Brown about the Siegen
Lane house during the initial interrogation on the evening of May
8. He told Brown that the body had been discovered at 10443
Siegen Lane Road, at an abandoned house set back from the main
road by a gravel and dirt road, in a culvert located in a heavily
weeded area behind the house. He then asked if Brown was
familiar with the location where the body had been found. Brown
stated that he knew about the location from having seen it on the
news, but completely denied that he personally knew the house or
was familiar with the area. On May 11, Brown was shown
photographs of the Siegen Lane house and its environs. However,
Brown continued to deny that he had ever seen the location
depicted in each specific photograph. He eventually admitted
that he knew Dawn Harding, and that he had visited the Siegen
Lane house with Laura Cramer while they were dating.
Hood, with equal vehemence, denied having done so and called
Brown a liar.
12
Lt. Keller also testified that Brown’s demeanor changed when
he was confronted with evidence that Brown had been at the Siegen
Lane house. On May 11, during Brown’s taped statement, Lt.
Keller showed Brown photographs of the Siegen Lane house. Brown
became extremely agitated. He began shaking, and his eyes began
tearing up. On cross-examination, Lt. Keller conceded that he
had taken a more hostile tone with Brown at this point in the
interview because he thought Brown was lying to him.
Laura Cramer also testified that Brown called her and tried
to prevent her from telling the police that he was familiar with
the Siegen Lane house. On the morning of May 9, Brown called
Cramer and asked her if she had heard about Daigle’s murder.
When she said that she had, he asked her not to tell anyone that
she had been at the crime scene or knew where it was. Brown
called Cramer again later that day, and said that he hoped she
would not “f” him over. During the days that followed, Brown
called her repeatedly, both at work and at home, until Cramer
changed her home phone number.
6. Alibi
Fisher testified as to Brown’s whereabouts between 9 p.m.
and 7 a.m. on May 6. Brown and Daigle came into the Capital
Grocery Store (where Fisher worked) around 5:30 or 6 p.m. Fisher
next saw Brown at about 9:05 p.m., when Fisher came home from
work. Fisher and Brown went to play pool at about 10 p.m., and
13
did not return to the apartment until 12:30 or 1 a.m. Fisher did
not hear Brown leave the apartment between 1 a.m. and 7 a.m. the
next morning. At 7:30 a.m., Brown telephoned his employer,
Salvador Saia. Saia returned the call at around 8 a.m. Brown
went to work, where he remained all day.13
B. Procedural History
On the basis of the evidence described above, Brown was
convicted of second-degree murder. See Brown I, 594 So.2d at
324. He was sentenced to the mandatory term of life imprisonment
at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension
of sentence. See id. Brown appealed his sentence, enumerating
thirteen assignments of error (but abandoning five). See id.The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal found that the trial
court had committed reversible error by admitting a hearsay
statement by Michael Hood. Without the statement, the court
ruled, “the state’s case for the otherwise apparently motiveless
killing of the victim depended entirely upon inferences from the
trier of fact from circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 326. The
Court of Appeal reversed Brown’s conviction and sentence, and
remanded the case to the trial court. See id.
13
At trial, Brown unsuccessfully tried to introduce
hearsay evidence indicating that a young girl, Jamie Gary, had
seen Daigle on the afternoon of May 7. The State was unable to
locate Jamie Gary, and the police, who had interviewed her, were
convinced that she was confused and had actually seen Daigle on
the afternoon of May 6.
14
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal’s
decision, reinstated Brown’s conviction and sentence, and
remanded the case to the Court of Appeal for consideration of the
remaining assignments of error. See State v. Brown, 562 So.2d
868 (La. 1990) (“Brown II”). On remand, the Court of Appeal
determined that the remaining assignments of error, including a
sufficiency of the evidence claim, lacked merit, and affirmed the
conviction and sentence. See State v. Brown, 594 So.2d 372 (La.
Ct. App. 1991) (“Brown III”). One court of appeals judge
dissented, finding that the evidence was insufficient to sustain
the verdict. See Brown III, 594 So.2d at 393-97. Brown applied
for review in the Louisiana Supreme Court, which was denied. See
State v. Brown, 596 So.2d 552 (La. 1992) (“Brown IV”).
On January 6, 1997, Brown timely filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Louisiana under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his
petiton, he raised four issues, including sufficiency of the
evidence. Adopting the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation over Brown’s written objections, the district
court entered a judgment dismissing Brown’s petition. On June 2,
1999, this court granted Brown a certificate of appealability on
the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence. This appeal
ensued.
II. DISCUSSION
15
Brown argues that (1) the prosecution failed to prove a time
of death or produce a weapon, (2) the evidence that his car was
present at the crime scene was inconclusive, (3) there was
evidence that he was in his apartment at the time his car was
allegedly seen at the crime scene, (4) Brett Fontenot was equally
familiar with the Siegen Lane house and acted suspiciously, (5)
his agitation during the taped statement could be explained by
Lt. Keller’s hostile interrogative style, and (6) evidence that
he asked Laura Cramer to conceal his familiarity with the Siegen
Lane location is insufficient to support an inference of guilt.
Thus, Brown contends, the Court of Appeal unreasonably applied
the Jackson standard in determining that the evidence adduced at
his trial was sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict of second-
degree murder. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
Brown’s petition for habeas review was filed after April 24,
1996, the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). Consequently, the AEDPA governs our
review of his petition. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336
(1997).
As an initial matter, the AEDPA requires that a state court
have adjudicated the claim on the merits. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d). Here, after the Louisiana Supreme Court remanded the
appeal to the Louisiana Court of Appeal in Brown II, the latter
court determined that the evidence was sufficient to sustain
16
Brown’s conviction. See Brown III, 594 So.2d at 384-87. The
Court of Appeal’s decision on direct appeal constitutes an
“adjudication on the merits.” See Jackson v. State, 112 F.3d
823, 824-25 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1119 (1998).
Under the AEDPA’s statutory scheme, we review pure questions
of law and mixed questions of law and fact under § 2254(d)(1),
and questions of fact under § 2254(d)(2). See § 2254(d).14 This
court has applied § 2254(d)(1) when reviewing the constitutional
sufficiency of the evidence supporting a state court’s ruling.
See Hughes v. Johnson, 191 F.3d 607, 620, 621 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 120 S.Ct. 1003 (2000).
Our review of a state-court decision under § 2254(d)(1) is
extremely limited. We are bound to uphold such a decision unless
we find that it was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A
decision is contrary to clearly established Federal law if the
state court (1) “arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached
by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law;” or (2) “confronts
facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant
Supreme Court precedent and arrives at [an opposite result].”
Williams v. Taylor, 2000 WL 385369, at *23 (U.S.). A decision
14
Factual findings are presumed to be correct unless the
petitioner shows by clear and convincing evidence that they were
unreasonably determined “in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
17
involves an unreasonable application of clearly established
Federal law if the state court (1) “identifies the the correct
governing legal rule from [the Supreme] Court’s cases but
unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state
prisoner’s case;” or (2) “either unreasonably extends a legal
principle from our precedent to a new context . . . or
unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context
where it should apply.” Id. at *25 (citation omitted).
Furthermore, a federal court may not issue a habeas writ “simply
because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the
relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal
law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at *27.
Here, Brown seeks to apply the clearly established Jackson
v. Virginia standard for determining the constitutional
sufficiency of the evidence on federal habeas review. See
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). The Court of Appeal
specifically applied this standard in reviewing Brown’s
sufficiency claim in Brown III. See Brown III, 594 So.2d at 384.
Thus, the question before us is whether its application of the
Jackson v. Virginia standard was objectively unreasonable. See
Williams, 2000 WL 385369, at *24.
B. Analysis
The inquiry under Jackson is whether, “after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
18
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Furthermore, under Jackson, “a federal
habeas corpus court faced with a record of historical facts that
supports conflicting inferences must presume . . . that the trier
of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution,
and must defer to that resolution.” Id. at 326. This standard
is applied with “explicit reference to the substantive elements
of the criminal offense as defined by state law.” Id. at 324
n.16.
At the time of Brown’s 1989 conviction, Louisiana state law
defined second-degree murder as, in relevant part:
the killing of a human being:
(1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or
to inflict great bodily harm . . . .
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 14:30.1 (West 1987). Furthermore, Louisiana
statutory and common law permitted specific intent to kill or
inflict great bodily harm to be inferred from the circumstances
of the attack and the actions of the defendant. See LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 15:445 (repealed 1989); State v. Carney, 319 So.2d
400, 402 (La. 1975) (“[T]he numerous stab wounds furnished
adequate evidence of the requisite ‘specific intent to kill or
inflict great bodily harm . . . .’”).
In Brown III, the Louisiana Court of Appeal stated that the
prosecution had “proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Sheri Lynn
19
Daigle was the victim of a (second degree) murder. Thus, the
question before us is . . . whether or not the evidence was
legally sufficient to prove [Brown’s] identity as the perpetrator
of this crime.” See Brown III, 594 So.2d at 384. To answer this
question, the Court of Appeal recited the “evidence introduced at
trial and the various inferences which may reasonably be drawn
from that evidence . . . .” Id. at 385.
We summarize the evidence enumerated by the Court of Appeal,
see id. at 385-87, as follows: Michael Hood reported that Daigle
told him that Brown was sexually interested in her, but that she
was not interested in Brown. Kimberly Cagle stated that Brown
told her he “needed a woman.” On the evening of May 7, witnesses
saw Daigle and Brown together at the 609 Spanish Town Road
apartments, at the Prescott Place apartments retrieving the
hibachi grill, and driving away from the Prescott Place
apartments, but no one saw Daigle alive after she was seen with
Brown. The hibachi was found at the crime scene. Daigle was
seen wearing the same clothes her body was found in. Daigle’s
jeans were unzipped and pulled down, but no seminal fluid was
detected in a vaginal swab taken from her body. Daigle’s chin
was lacerated, which could have been caused either by a blow with
a blunt instrument or by placing Daigle’s body in the septic
tank. The coroner estimated that Daigle died somewhere between 7
p.m. on May 6 and 1 p.m. on May 7.
20
Elgin Campbell saw a car resembling Brown’s coming out of
the driveway at 10443 Siegen Lane at about daybreak on May 7.
The car had a noisy exhaust system, and Campbell saw that Brown’s
car had a “bad” exhaust system when he inspected the underside of
the car at the police lab. The police expert found that the
tires on Brown’s car had the same tread design as the cast from
the crime scene. The abandoned Siegen Lane house was extremely
secluded and set back from the road so as to be barely visible.
The area behind the house was overgrown, and the trail to the
septic tanks was freshly made and direct. Brown knew the Siegen
Lane house and the location of the septic tanks. Brown lied
about his knowledge of the Siegen Lane house, and made efforts to
conceal this knowledge by calling Laura Cramer. Brown began
shaking and his eyes “teared up” when Lt. Keller confronted him
with the fact that he had lied about his familiarity with the
Siegen Lane house.
The Court of Appeal stated that, from this evidence, a
reasonable inference could be drawn that (1) “someone may have
had sex or attempted to have sex” with Daigle, id. at 386; (2)
the pathway to the septic tanks where Daigle’s body was found
“had been formed by the individual who had placed the victim’s
body in the septic tank and that that person had prior knowledge
of the location of the septic tanks,” id. at 386-87; and (3) that
Brown had a guilty mind, see id. at 387. The Court of Appeal
concluded that “[v]iewing all of the evidence introduced in this
21
case, both direct and circumstantial, in the light most favorable
to the state, we find that any rational trier of fact could have
concluded beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that [Brown] committed
the second degree murder of Sheri Lynn Daigle.” Id. at 387.
Based on our careful consideration of the Brown III
decision and our review of the record, we cannot say that the
Court of Appeal’s application of the Jackson standard was
objectively unreasonable. The Court of Appeal applied this
standard with reference to the substantive elements of second-
degree murder as defined under Louisiana law. The court
considered all of the evidence in the record, as indicated by the
facts enumerated in its opinion. Furthermore, since the court
also concluded that guilt was proven to the exclusion of all
reasonable hypotheses of innocence, it appears that the court
assumed, in accordance with Jackson’s mandate, that the jury
resolved all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the
prosecution. Brown has not demonstrated that this application of
Jackson is either arbitrary or contrary to Supreme Court
precedent. Furthermore, our prior decisions require us to accord
great deference to the determination resulting from the Louisiana
Court of Appeal’s thorough consideration of the evidence. See
Callins v. Collins, 998 F.2d 269, 276 (5th Cir. 1993).
Consequently, we decline to rule the Court of Appeal’s
determination that the evidence was sufficient such as to merit
issuance of the writ.
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III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court.
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