Slaughter v. Shackelford ( 2000 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 98-11425
DEWAYNE SLAUGHTER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
OFFICER SHACKELFORD; OFFICER ORTIZ,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of Texas
(5:97-CV-291)
March 22, 2000
Before GARWOOD, WIENER, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, Dewayne Slaughter, a
Texas prisoner, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that
Defendant-Officers Shackelford and Ortiz used excessive force in
violation of the Eighth Amendment during an incident at the Lubbock
County Jail. The district court denied Slaughter’s motion for
summary judgment and granted summary judgment to the officers,
dismissing Slaughter’s claim. Because there exists a genuine issue
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
of material fact, we vacate the judgment and remand for trial.
I.
Slaughter was arrested on a warrant revoking his parole and
for burglary of a habitation on April 27, 1997, and was placed in
the Lubbock County Jail. On the night of July 14, 1997, Slaughter
was shaving in the jail’s day room when Shackelford, who was
distributing personal care items to prisoners, directed him to put
on his shirt. Slaughter objected and debated with Shackelford as
to whether the rules permitted a prisoner to have his shirt off in
the day room while shaving. After a moment of arguing, Shackelford
went to his superiors to determine who was correct. He returned
shortly thereafter and confirmed Slaughter’s assertion that a
prisoner could shave without his shirt on in the day room.
From this point on, the two sides present conflicting versions
of what happened. Slaughter maintains that Shackelford ordered him
to come with Shackelford to another part of the jail, while
Shackelford asserts that Slaughter demanded to see some “brass,” or
higher ranking officers. What is clear is that Shackelford, with
the assistance of Ortiz, escorted Slaughter from the day room to
another part of the jail, whereupon the alleged use of excessive
force occurred.
According to Shackelford, when Ortiz and he were escorting
Slaughter through a door connecting the inmate corridor to the
office corridor, Slaughter became aggressive. Slaughter allegedly
had clenched fists by his side and was inches from Shackelford’s
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face, a posture that in itself was an aggressive act because
Shackelford could no longer see Slaughter’s hands, knees, or feet.
Shackelford responded by grabbing Slaughter’s arm and attempting to
move him forward. Instead of first moving forward, Slaughter
initially stepped back and then apparently proceeded towards
Shackelford. Upon observing what appeared to be an aggressive move
towards a fellow officer, Ortiz attempted to place himself between
Slaughter and Shackelford, but Slaughter tried to get past Ortiz.
Subsequently, Ortiz and Shackelford tried to restrain Slaughter and
again tried to move him forward. Slaughter allegedly continued to
resist.
Around this time, Sergeant Rocha observed the scuffle and told
the officers to handcuff Slaughter and take him to a violent cell.
Because the two officers did not have enough leverage and were not
able to turn Slaughter around, Shackelford utilized a straight-arm
takedown to force Slaughter to the ground to handcuff him.
Slaughter allegedly continued to resist, causing both officers to
end up on the floor with him and injuring Ortiz. After Slaughter
was handcuffed, Shackelford and Ortiz took him to the violent cell
where his handcuffs were removed. Slaughter did not indicate that
he needed medical attention. The two officers then left and
returned to their other duties.
Slaughter’s account of that night’s events contrasts sharply
with the officers’ version. He maintains that he expressed no
hostility or belligerence while being escorted. Instead, Slaughter
asserts that upon being taken to the trap door, the two officers
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jumped on his body. According to Slaughter’s deposition testimony,
he was standing by the wall next to the trap door when Shackelford
started to yell at him. Slaughter apparently turned around to face
Shackelford, whereupon Shackelford came within inches of
Slaughter’s face. Thereafter, Ortiz allegedly came behind
Slaughter and grabbed Slaughter’s throat, spinning him around into
the wall. As Ortiz spun Slaughter around, Slaughter contends that
Shackelford grabbed his arm and moved him forward through the door.
At that point, an officer called out to take Slaughter down.
Slaughter argues that he gave no resistance and that he actually
aided the officers by placing his body in a prone position on his
own initiative. While Slaughter concedes that Ortiz let up on his
hold, he states that Shackelford utilized his arms in a choking
fashion. After the officers placed Slaughter under control, he was
escorted to the “Rubber Room,” where he alleges that he was again
taken to the floor and then hit upon by another officer.
Slaughter did not initially request medical attention upon
being placed in the violent cell, but he charges that such requests
were tendered to Rocha during the 10 to 11 hours that he was in the
cell that night. Notwithstanding those requests, medical attention
was not given until July 19, five days later. At the medical
examination, Slaughter was prescribed Motrin and bed rest for five
days. In mid-August, he again requested and received medical
attention after further complaining of back, neck, and arm pain.
On September 23, 1997, Slaughter filed suit complaining of
injuries suffered from Shackelford and Ortiz’ use of force. A
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magistrate judge held a hearing pursuant to Spears v. McCotter, 766
F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985), to determine the precise claims made by
Slaughter. The magistrate judge concluded that Slaughter was
pleading an excessive force claim that sufficiently asserted a
constitutional deprivation and, therefore, ordered responsive
pleadings from the two officers. In their jointly filed answer,
the officers denied using any excessive force, although they
admitted to taking Slaughter down. After both parties submitted
motions for summary judgment, the district court granted
Shackelford and Ortiz’ motion and denied Slaughter’s.
II.
We review a grant or denial of summary judgment de novo. See
Webb v. Cardiothoracic Surgery Assocs., P.A., 139 F.3d 532, 536
(5th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with any affidavits filed in support of the motion, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c). The summary judgment evidence is reviewed in the
light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Melton v. Teachers Ins.
& Annuity Ass’n, 114 F.3d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 1997). If the moving
party meets its initial burden of showing that there is no genuine
issue, then the burden shifts to the nonmovant to set forth
specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(e). The nonmovant cannot satisfy his summary
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judgment burden with conclusional allegations, unsubstantiated
assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence. See Little v. Liquid
Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). If the
nonmovant fails to respond, then summary judgment, if appropriate,
shall be entered against that party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
III.
When prison officials stand accused of using excessive force
in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the key inquiry is whether
“force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson
v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 999 (1992), rev’g, 929 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir.
1990). To aid in this examination, we have established several
factors for review. They include:
1) the extent of the injury suffered;
2) the need for the application of force;
3) the relationship between the need and the amount of
force used;
4) the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible
officials; and
5) any efforts made to temper the severity of a
forceful response.
Hudson v. McMillian, 962 F.2d 522, 523 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing
Hudson, 112 S. Ct. 995, 999 (1992)). Of these factors, the primary
emphasis is “the degree of force employed in relation to the
apparent need for it, as distinguished from the extent of injury
suffered.” Gomez v. Chandler, 163 F.3d 921, 923 (5th Cir. 1999).
Indeed, the physical injury need not be significant, serious, or
more than minor. See id. at 924. De minimis uses of force,
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however, are excluded from Eighth Amendment analysis provided that
the use of such force is not “repugnant to the conscience of
mankind.” See Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1000.
In its order, the district court held that Slaughter could not
show that Defendants used force maliciously and sadistically in a
manner to cause harm to Slaughter and that the summary judgment
evidence indicated that Defendants applied force in a good faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline. But Slaughter’s version
of the events of July 14 contradicts those conclusions. From the
original complaint filed with the Lubbock County Jail’s
administration to his deposition testimony, Slaughter has
consistently maintained that the officers attacked him despite a
lack of aggression on his part. In essence, Slaughter charges that
there was no good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline;
rather, the inference from Slaughter’s deposition testimony and his
administrative complaint is that Defendants used force maliciously,
possibly in retaliation for Slaughter’s refutation of Shackelford’s
directive that shaving with a shirt off in the day room was
prohibited. Hence, we conclude that a genuine issue of material
fact exists as to whether force was applied in a good-faith effort
to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically
to cause harm.
As further support for its ruling, though, the district court
also concluded that Slaughter had not suffered an injury that was
more than de minimis. Thus, it apparently surmised that he had not
suffered an identifiable injury sufficient to make out a claim for
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use of excessive force. The summary judgment evidence, however,
indicates that due to Defendants’ actions, medical personnel
prescribed five days of bed rest, in addition to medication, for
Slaughter’s injuries. Such injuries are more than de minimis and
are sufficient to state an excessive force claim.
For the assigned reasons, we vacate the judgment of the
district court and remand for a trial on the merits.
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