United States v. Almanza-Cerda ( 1999 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
____________
No. 98-50828
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LUIS RAMON ALMANZA-CERDA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
(DR-97-CR-428)
December 22, 1999
Before JOLLY, EMILIO M. GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Luis Ramon Almanza-Cerda (“Almanza”) appeals his conviction for possession of marijuana
with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), citing insufficient evidence to sustain the
conviction. We affirm.
While en route to the United States from Mexico in his late-model Chevrolet pickup truck,
Almanza was stopped at the Eagle Pass port of entry, where he was confronted by two customs
inspectors. Custom Inspector Schussler “took the normal declaration” from Almanza. Almanza
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
told Schussler that he was coming from Piedras Negras, a border town just across the river from
Eagle Pass, that he was making the trip to Eagle Pass to go shopping, and that he had nothing to
declare.
Meanwhile, Customs Inspector Perales began a physical inspection of the vehicle. The
truck had “saddle” gas tanks on both sides. Perales hit the side of one tank with a hammer and it
produced a thud, which Perales identified as an indicator that something solid was contained
within the tank. Perales than examined the tank visually and identified signs of recent tampering.
During this inspection, the truck stalled. Schussler asked Almanza if he was out of gas, and
Almanza responded that he was going to Eagle Pass to buy a new fuel pump. Almanza then
successfully re-started the truck.
The inspectors then directed Almanza to the secondary inspection area, where Inspector
Ramos asked Almanza who owned the truck. Almanza replied that it was his. During a canine
search of the vehicle, the dog alerted to the gas tanks. The inspectors proceeded to remove the
tanks from the truck; in the process, one inspector observed that the bolts connecting the tanks to
the truck had been tampered with and that fresh mud had been recently placed there. Opening the
tanks revealed large metal boxes which had been inserted before the tanks were welded shut. The
boxes were so large that, as Inspector Perales testified, “barely any gasoline” could fit within the
tanks. The boxes contained a total of 149 pounds of marijuana. Almanza was tried and convicted
of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and
sentenced to forty-one months imprisonment.
To obtain a conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana, the government must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Almanza “(1) knowing[ly] (2) possess[ed] the drugs in question
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(3) with intent to distribute them.” United States v. Ortega Reyna, 148 F.3d 540, 543-44 (5th Cir.
1998). As he did at trial, on appeal Almanza contests only the element of knowledge, asserting that
the government produced insufficient evidence that he knew drugs were in the truck. We review the
record in the light most favorable to the verdict, asking only “if a rational trier of fact could have
found that the evidence established the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.”
United States v. Ramos-Garcia, 184 F.3d 463, 465-66 (5th Cir. 1999).
Generally, we allow juries to infer that a defendant has knowledge of the presence of drugs
when the defendant has exercised control over the vehicle containing the contraband. See Ortega
Reyna, 148 F.3d at 544. However, in cases where the contraband is contained in “hidden
compartments” within a vehicle, “control over the vehicle alone is not sufficient to prove knowledge.”
United States v. Garza, 990 F.2d 171, 174 (5th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Pennington, 20
F.3d 593, 598 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding drugs “hidden” when not “clearly visible or readily accessible”).
We require additional evidence in these cases because juries should entertain the “fair assumption that
a third party might have concealed the controlled substances in the vehicle with the intent to use the
unwitting defendant as the carrier in a smuggling enterprise.” United States v. Resio-Trejo, 45 F.3d
907, 911 (5th Cir. 1995).
Recognizing that “[t]he knowledge element in a possession case can rarely be established by
direct evidence,” Garza, 990 F.2d at 174, we have identified many circumstantial factors which,
combined with control over the vehicle, can be sufficient to prove the defendant’s requisite “guilty
knowledge.” See Ortega Reyna, 148 F.3d at 544 & nn. 11-19 (listing factors and citing cases). The
government argues that several circumstantial factors present in this case constitute sufficient
evidence to infer Almanza’s knowledge. We agree. First, Almanza admitted his ownership, not
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merely his possession, of the truck; he claimed he had purchased it one month before the event in
question.1 This fact, somewhat unusual in hidden compartment cases, supports the inference that
Almanza knew the truck contained contraband. See United States v. Williams-Hendricks, 805 F.2d
496, 501 (5th Cir. 1986) (“As the owner of the truck [in which gas tanks had been modified to house
marijuana], [the defendant] had control over who used it an how it was used.”); cf. Resio-Trejo, 45
F.3d at 912 (“In the typical hidden compartment case, the driver disclaims ownership of the
vehicle.”).
Second, Inspector Perales testified, and the exhibits introduced by the government showed,
that “barely any gasoline” could fit in the tanks. In an analogous case, we held that when there is
evidence that a secret compartment has greatly decreased a vehicle’s fuel capacity, a jury could
“rationally infer that [a defendant] would notice such a dramatic decrease in the fuel capacity of his
truck.” Resio-Trejo, 45 F.3d at 913. While the facts of Resio-Trejo are not identical to the facts of
the case at bar, the additional evidence presented by the government))Almanza’s previous ownership
of an automobile body shop and his statement that he was going to Eagle Pass to buy a fuel
pump))makes the government’s argument equally compelling here.
Third, 149 pounds of marijuana were found in Almanza’s gas tanks, having an aggregate
street value of over $112,000. The jury reasonably could have inferred that it was extremely unlikely
that a third party would entrust a product that valuable to an unknowing carrier, hoping to recover
it across the border. See Ramos-Garcia, 184 F.3d at 466 (agreeing with the government’s argument
that “it is unreasonable to believe that [the defendant] would have been entrusted with a large quantity
1
The record is devoid of any evidence that the truck had been stolen or borrowed from
Almanza at any point during the one month he owned it.
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of drugs without his knowledge”). As in Resio-Trejo, in this case “we find the alternative explanation
for what happened incredulous: that someone would take [Almanza’s] truck and, without his
knowledge, spend several days constructing secret compartments in the gas tanks, load these
compartments with over $130,000 worth of marijuana, and return the truck to him.” Resio-Trejo,
45 F.3d at 913.
Viewing the evidence as a whole in a light most favorable to the verdict, we hold that there
was sufficient evidence for the jury to have concluded that Almanza knowingly possessed the
marijuana hidden within the secret compartments of his truck’s gas tanks. Accordingly, we AFFIRM
Almanza’s conviction.
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