Ruiz v. Lynaugh ( 1996 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 95-40005
____________________
DAVID R. RUIZ,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
and
CURTIS R. CLOWDUS,
Plaintiff,
versus
JAMES A. LYNAUGH; LARRY CROW; G. B. FLOWERS;
M. SHARP, Captain; FNU ENGLAND, Sgt;
D. LANMAN; MISSY SMITH; FNU GRIFFIN; B. MILES;
EDUARDO GARCIA; OLGA A. PERRY; FNU STRICKLAND;
GREG BARNHART; CATHY BURRIS,
Defendants,
and
SAMUEL BENNETT; WILLIAM MEIER,
Defendants-Appellants.
_______________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas
(89-CV-497)
_______________________________________________________________
June 26, 1996
Before JOLLY, DUHÉ, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
Two correctional officers appeal judgments entered against them for
retaliatory actions that they took against a prison "writ writer."
We reverse in part, vacate in part and remand.
David Ruiz ("Ruiz"), an inmate well-known throughout the Texas
prison community for his high-profile role in prisoner reform
litigation, filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983against nineteen prison employees. Ruiz alleged that the prison
employees had violated his constitutional rights in retaliation for
his participation in class action litigation against the Texas
penal system. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982).
A jury found that two of the named defendants, Robert Bennett
("Bennett") and William Meier ("Meier"), retaliated against Ruiz
and were liable for damages. Specifically, the jury found that
Bennett retaliated against Ruiz by searching Ruiz's cell and
confiscating certain items. The jury also found retaliation on the
part of Meier, who had searched Ruiz's cell and left it in a state
of disarray. However, in both cases, the jury found that each
correctional officer would have engaged in the same conduct even in
the absence of a retaliatory motive and therefore awarded Ruiz with
only two dollars in nominal damages.
Thereafter, in ruling upon Ruiz's posttrial motion for
equitable relief, the district court entered a declaratory judgment
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against Bennett1 and a permanent injunction against Meier.2 At the
same time, the district court entered a partial final judgment that
ordered Bennett and Meier to pay one dollar each in nominal damages
to Ruiz; the judgment also dismissed all other claims and
defendants to the lawsuit.3 Bennett and Meier noticed an appeal of
the district court's partial final judgment, permanent injunction,
declaratory judgment and memorandum opinion regarding the award of
equitable relief.
1
The declaratory judgment states in relevant part:
DECLARED that defendant Robert Bennett violated
plaintiff David Ruiz's Constitutional rights by
retaliating against him for his legal and other
expressive activity by means of confiscating a
therapeutic rubber ball and typewriter hinge from
plaintiff David Ruiz's prison cell.
2
The permanent injunction states in relevant part:
... defendant William Meier ... is hereby
PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from searching plaintiff David
Ruiz's cell and leaving it in a state of disarray
in retaliation for Plaintiff David Ruiz's legal or
other expressive activities.
3
In its listing of the dismissed defendants, the district
court's partial final judgment does not expressly mention one named
defendant to this lawsuit, Greg Barnhart. We note however that,
apart from an opening statement reference made by Ruiz's counsel to
defendant "John Barnhart," the claims related to Greg Barnhart were
not presented at trial. In addition, the record contains nothing
to indicate that Ruiz successfully served Barnhart on or prior to
November 3, 1994, the service compliance date imposed by order of
the district court. Therefore, despite some ambiguity in the
record, we conclude that Greg Barnhart was not a defendant at the
time of trial and that the partial final judgment did indeed
dismiss all remaining defendants to this lawsuit.
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I
Before reaching the merits of this appeal, we address sua
sponte our appellate jurisdiction of this matter. Federal circuit
courts only have jurisdiction over three types of appeals: (1)
final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291; (2) certain specific types of
interlocutory appeals, such as those where injunctive relief is
involved, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1); and (3) an appeal that the
district court has certified as final pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(b), 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Dardar v. LaFourche
Realty Co., Inc., 849 F.2d 955, 957 (5th Cir. 1988). In a
multiparty lawsuit such as this one, a district court order is
final only if it adjudicates the claims or the rights and
liabilities of all the parties, or if it expressly determines that
there is no just reason for delay and expressly directs the entry
of judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b); see also, e.g., Jetco
Electronic Industries, Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1231 (5th
Cir. 1973). The record before us includes a "Partial Final
Judgment" of the district court, but nothing that resembles a Rule
54(b) certification. While we clearly have appellate jurisdiction
to hear an appeal from the grant of an injunction, the appellants
ask us to review and rule upon much more than the permanent
injunction that was entered against Meier.
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Previously in this circuit, we have taken a "practical, not
technical" approach to finality. Jetco, 473 F.2d at 1231. We have
held that a series of orders, considered together, may dispose of
all claims and all parties to a lawsuit and thereby terminate the
litigation just as effectively as a single, final order of the
district court. Id.; see also Riley v. Wooten, 999 F.2d 802,
804-05 (5th Cir. 1993). Collectively considered, the district
court's partial final judgment, permanent injunction and
declaratory judgment dispose of all claims or rights and
liabilities of all remaining parties to this litigation.4 We
therefore exercise our appellate jurisdiction and turn to the
merits of this appeal.
II
Our disposition of the substantive merits of this appeal is
controlled by Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161 (5th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S.Ct. 800 (1996). In Woods, our court reviewed the
4
We note in passim that Ruiz's motion for attorney's fees
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 remains outstanding and subject to a stay of
the district court pending resolution of this appeal. The question
whether judgments are final and appealable prior to a ruling on
section 1988 attorney's fees was addressed by our court in Cobb v.
Miller, 818 F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. 1987). In Cobb, we concluded that,
because of the collateral nature of the outstanding section 1988
fee question in that case, the district court's judgment on the
merits was final and appealable. Our reasoning in Cobb is
applicable to this case, and we therefore conclude that the
outstanding section 1988 fee issue here does not bar our exercise
of appellate jurisdiction over the district court's cumulative
judgments.
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denial of a motion for summary judgment in a section 1983 prisoner
retaliation case and held that prisoners must satisfy a "but for"
standard in such cases. Id. at 1166. Recognizing that this
standard places a significant burden on the inmate, we nonetheless
held that an inmate fails to state a claim of retaliation if he is
not "prepared to establish that but for the retaliatory motive the
complained of incident ... would not have occurred." Id.
Our court is not alone in applying the "but for" standard to
prisoners' retaliation claims. The Eighth Circuit has consistently
adhered to this same standard in reviewing retaliatory transfer
claims filed against prison officials. E.g., Goff v. Burton, 7
F.3d 734, 738-39 (8th Cir. 1993) (reversing district court's
posttrial judgment in favor of prisoner because district court
failed to evaluate trial evidence under the correct "but for"
standard); Ponchik v. Bogan, 929 F.2d 419, 420 (8th Cir. 1991)
(despite fact that prisoner's filing of lawsuits was a clear factor
in his transfer, prisoner's claim of retaliatory transfer failed
because officials would have requested the transfer notwithstanding
the prisoner's litigation activities); Orebaugh v. Caspari, 910
F.2d 526, 529 (8th Cir. 1990) (to prevail on retaliation claim,
prisoner has heavy burden of showing that, but for an impermissible
motive on the part of prison officials, disciplinary charges would
not have been brought).
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Because the jury found as a fact that Bennett and Meier would
have engaged in the same conduct even without a retaliatory motive,
Ruiz did not establish, as required by Woods, that but for the
retaliatory motive the complained of incidents would not have
occurred. Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166. We therefore conclude as a
matter of law that Ruiz failed to satisfy this circuit's "but for"
standard and, accordingly, failed to prove his claim of
retaliation. The district court's permanent injunction against
Meier and its declaratory judgment against Bennett are VACATED.
The district court's partial final judgment awarding nominal
damages to Ruiz is REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
VACATED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
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