Pinkney v. Chappell ( 1996 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-60204
Summary Calendar
BOBBY J. PINKNEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MALCOLM E. MCMILLAN,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 4:95-CV-40-B-A
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July 17, 1996
Before SMITH, BENAVIDES and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Bobby J. Pinkney, a Mississippi state prisoner, filed this
civil rights action against the Sheriff and Board of Supervisors
of the county in which he was convicted, Governor Kirk Fordice,
Eddie Lucas, former interim Commissioner of the Mississippi
Department of Corrections (MDOC), Edward Hargett, former MDOC
superintendent, and MDOC. Pinkney alleged numerous constitutional
violations arising out of the conditions of his confinement at
the state penal institution in Parchman, Mississippi, and
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
requested both injunctive and monetary relief. This appeal raises
the question of whether the district court abused its discretion
in dismissing Pinkney’s complaint for failing to comply with the
court’s order to exhaust administrative remedies.
The district court in the Southern District of Mississippi
dismissed the Sheriff and Board of Supervisors because they no
longer had control over the conditions of Pinkney’s confinement
and sua sponte transferred the complaint to the Northern District
of Mississippi, where Parchman is located.
A magistrate judge for the Northern District issued a 90-day
stay order, ordering Pinkney to make a good faith attempt to
exhaust the available administrative remedies. The magistrate
judge ordered Pinkney to file a certificate from the
Administrative Remedy Program (ARP) that he had exhausted his
administrative remedies within 90 days after the date of the
order or to file a statement that he had attempted to obtain the
certificate but had not been furnished with one within 150 days
of the date of the order. The order warned Pinkney that if he did
not reasonably and in good faith attempt to exhaust his
administrative remedies, his complaint would be dismissed with
prejudice.
Pinkney submitted a request to the ARP, in which he
requested an administrative remedy for all of the issues listed
in his federal complaint. Pinkney’s request was denied because he
had requested a remedy for more than one incident in a single
complaint.
Approximately 75 days after the issuance of the stay order,
Pinkney submitted to the court his request for an administrative
remedy, the denial of that request, and a sworn statement in
which he outlined the actions that he had taken. Pinkney stated
that he took no further action after his request was denied
because it would be “meaningless.” Pinkney construed the “one
issue, one complaint” rule to limit him to one request in the
program at a time; thus, he could not file a second request until
his first request had been resolved. Pinkney argued, then, that
it would take “years” to grieve all of his complaints because it
allegedly takes 90 days for a single complaint to be decided.
Pinkney asked the court to consider that he had complied with the
court’s stay order so that his case could proceed or advise him
on how to pursue the case.
Over three months later, the district court issued an order
dismissing Pinkney’s complaint without prejudice for failure to
exhaust his administrative remedies because Pinkney had failed to
comply with the court’s order. Pinkney timely appealed.
Pinkney contends that he made a good-faith effort to exhaust
his remedies, that he complied with the stay order by submitting
a statement detailing the steps that he had taken, and that he
sought help from the district court as to how to proceed with his
case.
A district court may sua sponte dismiss an action for
failure to prosecute or to comply with any court order. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 41(b); McCullough v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 1126, 1127 (5th
Cir. 1988). A sua sponte dismissal by the district court
pursuant to Rule 41(b) must be upheld on appeal unless the court
determines that the district court abused its discretion in
choosing that sanction. Id.Although there is no general exhaustion requirement for
§ 1983 cases, Congress created a limited exhaustion requirement
for adult prisoners bringing actions pursuant to § 1983 in the
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e. Patsy v. Board of Regents of State of Florida, 457 U.S.
496, 507-08 (1982). If the court orders exhaustion of
administrative remedies, then § 1997e provides that the court may
continue the case for a period "not to exceed ninety days" to
require exhaustion. Rocky v. Vittorie, 813 F.2d 734, 736 (5th
Cir. 1987). A district court may dismiss a suit under § 1997e
after determining that the prisoner failed to make a good faith
attempt to exhaust his administrative remedies. Marsh v. Jones,
53 F.3d 707, 710 n.7 (5th Cir. 1995).
The stay order advised Pinkney that he could comply with the
order either by filing a certificate showing that he had
exhausted his administrative remedies or by filing a statement
that he had attempted, in good faith, to obtain the certificate
but had been unable. Pinkney timely submitted a statement to the
court detailing his good faith effort to secure the certificate
and requesting that the court lift the stay or further advise him
how to proceed. Pinkney’s submission complied with the order,
therefore, the district court’s dismissal of the complaint
without explanation was an abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, we VACATE and REMAND.