Hughes v. Grand Casinos Inc ( 1999 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 99-60123
_____________________
ALVIN K. HUGHES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GRAND CASINOS INC.; JIM PETERSON;
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
(1:97-CV-500-GR)
_________________________________________________________________
October 22, 1999
Before KING, Chief Judge, JOLLY and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Alvin K. Hughes appeals from the
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
Defendants-Appellees Grand Casino, Inc. and Jim Peterson. We
AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
In the Spring of 1997 Defendant-Appellee Grand Casinos, Inc.
(the “Casino”) restructured its Table Games Department.
Defendant-Appellee Jim Peterson (“Peterson”) was the vice-
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIRCUIT RULE 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIRCUIT
RULE 47.5.4.
president of the department during the restructuring. The
restructuring resulted in the demotion of forty-four employees
and the termination of twelve others. Plaintiff-Appellant Alvin
K. Hughes (“Hughes”) was one of two black male employees
terminated in the restructuring. Additionally, six white males,
two Hispanic males, and two white females were terminated.1
Hughes’s effective termination date was April 7, 1997. On
or about the same day, the Casino presented Hughes with a written
separation agreement (the “Agreement”). The Agreement released
the Casino from any and all claims arising out of Hughes’s
employment and his subsequent termination.2 In exchange for such
1
There appears to be some confusion regarding the number of
terminated white male employees. Hughes’s brief and the
affidavit of Defendant-Appellee Peterson both state that twelve
employees, including Hughes, were terminated: six white males,
two Hispanic males, two black males, and two white females. In
Hughes’s Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment,
however, Hughes attached an internal memorandum from the Casino’s
Human Resources Department discussing the restructuring. That
memo indicated that thirteen employees were terminated: seven
white males, two Hispanic males, two black males, and two white
females. In any event, the precise number and race of the
terminated employees does not affect our holding.
2
Specifically, the Agreement stated that Hughes
hereby releases and discharges Grand [the
Casino] and its affiliates, and all of their
directors, officers, and employees, agents,
successors and assigns from any and all
claims (except for claims under this
Agreement) arising out of Hughes’s employment
by Grand and/or the termination of such
employment, including but not limited to
claims arising under the United States
Constitution, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended, the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 47 U.S.C., [sic]
225, 661; the Civil Rights Act of 1991; the
2
release Hughes was to receive five weeks of salary as severance
pay. The Agreement gave Hughes fourteen days to consider the
offer and advised him to consult with an attorney prior to
acceptance. Hughes signed the Agreement sometime after he was
presented with it and received a check from the Casino.
On September 12, 1997, Hughes filed this action in federal
district court against the Casino and Peterson. Hughes’s
complaint alleged that his termination violated Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Casino and Peterson subsequently
filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Agreement
Hughes signed prevented him from maintaining this action. The
district court agreed, finding that Hughes had knowingly released
the Casino by signing the Agreement and, if not, he ratified it
by retaining his severance pay.
II. DISCUSSION
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. See Celotex
Equal Pay Act: [sic] the Rehabilitation in
Employment Act of 1973; Section 1981 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1966; the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, and any
other federal, state and local [sic] statute
or regulation regarding employment or
termination of employment, as well as all
common law claims, arising out of any act or
failure to act.
3
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986); Blakeney v. Lomas
Information Systems, Inc., 65 F.3d 482, 484 (5th Cir. 1995).
Summary judgment is proper when, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmovant, there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Amburgey v. Corhart Refractories
Corp., Inc., 936 F.2d 805, 809 (5th Cir. 1991); Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c).
An employee may enter into a binding agreement to release an
employer from all future claims so long as the employee enters
into the release knowingly and voluntarily. See Williams v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 23 F.3d 930 (5th Cir. 1994); EEOC v.
Cosmair, Inc., 821 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1987). A release will be
found to be valid unless the totality of the circumstances
indicates that the employee did not enter into the release
knowingly and voluntarily. See O’Hare v. Global Natural
Resources, 898 F.2d 1015, 1017 (5th Cir. 1990). Hughes argues
that he did not release the Casino because he did not knowingly
and voluntarily enter into the Agreement. Hughes points to our
decision in O’Hare for the proposition that a court should
consider six factors when determining whether a release was
entered into knowingly and voluntarily. These factors are:
(1) the plaintiff’s education and business
experience, (2) the amount of time the
plaintiff had possession of or access to the
agreement before signing it, (3) the role of
plaintiff in deciding the terms of the
agreement, (4) the clarity of the agreement,
(5) whether the plaintiff was represented by
or consulted with an attorney, and (6)
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whether the consideration given in exchange
for the waiver exceeds employee benefits to
which the employee was already entitled by
contract or law.
Id. (citations omitted). This list is not exclusive, and a court
need not address each of these six factors when determining
whether a release was entered into knowingly and voluntarily.
Rather, these are simply six “relevant” factors to consider under
the totality of the circumstances test. Id.
Hughes states that he was unsuccessful in attempting to
consult with an attorney, that he did not have a hand in
preparing the Agreement, and that he “felt pressured” to sign the
Agreement because he was told he would be terminated whether he
signed it or not. Hughes maintains that, under the totality of
the circumstances, these facts indicate that he could not have
entered into the Agreement knowingly and voluntarily. We
disagree.
Hughes’s failure to consult an attorney prior to signing the
Agreement does not compel the conclusion that he did not enter
into it knowingly and voluntarily. Consultation with an attorney
is a relevant, but not dispositive, factor in determining whether
a release was entered into knowingly. See O’Hare at 1017. It is
not the Casino’s fault that Hughes did not consult an attorney.
See Williams at 937.
Moreover, Hughes’s arguments that he “felt pressured” into
signing the Agreement and did not have a hand in drafting the
Agreement are insufficient, in the light of other statements, to
5
show that he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into the
Agreement. In his deposition testimony Hughes admitted that he
understood that signing the Agreement and accepting the severance
pay meant he was releasing the Casino from any claims. Hughes’s
statement that “[i]t was my understanding that irregardless of
whether or not I signed the agreement that I was still terminated
from the Grand” does not indicate that he was pressured into
signing the Agreement. While Hughes was to be terminated
regardless of whether he signed the Agreement, he could have
chosen not to sign it, foregone severance pay, and taken legal
action against the Casino. He did not. Instead he signed the
Agreement and accepted payment. The totality of the
circumstances indicate that Hughes knowingly and voluntarily
entered into the Agreement, thereby releasing the Casino from all
claims arising out of his employment and termination. Therefore,
there was no issue of material fact, and the district court
properly granted summary judgment in favor of the Casino and
Peterson.
Because we find that Hughes knowingly and voluntarily
released the Casino from any claims, we need not reach the
district court’s alternative grounds for granting summary
judgment.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees Grand
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Casino, Inc., and Jim Peterson.
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