Witherspoon v. White , 111 F.3d 399 ( 1997 )

REVISED
United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 95-40856
Summary Calendar.
Tyrone Lamel WITHERSPOON, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Ivan WHITE, in his official capacity as Warden, FCI Texarkana;
Janet Reno, in her official capacity as U.S. Attorney General; Up
Springfellow, in his official capacity as Doctor, FCI Texarkana,
Wade Lee Medical Center, Texarkana, Arkansas; Kathleen Hawk, in
her official capacity as Director of U.S. Bureau of Prisons, CMC
Cord Texarkana, AR, FCI, Defendants-Appellees.
May 2, 1997.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas.
Before JOHNSON, WIENER and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
JOHNSON, Circuit Judge:
Tyrone Lamel Witherspoon appeals the dismissal of his 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action. However, because the district court failed
to render a final judgment in this action, we dismiss the present
appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Witherspoon, a federal prisoner, filed a civil rights
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Warden Ivan White,
United States Attorney General Janet Reno; a physician at the
Federal Correctional Institute in Texarkana, Texas, Dr.
Stringfellow; Director of United States Bureau of Prisons Kathleen
1
Hawk (federal defendants);1 and Wadley Medical Center (Wadley),
alleging that the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights
by failing to provide medical treatment and a safe environment. In
Witherspoon's complaint, he requested appointment of counsel. The
magistrate judge denied this request and stated that the questions
presented in this action were "rather routine" and "that the
applicable law [was] well settled." Furthermore, the magistrate
judge found that Witherspoon was "able to articulate his claim,"
thus alleviating the need for assistance of counsel.2
Wadley filed an answer to Witherspoon's complaint. The
federal defendants, however, filed a motion to dismiss, or
alternatively, a motion for summary judgment. The magistrate judge
ordered Witherspoon to respond to the federal defendants' motion.
Witherspoon filed a handwritten letter, requesting the assistance
of appointed counsel in order to respond to the federal defendants'
motion. Additionally, Witherspoon made a third request for the
appointment of counsel in a formal motion drafted with the help of
a fellow inmate. Apparently, neither the magistrate nor district
judge reconsidered Witherspoon's potential need for appointment of
1
Witherspoon filed his petition against all of the defendants
pursuant to § 1983. However, because some of the defendants
alleged to have violated Witherspoon's Eighth Amendment rights are
federal defendants, we construe his complaint against them as an
action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1971).
See Stephenson v. Reno, 28 F.3d 26, 26 n. 1 (5th Cir.1994).
2
Jurisdictional defects prohibit this court from addressing
the merits of whether the district court's denial of appointment of
counsel was improper. However, we note that substantial issues
involving Witherspoon's competency to represent himself were raised
on appeal.
2
counsel at this juncture in the litigation; indeed, no specific
ruling on either of these last two requests appears in the record.
The magistrate judge reviewed the federal defendants' motion
to dismiss and alternative motion for summary judgment and
recommended granting the motion as a motion for summary judgment.3
After the magistrate judge made his report and recommendation to
the district court, Wadley filed its own motion for summary
judgment, which neither the magistrate judge nor the district court
appears to have ever reviewed.
The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and
recommendation regarding the federal defendants' motion and issued
a separate final judgment in accordance with Federal Rule 58. In
the district court's final judgment, the court granted the
"defendants' motion to dismiss"4 and purported to dismiss
Witherspoon's entire complaint with prejudice. See discussion
infra pp. ---- - ----. Witherspoon filed a notice of appeal from
3
The magistrate judge found that Witherspoon had failed to
demonstrate that the federal defendants acted with deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need or to his safety needs.
Thus, Witherspoon had failed to prove that the federal defendants
violated his Eighth Amendment rights. Additionally, the magistrate
judge found that the federal defendants were entitled to qualified
immunity due to Witherspoon's inability to allege a constitutional
deprivation.
4
The district court stated that it granted the "defendants'
motion to dismiss." However, the magistrate judge recommended that
the defendants' motion be granted as a motion for summary judgment.
The district court, prior to entering its final judgment order,
issued a memorandum order adopting the magistrate's report and
recommendation and stated that "final judgment will be entered in
this case in accordance with the magistrate judge's
recommendations." Therefore, we construe the district court's
final judgment order as granting the federal defendants' motion for
summary judgment.
3
the district court's entry of "Final Judgment."
II. Discussion
None of the parties to this action have raised the issue of
the existence of appellate jurisdiction; nevertheless, we are
obligated to raise the matter on our own motion. See United States
v. Garner, 749 F.2d 281, 284 (5th Cir.1985). In general, federal
appellate courts have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to
hear appeals from "final decisions," although in limited
circumstances, an appellate court's jurisdiction may extend to
reviewing nonfinal or interlocutory orders.5
A final judgment is one that "ends the litigation on the
merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the
judgment." Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467, 98
S. Ct. 2454, 2457, 57 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1978) (internal quotations and
citations omitted); see also Pan Eastern Exploration Co. v. Hufo
Oils, 798 F.2d 837, 838 (5th Cir.1986). Merely labeling a judgment
as final does not make it so. See Stillman v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
88 F.3d 911, 913 (11th Cir.1996). The order must adjudicate the
rights and liabilities of all parties properly before the court.
See Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371, 1374
(5th Cir.1980). In circumstances in which a court order is
ambiguous as to what parties and claims are being disposed of and
5
By statute federal courts may hear appeals from certain
interlocutory orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292. Additionally,
courts have created certain narrow exceptions allowing appeals of
orders that are determined not to be final. These exceptions
include the collateral order exception, the death knell exception,
and pragmatic finality. See 15A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 3911-3913 (2d ed. 1991).
4
"the district court ... intend[ed] to effect a final dismissal of
a claim, we will construe its order accordingly, despite ambiguous
language that might indicate otherwise." Picco v. Global Marine
Drilling Co., 900 F.2d 846, 849 n. 4 (5th Cir.1990); see also 15A
WRIGHT, ET AL., supra, § 3914.6. However, when the record clearly
indicates that the district court failed to adjudicate the rights
and liabilities of all parties, the order is not and cannot be
presumed to be final, irrespective of the district court's intent.
See Patchick v. Kensington Publishing Corp., 743 F.2d 675, 677 (9th
Cir.1984) (holding that when the record indicates that a served
defendant remains a party to an action, the court cannot assume
finality).
In the present case, the district court issued an order
entitled "Final Judgment," apparently intending to dismiss
Witherspoon's case in its entirety. In the order, the court
granted the "defendants' motion to dismiss" and denied all other
outstanding motions. The face of the order appears unclear as to
whom the district court is referring when it states "defendants'
motion to dismiss." As stated above, the federal defendants filed
a motion to dismiss, or alternatively, a motion for summary
judgment and Wadley filed a separate motion for summary judgment.
However, after thoroughly reviewing the record, we find that the
district court only granted the federal defendants' motion.
First, the court granted "defendants' motion to dismiss,"
whereas Wadley never filed a motion to dismiss. The federal
defendants, however, file a motion titled, "Defendants' Motion to
5
Dismiss or Alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment." Thus, when
the district court used the phrase "defendants' motion to dismiss"
the court was simply referencing the name of the specific document
filed by the federal defendants. Second, the district court issued
its judgment in accordance with the magistrate judge's report and
recommendation which dealt solely with the federal defendants'
motion. While the magistrate never specifically addressed for
which defendants he recommended granting summary judgment, it is
clear after reviewing the record that the recommendation applied
only to the federal defendants. The record indicates that Wadley
was not represented in this action by the United States Attorney
who filed the motion reviewed by the magistrate judge, and that
Wadley did not file its separate motion for summary judgment until
after the magistrate judge issued his report. Thus, Wadley's
motion was never before the magistrate judge.
Because we find that the district court was solely granting
the federal defendants' motion for summary judgment in its final
judgment order, Wadley's motion for summary judgment remained live
and undetermined. The record indicates that neither the district
court nor the magistrate judge ever ruled on Wadley's motion.
Moreover, Wadley's motion asserted different grounds than those
asserted by the federal defendants, and the magistrate's report,
which the district court adopted, did not address the grounds
asserted by Wadley. Further complicating matters, the district
judge stated in its final judgment order that "all motions by
either party not previously ruled on [were] denied." Normally,
6
this phrase is merely boilerplate language used by district courts
to insure the finality of their order. In the present case,
however, the district court actually achieved an inverse result.
Since the district court had not ruled on Wadley's motion, the
final judgment order effectively denied Wadley's motion for summary
judgment and left Wadley as a party to the action with
Witherspoon's claims against Wadley intact. Irrespective of the
district court's intent to dismiss Witherspoon's entire action and
issue a final judgment, we hold that Witherspoon's claims against
Wadley are still viable and that the district court's "Final
Judgment" order lacks finality.
We do, however, recognize that a decision failing to
adjudicate the rights and liabilities of all parties, while not
technically final, can be certified as final pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). See Thompson v. Betts, 754 F.2d
1243, 1245 (5th Cir.1985). In certifying a decision as final for
appellate jurisdiction purposes, the district court must comply
with the requirements set out in Rule 54(b). See id. Until the
district court makes an express determination that no just reason
for delay exists and expressly directs entry of judgment, finality
will not attach to an order that disposes of some but not all of
the defendants. See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b); see also Kelly v. Lee's
Old Fashioned Hamburgers, Inc., 908 F.2d 1218, 1220 (5th Cir.1990)
(en banc) (interpreting Rule 54(b) as requiring the language of the
order appealed from to "reflect[ ] the district court's
unmistakeable intent to enter a partial final judgment under Rule
7
54(b)"). Thus, when the district court fails to clearly indicate
that a judgment disposing of less than all parties was entered
pursuant to Rule 54(b), the judgment is not considered final. See
Thompson, 754 F.2d at 1245 (holding that absent a Rule 54(b)
certification, a partial disposition of a multi-party action is not
a final decision under § 1291); Brookens v. White, 795 F.2d 178,
179 (D.C.Cir.1986) (stating that it is "elementary that a grant of
summary judgment as to some parties in multi-party litigation does
not constitute a final order unless the requirements of
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) are met").
In the instant case, there is no indication in the record that
the district court certified its final judgment order pursuant to
Rule 54(b) or that any of the parties ever sought such a ruling.
See Thompson, 754 F.2d at 1245-46. Accordingly, the district
court's order can not be viewed as a Rule 54(b) judgment.
Furthermore, while certain other exceptions to the final judgment
rule may allow appellate courts to hear appeals from otherwise
interlocutory judgments, none of these exceptions apply to the
present case. The district court has left a substantial part of
the action intact and must dispose of Witherspoon's claims against
Wadley before the court's order may be deemed final and reviewable.
III. Conclusion
The district court attempted to enter a final judgment in the
present case. However, the court neglected to adjudicate the
rights and liabilities of Wadley, a party properly before the
court. Because of the district court's failure to dispose of all
8
parties to the litigation, we find that the "Final Judgment" order
lacks finality thus depriving this court of appellate jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. For this reason, the appeal is
DISMISSED.
9