Friddell v. Gatewood ( 1998 )


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  •                  IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    __________________
    No. 96-20785
    Summary Calendar
    __________________
    DONALD ALAN FRIDDELL,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    RANDY GATEWOOD, Officer; STEVE BORGEO, Officer; JOHNNY
    KLEVENHAGEN; HARRIS COUNTY TEXAS; EL FRANCO LEE, Commissioner;
    JIM FONTENO, Commissioner; STEVE RADACK, Commissioner;
    JERRY EVERSOLE, Commissioner; ROBERT ECKELS, Commissioner;
    INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE; J.R. KOPIDLANSKY, IRS Director;
    BILLY K. MARTIN, IRS Agent; KEN FREELOW, IRS Agent; STAN
    TRUEHART, IRS Agent; RON OLIVER, IRS Agent; RAGINA ORTIGO,
    IRS Agent; ROBERT SIMPSON, IRS Agent; ROSYLYN MAZE, IRS Agent;
    ED HARDIN, IRS Agent; VERA ARSOLA, IRS Agent; TRACEY E. WARREN,
    IRS Agent,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    __________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    (CA-H-95-4739)
    __________________
    April 7, 1998
    Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Donald Alan Friddell appeals the district court’s dismissal of
    and entry of summary judgment against him on his claims against
    Harris County, employees of the Harris County Sheriff’s Department,
    and Harris County Commissioners brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion
    should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    1983, and his claims against the IRS and various IRS agents, which
    we construe as being brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown
    Named Agents, 
    403 U.S. 388
     (1971).               After careful review of the
    record   and    those    arguments      raised   on    appeal,   we     affirm   for
    substantially the same reasons stated by the district court.                      See
    Friddell v. Gatewood, CA-H-95-4739 (S.D. Tex. April 11, 1996, and
    June 20, 1996).
    With respect to his claims against the IRS, it is well settled
    that a plaintiff may not bring a Bivens action for damages against
    a federal agency.       See FDIC v. Meyer, 
    510 U.S. 471
    , 483-86 (1994).
    Likewise, because a suit against a government official in his
    official capacity is actually a suit against the governmental
    agency, see Baker v. Putnal, 
    75 F.3d 190
    , 195 (5th Cir. 1996), the
    district court properly dismissed Friddell’s claims against the IRS
    agents in      their    official   capacity.          The   district    court    also
    properly dismissed Friddell’s claims against Harris County and the
    Harris   County    defendants      in    their   official      capacity    because
    Friddell offered no evidence as to a policy or custom on behalf of
    Harris County.     See Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
    
    436 U.S. 658
    , 690-91 (1978); Baker, 
    75 F.3d at 195
    .                    With respect
    to Friddell’s claims against the Harris County defendants and the
    IRS agents in their individual capacities, the district court
    properly granted summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds
    because Friddell has not alleged a constitutional violation.                      To
    the extent that Friddell argues that the search was defective
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    because he was not given a copy of the affidavit upon which the
    warrant was based, the federal rules require only that the warrant
    be served.      See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(d).          To the extent that
    Friddell claims that he was improperly required to turn over his
    private mail, the government had obtained a separate warrant to
    search his post office box.        To the extent that Friddell argues
    that the search warrant was obtained under “false statements and
    misrepresentations,” Friddell has completely failed to substantiate
    this allegation with any offer of proof beyond his own conclusory
    statements.      Such   conclusory    allegations   are   insufficient   to
    survive summary judgment.        See Franks v. Delaware, 
    438 U.S. 154
    ,
    171   (1978).    Finally,   we    have   reviewed   Friddell’s   remaining
    arguments on appeal and find them to be entirely without merit.
    For these reasons and for substantially the same reasons set
    forth by the district court in its orders dated April 11, 1996, and
    June 20, 1996, we affirm the decision of the district court.
    All pending motions are DENIED.
    AFFIRMED; MOTIONS DENIED.
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