United States v. Goodley ( 1999 )


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  •                 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 98-50923
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    VERSUS
    HILLIARD LEE GOODLEY, III;
    ARANDAL DERRICK GOODLEY,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    --------------------
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. MO-97-CR-50-4
    --------------------
    September 23, 1999
    Before JOLLY, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Arandal Derrick Goodley (hereinafter “Derrick”) and Hilliard
    Lee Goodley, III (hereinafter “Hilliard”), appeal their convictions
    and sentences for various drug and money-laundering offenses,
    including   conspiracy,   and   for   possession   of   an   unregistered
    firearm.2   Derrick argues (1) that a fatal variance existed between
    the indictment and the proof at trial, (2) that
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    2
    The motion to withdraw as counsel filed by David Rogers
    is GRANTED.
    No. 98-50923
    -2-
    the district court abused its discretion when it admitted the
    Government’s organizational chart into evidence, (3) that his
    mandatory life sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) violated his
    rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments to the U.S.
    Constitution, and (4) that his trial was rendered fundamentally
    unfair by cumulative trial error.
    Derrick’s arguments are unavailing.       Based on the testimony
    adduced at trial, a reasonable jury would not have been precluded
    from finding a single conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.         See
    United States v. Morris, 
    46 F.3d 410
    , 414-17 (5th Cir.1995).        The
    district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
    Government’s organizational chart into evidence. See United States
    v. Brewer, No. 94-60565, slip op. at 8-9 (5th Cir. June 30,
    1995)(unpublished; copy attached).3    Even if it could be said that
    the admission of the chart was error, it was most assuredly
    harmless error given the district court’s limiting instruction at
    the outset of the trial, the overwhelming evidence of guilt, and
    the fact that the jury acquitted Hilliard Goodley on the drug-
    conspiracy count and another codefendant, Carey Goodley, on all
    counts.   See United States v. Winn, 
    948 F.2d 145
    , 151, 157-59 (5th
    Cir. 1991); United States v. Jennings, 
    724 F.2d 436
    , 442 (5th Cir.
    1984).    Nor   was   Derrick’s   mandatory   life   sentence   under   §
    841(b)(1)(A) constitutionally infirm. Derrick has waived his Fifth
    Amendment challenge to his sentence by failing to brief it
    3
    Brewer is precedential because it was decided before
    January 1, 1996. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.3.
    No. 98-50923
    -3-
    adequately.    See United States v. Flores, 
    63 F.3d 1342
    , 1374 n.36
    (5th Cir. 1995). Derrick’s Eighth Amendment claim is foreclosed by
    circuit precedent, see United States v. Fisher, 
    22 F.3d 574
    , 579-80
    (5th Cir. 1994), and his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
    at sentencing is inappropriate for consideration on direct appeal.
    See United States v. Higdon, 
    832 F.2d 312
    , 313-14 (5th Cir. 1987).
    Finally, Derrick’s trial was not rendered fundamentally unfair by
    cumulative trial error. See United States v. Powers, 
    168 F.3d 741
    ,
    754 (5th Cir. 1999).
    Hilliard argues (1) that the district court erred in finding
    that he had breached his plea agreement by failing to cooperate
    truthfully    and   (2)   that   the    district    court    clearly    erred   in
    enhancing his offense level for obstruction of justice. Hilliard’s
    arguments are likewise unavailing.           The district court’s finding
    that Hilliard failed to provide the Government with truthful
    information during his debriefings was plausible in light of the
    trial   testimony    of   Freddie      Goodman   and   Patricia   Miller    and,
    therefore,    was   not   clearly      erroneous.      See   United    States   v.
    Castaneda, 
    162 F.3d 832
    , 836 n.24 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v.
    Ballis, 
    28 F.3d 1399
    , 1409 (5th Cir. 1994).            Moreover, the district
    court did not clearly err in enhancing Hilliard’s offense level for
    obstruction of justice given the different standards of proof
    governing trials and sentencing proceedings.             See 
    Powers, 168 F.3d at 752-53
    ; see also United States v. Sotelo, 
    97 F.3d 782
    , 799 (5th
    No. 98-50923
    -4-
    Cir. 1996)(stating that credibility determinations at sentencing
    are peculiarly within the province of the trier-of-fact).4
    MOTION TO WITHDRAW GRANTED.   AFFIRMED.
    4
    Relying on Fed. R. App. P. 28(i), Hilliard states that he
    “adopts by reference all relevant issues presented for review” in
    Derrick’s appellate brief. Most, if not all, of the issues
    raised in Derrick’s brief involve fact-specific challenges which
    are inappropriate for adoption under Rule 28(i). See United
    States v. Alix, 
    86 F.3d 429
    , 434 n.2 (5th Cir. 1996). The only
    issue of Derrick’s which conceivably could be adopted by Hilliard
    is the issue pertaining to the admission of the organizational
    chart. To the extent that the issue has been properly adopted by
    Hilliard, our holding on that issue in regard to Derrick applies
    equally to Hilliard. See id.