Moore v. Booker ( 1999 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 99-60213
    USDC No. 1:98-CV-314-D-D
    GARRY LEE MOORE,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    versus
    WALTER BOOKER, Superintendent
    of Mississippi State Penitentiary;
    MIKE MOORE, Attorney General,
    State of Mississippi,
    Respondents-Appellees.
    ---------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Mississippi
    ---------------------
    September 3, 1999
    Before JOLLY, DeMOSS, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM1:
    Garry Lee Moore, Mississippi prisoner # 46504, requests a
    certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s
    denial of his in forma pauperis (IFP) request with respect to his
    petition filed purportedly pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.   Moore
    also requests leave to proceed IFP on appeal.
    An order denying an application to proceed IFP is
    immediately appealable and thus is properly before this court.
    1
    Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R.
    475.4.
    No. 99-60213
    - 2 -
    See Flowers v. Turbine Support Division, 
    507 F.2d 1242
    , 1244 (5th
    Cir. 1975).    To obtain a COA when the assigned error concerns a
    nonconstitutional issue, the applicant must first make a credible
    showing that the district court erred.      Davis v. Johnson, 
    158 F.3d 806
    , 809 (5th Cir. 1998).
    The district court construed Moore’s petition as challenging
    the conditions of confinement, consequently determined that the
    claim must be pursued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and denied Moore
    leave to proceed IFP because he has been barred by 42 U.S.C.
    § 1915(g) from proceeding IFP in civil actions.
    "The line between claims which must initially be pressed by
    writ of habeas corpus and those cognizable under § 1983 is a
    blurry one."     Cook v. Texas Dep't of Crim. Just. Transitional
    Planning Dep't, 
    37 F.3d 166
    , 168 (5th Cir. 1994).     “Generally,
    § 1983 suits are the proper vehicle to attack unconstitutional
    conditions of confinement and prison procedures.”      Carson v.
    Johnson, 
    112 F.3d 818
    , 820 (5th Cir. 1997).     A challenge to the
    fact and duration of confinement must be pursued in a habeas
    corpus action.     Preiser v. Rodriguez, 
    411 U.S. 475
    , 488-90, 500
    (1973); Clarke v. Stalder, 
    154 F.3d 186
    , 189 (5th Cir. 1998) (en
    banc), cert. denied, 
    119 S. Ct. 1052
    (1999).     When a prisoner
    challenges a single hearing as constitutionally defective, the
    challenge must be pursued by writ of habeas corpus.      Serio v.
    Members of La. St. Bd. of Pardons, 
    821 F.2d 1112
    , 1118 (5th Cir.
    1987); see also Johnson v. Hardy, 
    601 F.2d 172
    , 173 (5th Cir.
    1979) (prisoner’s “contention that he was denied due process in a
    No. 99-60213
    - 3 -
    prison disciplinary hearing is in reality a challenge to the
    duration of his confinement.”).
    In his complaint, Moore alleged that he had been confined in
    administrative segregation since 1995 after he was found guilty
    at the disciplinary hearing of conspiring to smuggle U.S. postal
    money orders into the prison.   Moore alleged that the
    disciplinary hearing had violated his due process rights because
    the charging officer did not have actual knowledge that he had
    committed the offense, he had not received adequate notice of the
    charges against him, there had been an inadequate investigation,
    false testimony had been given, and the disciplinary board had
    not given any reasons for crediting the charging officer’s
    testimony over the testimony offered in his behalf.
    Moore’s contention that he was denied due process in a
    prison disciplinary hearing is a challenge to the fact and
    duration of his confinement, and it must be pursued by writ of
    habeas corpus.   
    Johnson, 601 F.2d at 173
    ; 
    Preiser, 411 U.S. at 488-90
    ; 
    Carson, 112 F.3d at 820
    .   Accordingly, we GRANT a COA and
    IFP, VACATE the district court’s denial of IFP, and REMAND the
    case to the district court for further proceedings.
    COA AND IFP GRANTED; VACATE AND REMAND.