Monroe v. Melder ( 2001 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 00-30214
_____________________
ROBERT MONROE
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
AUBREY MELDER, Shift Captain Allen Correctional Center;
DELTON HILLMAN, Walk Sergeant Allen Correctional Center;
MARK SONNIER, Shift Lieutenant Allen Correctional Center
Defendants - Appellees
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
U.S.D.C. No. 98-CV-724
_________________________________________________________________
January 10, 2001
Before KING, Chief Judge, and HIGGINBOTHAM and DUHÉ, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Appellant-Plaintiff Robert Monroe is a prisoner at Allen
Correctional Center in Kinder, Louisiana. Defendants-Appellees
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
Aubrey Melder, Delton Hillman, and Mark Sonnier are correctional
officers at Allen Correctional Center. Monroe appeals the
district court’s judgment, which granted summary judgment in
favor of Defendants-Appellees on Monroe’s Eighth Amendment
excessive force claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For
the following reasons, we AFFIRM.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Robert Monroe filed a pro se, in forma pauperis complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Allen Correctional
Center officers Aubrey Melder, Delton Hillman, and Mark Sonnier
(collectively the “Officers”) used excessive force against him in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. Monroe contends that on
January 3, 1997, the Officers physically assaulted him without
justification and without penological reason while escorting him
through the cell block. The Officers deny that excessive force
was used on Monroe.
According to Monroe, the assault resulted from his refusal
to accept legal mail at an early hour of the morning. Monroe
claims he was roused at 3:00 am in order to receive his legal
mail. Unhappy with the hour, he refused to sign for the mail,
and, as a result of this refusal, he was ordered to report to
Captain Melder at the command post. At the command post, Captain
Melder ordered Sergeant Hillman to handcuff Monroe’s hands behind
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his back. Melder then reprimanded Monroe. Monroe alleges that
as he was being led out of the command post still handcuffed,
Hillman placed him in a choke-hold, and Melder punched him three
times in the head and face, causing a one-inch gash over his eye.
Monroe also alleges that Lieutenant Sonnier punched him in the
mouth while being held by Hillman. Monroe was taken to the
infirmary, and his eye was sutured. Monroe also received
treatment for headaches.
The Officers strongly dispute Monroe’s factual allegations.
They aver that Monroe caused a disturbance in his cell block
because he believed he was not receiving his legal mail.
According to the Officers, Monroe refused direct orders to stop
yelling about his mail and was therefore escorted to Melder at
the command post. After speaking with Melder, Monroe was
handcuffed and ordered to prehearing detention. The Officers
allege that Monroe broke free of their custody and attempted to
flee down the hall. After he was under control, Monroe refused
to continue forward. Despite several verbal orders to move,
Monroe refused, and Melder and Hillman were required to
physically escort him. The Officers allege that Monroe struggled
with them and, due to that struggle, lost his balance, falling
headfirst against the fence alongside the hallway and then to the
ground. Sonnier claims he responded to a distress code seeking
assistance by the Officers and witnessed Monroe lose his balance
and fall to the floor. The Officers state that the injury to
3
Monroe’s eye was the result of the fall against the fence and the
floor. They concede that Monroe was treated at the infirmary on
January 3, 4, 6, 8, 16, and 24, 1997.
As a result of the incident, Monroe brought suit seeking
monetary damages and injunctive relief. Monroe filed claims
through the Louisiana Correctional Administrative Remedy
Procedure (“ARP”) and in both state and federal courts.1 The
1
On January 22, 1997, Monroe timely filed an ARP request
pursuant to LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:1171-1179. Monroe properly
exhausted all three steps of the ARP system, being denied in all
three stages. Monroe’s “third step review” was denied March 6,
1997. On June 27, 1997, Monroe refiled a petition for review in
Louisiana’s 19th District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge. The
19th District Court has been designated under Louisiana law as
the court to hear all requests for judicial review of ARP
decisions. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1177 (West 2000).
On July 28, 1997, Monroe filed suit in federal court along
with several other inmates, seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief from cruel and unusual punishment in the form of excessive
force used by correctional officials. On July 17, 1998, Monroe’s
excessive force claim was severed from the claims of the other
inmates and allowed to go forward as a separate action.
On December 8, 1998, the Officers moved to stay the federal
proceedings until a final resolution of the matter was achieved
in Louisiana’s 19th District Court. The magistrate judge denied
the motion. On September 16, 1999, the Officers moved for
summary judgment in federal court on the grounds that Monroe’s
ARP appeal before Louisiana’s 19th District Court had been
dismissed on March 30, 1999, and because Monroe had failed to
appeal the adverse decision, was now a final judgment with res
judicata effect. On November 18, 1999, the district court
adopted the magistrate judge order denying the motion for summary
judgment on res judicata grounds, and found that Monroe was not
given a full and fair opportunity to litigate his constitutional
challenges in the state court proceeding. Because we resolve
Monroe’s appeal of the district court grant of summary judgment
on the excessive force claim, we need not reach the Officers’ res
judicata argument.
4
instant Eighth Amendment excessive force case was brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
On November 3, 1999, the Officers moved for summary judgment
on the following grounds: (1) Monroe had failed to establish that
the Officers had exerted excessive force in violation of the
Eighth Amendment; and (2) Monroe had failed to demonstrate that
he had suffered more than a de minimis injury as a result of the
alleged excessive force. Monroe failed to respond to this motion
for summary judgment. On January 28, 2000, the district court
adopted the magistrate’s order granting the Officers’ motion for
summary judgment on Monroe’s excessive force claims.
Monroe timely appeals this grant of summary judgment in
favor of the Officers.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant. Smith v. Brenoettsy, 158 F.3d 908, 911 (5th Cir.
1998); see also Tolson v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 141 F.3d 604,
608 (5th Cir. 1998). “Summary judgment is proper ‘if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”
5
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). The moving party bears the burden of
showing the district court that there is an absence of evidence
to support the nonmoving party’s case. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at
325. “If the moving party fails to meet this initial burden, the
motion must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant’s response.
If the movant does, however, meet this burden, the nonmovant must
go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan,
45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995). “A dispute over a material
fact is genuine ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Smith, 158 F.3d
at 911 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986)). The substantive law determines which facts are
material. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION ON EXCESSIVE FORCE CLAIM
To prevail on an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim, the
central question that must be resolved is “whether force was
applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline,
or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992); see also Gomez v. Chandler, 163
F.3d 921, 923 (5th Cir. 1999); Eason v. Holt, 73 F.3d 600, 601-02
(5th Cir. 1996). The Court in Hudson “placed primary emphasis on
6
the degree of force employed in relation to the apparent need for
it, as distinguished from the extent of injury suffered.” Gomez,
163 F.3d at 923 (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7). In determining
whether an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim has been
demonstrated, courts consider: “1. the extent of the injury
suffered, 2. the need for the application of force, 3. the
relationship between the need and the amount of force used, 4.
the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officers, and
5. any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful
response.” Gomez, 163 F.3d at 923 (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
Further, the physical injury suffered as a result of the
excessive force must be more than de minimis, but need not be
significant. See id. at 924 (“[T]he law of this Circuit is that
to support an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim a prisoner
must have suffered from the excessive force a more than de
minimis physical injury, but there is no categorical requirement
that the physical injury be significant, serious, or more than
minor.”)2; see also Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th
Cir. 1997) (finding that plaintiff’s claim of a sore bruised ear
2
As was recognized in Gomez and Siglar v. Hightower, 112
F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 1997), this court has left open the
possibility that “a physical injury which is only de minimis may
nevertheless suffice for purposes of the Eighth Amendment and [42
U.S.C. §] 1997(e)(e) if the force used is of the kind ‘repugnant
to the conscience of mankind.’” Gomez, 163 F.3d at 924 n.4
(citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 10); see also Siglar, 112 F.3d at
193.
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lasting three days to be de minimis). But see Brooks v. Kyler,
204 F.3d 102, 108 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding that absence of proof
of minor or significant injury does not mandate dismissal of
excessive force claim); Griffin v. Crippen, 193 F.3d 89, 91 (2d
Cir. 1999) (finding that minor injuries in excessive force claim
did not warrant dismissal on summary judgment motion).
The Officers’ motion for summary judgment included evidence
to support their argument that they did not use excessive force
against Monroe. See Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1131 (5th
Cir. 1992) (“The movant accomplishes [meeting its burden] by
informing the court of the basis for its motion, and by
identifying portions of the record which highlight the absence of
genuine factual issues.”). First, they provided signed
affidavits stating that they had never physically abused Monroe3
and attached the unsigned and unsworn prison incident reports
which substantiated the Officers’ factual averments that they
acted in good-faith to restore discipline and did not act
maliciously or sadistically. Further, they provided documentary
3
All three defendants signed the following two sworn
affidavit statements, (1) “He has read the complaint filed by
Robert Monroe in this matter and does not recall the events
alleged therein”; (2) “He denies ever having beaten or otherwise
physically abused Robert Monroe on any date, including on January
3, 1997.” While the Officers’ statement, that they do not recall
the events alleged, could be considered in conflict with their
averment that they did not assault Monroe, this internal conflict
will not alone create a genuine issue of material fact. See 11
JAMES WM. MOORE ET. AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 56.14[1][f] (3d ed.
1999) (“Two conflicting conclusory affidavits submitted by the
same party do not preclude summary judgment.”).
8
evidence that they claim demonstrated that Monroe did not receive
more than de minimis injuries from the incident. This evidence,
uncontradicted in the record, includes the medical records
concerning the extent of Monroe’s injury and the medical reports
and records of the incident detailing Monroe’s limited injuries.4
The Officers’ motion also includes a statement of uncontested
facts and a memorandum of law in support of summary judgment.
This evidence, providing documented proof that the Officers did
not assault Monroe, and did not cause more than a de minimis
injury, satisfied the initial burden of the Officers to
“demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.
Monroe failed to respond to the Officers’ motion for summary
judgment on the excessive force claim. In doing so, Monroe
failed to “go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” See Stults v.
Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 656 (5th Cir. 1996) (“To meet [its]
burden, the nonmovant must identify specific evidence in the
record and articulate the precise manner in which that evidence
supports its claims. As to material facts on which the nonmovant
will bear the burden of proof at trial, the nonmovant must come
4
The motion for summary judgment also includes an
affidavit from the Health Administrator for Allen Correctional
Center certifying the medical records and an affidavit from a
doctor who treated Monroe for eye problems in June 1997, which
stated Monroe’s June injuries were unrelated to the incident in
January 1997.
9
forward with evidence which would be sufficient to enable it to
survive a motion for directed verdict at trial.” (internal
quotations and citations omitted)); see also Unida v. Levi
Strauss & Co., 986 F.2d 970, 975-76 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding that
summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmovant has failed “to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.”). After the burden
shifted to the nonmovant, Monroe made no affirmative showing to
direct the district court toward a material fact at issue or to
establish the existence of an essential element to his excessive
force claim.
By failing to file any opposition to the Officers’ motion
for summary judgment, Monroe did not identify or demonstrate an
issue of material fact that would defeat summary judgment.5 The
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the
Officers was therefore proper. See Skotak v. Tenneco Resins,
Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915 n.7 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Rule 56 does not
impose upon the district court a duty to sift through the record
5
Of course, Monroe’s failure to oppose summary judgment
does not automatically mean a grant of summary judgment is
appropriate. See John v. State of Louisiana, 757 F.2d 698, 709
(5th Cir. 1985) (“We hold, therefore, that the summary judgment
cannot be supported solely on the ground that [plaintiff] failed
to respond to defendants’ motion for summary judgment.”). The
burden still rests on the movant to demonstrate the absence of a
material fact at issue for trial. However, since the Officers
met their initial burden, Monroe’s failure to respond means
summary judgment was appropriately granted.
10
in search of evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary
judgment.”); Savers Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Reetz, 888 F.2d
1497, 1501 (5th Cir. 1989) (“[W]e have rejected the assumption
that the entire record in the case must be searched and found
bereft of a genuine issue of material fact before summary
judgment may be properly entered.” (internal quotations and
citations omitted)). Applying the same standard as the district
court in our review of summary judgment, see Unida, 986 F.2d at
975, we hold that Monroe has failed to meet his burden of
demonstrating that genuine issues of material fact exist for his
claim to survive a motion for summary judgment. See Skotak, 953
F.2d at 915 n.7 (“Rule 56 allocates th[e] duty to the opponent of
the motion, who is required to point out the evidence, albeit
evidence that is already in the record, that creates an issue of
fact.”).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants-
Appellees on Monroe’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claim.
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