United States v. Orona-Herrera ( 2001 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 01-50025
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    ANTONIO ORONA-HERRERA,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    (P-00-CR-250-1)
    --------------------
    October 15, 2001
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Defendant-Appellant     Antonio   Orona-Herrera   appeals    his
    conviction, based on a conditional guilty plea, for importing
    marijuana into the United States and possessing with the intent to
    distribute marijuana. Orona contends that the district court erred
    in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the
    warrantless searches of:    (1) an area of brush on a residential lot
    containing a mobile home at which he was an overnight guest and (2)
    bags found in the brush area.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    The "standard of review for a motion to suppress based on live
    testimony at a suppression hearing is to accept the trial court's
    factual findings unless clearly erroneous or influenced by an
    incorrect view of the law."          United States v. Alvarez, 
    6 F.3d 287
    ,
    289 (5th Cir. 1993).          We view the evidence in the light most
    favorable    to   the    prevailing    party       and   will    not   question   the
    district court's credibility calls.                United States v. Garza, 
    118 F.3d 278
    , 282-83 (5th Cir. 1997).                We review questions of law de
    novo, however, including whether an expectation of privacy is
    reasonable under the circumstances and whether the district court's
    ultimate    conclusions      of   Fourth        Amendment       reasonableness    are
    correct.     United States v. Paige, 
    136 F.3d 1012
    , 1017 (5th Cir.
    1998).
    “The [Fourth] Amendment protects persons against unreasonable
    searches of “‘their persons [and] houses’" and thus indicates that
    the Fourth Amendment is a personal right that must be invoked by an
    individual.”      Minnesota v. Carter, 
    525 U.S. 83
    , 88 (1998).                  “[T]o
    claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must
    demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the
    place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable . . . .”
    
    Id.
       “An overnight guest in a house ha[s] the sort of expectation
    of privacy that the Fourth Amendment protects.”                    
    Id. at 89
    .
    The Fourth Amendment protects the privacy of the home, but an
    individual    who   is    entitled    to       claim   that   protection    may   not
    legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted in open areas
    out of doors, such as fields or woods, except in the immediate
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    vicinity of the home.   Oliver v. United States, 
    466 U.S. 170
    , 176,
    178 (1984).    This limited additional area of protection, the
    “curtilage”, comprises the zone that a person reasonably may expect
    to be treated as the home itself.       United States v. Thomas, 
    120 F.3d 564
    , 571 (5th Cir. 1997).        In determining whether an area
    outside the home is curtilage, we consider: (1) the proximity of
    the area to the home; (2) whether the area is within an enclosure
    surrounding the home; (3) the nature of the uses to which the area
    is put, and (4) the steps taken by the resident to protect the area
    from outside observation.   
    Id.
    In the instant case, the brush area was 20 to 30 feet away
    from the mobile home; was not within any enclosure surrounding the
    mobile home; was not put to use for normal living activities but
    instead was used for hiding things; and only rudimentary steps were
    taken to protect the area from outside observation. When viewed in
    light of these factors, Orona’s efforts to establish that the brush
    area was so intimately tied to the mobile home that it should be
    placed under the home’s umbrella of Fourth Amendment protection for
    curtilage are unavailing.    See Thomas, 
    120 F.3d at 571
    ; United
    States v. McKeever, 
    5 F.3d 863
    , 867 (5th Cir. 1993); United States
    v. Dunn, 
    480 U.S. 294
    , 297, 302-03 (1987).      The district court’s
    judgment is
    AFFIRMED.
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