United States v. Julio Bernal ( 2014 )


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  •      Case: 13-40201      Document: 00512492440         Page: 1    Date Filed: 01/08/2014
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    No. 13-40201                         January 8, 2014
    Lyle W. Cayce
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                                                          Clerk
    Plaintiff – Appellee,
    v.
    JULIO CESAR BERNAL,
    Defendant – Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    U.S.D.C. No. 7:11-CR-1384-1
    Before JONES, ELROD, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Julio Cesar Bernal appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for
    leave to file an out-of-time appeal. We VACATE and REMAND.
    I.    Background
    Bernal was charged in a two-count indictment with: (1) conspiracy to
    possess with intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana in
    violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 846
    , 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(B) (“Count One”); and (2)
    possession with intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana in
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 13-40201    Document: 00512492440     Page: 2   Date Filed: 01/08/2014
    No. 13-40201
    violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), and 
    18 U.S.C. § 2
     (“Count
    Two”).   After Bernal pleaded guilty to Count Two pursuant to a plea
    agreement, the district court sentenced Bernal to serve the statutory minimum
    of sixty months of imprisonment followed by four years of supervised release.
    Judgment was entered on March 23, 2012.
    On July 23, 2012, Bernal moved pro se for leave to file an out-of-time
    appeal and for appointment of counsel. In his motion, Bernal stated, among
    other things, that he had been trying to file a notice of appeal, that he had not
    spoken with his attorney and “was alone,” and that he had a limited grasp of
    English and of the law. He acknowledged that he had not complied with
    Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) (“Appellate Rule 4(b)”) and requested
    that the district court treat his motion as a “Belated Appeal, and not a 28
    U.S.C[. §] 2255 motion.”
    After the district court referred the motion to the magistrate judge, the
    magistrate judge recommended denial of Bernal’s request for leave to file an
    out-of-time appeal, but granted his request for the appointment of counsel. The
    magistrate judge did not examine whether the motion should be construed as
    a § 2255 motion, analyzing only the question of timeliness under Appellate
    Rule 4(b). In this regard, he correctly concluded that the time for Appellate
    Rule 4(b) motions had passed.
    Now represented by counsel, Bernal filed objections to the magistrate
    judge’s report and recommendation, arguing that his motion should be
    construed as a motion pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     for an out-of-time appeal
    based on ineffective assistance of counsel. In the alternative, Bernal asked for
    an evidentiary hearing. Over Bernal’s objection, the district court adopted the
    report and recommendation of the magistrate judge and denied Bernal’s
    motion for leave to file an out-of-time appeal. Bernal appeals the denial of his
    motion. The district court’s order did not conduct an evidentiary hearing and
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    did not address the § 2255 argument except by stating “after appropriate
    review   of   Defendant’s    objections       [to   the   magistrate’s   report   and
    recommendations] . . . the conclusions [in that document] should be adopted.”
    II.     Discussion
    Appellate Rule 4(b)(1)(A) provides that, in a criminal case, a defendant
    must file a notice of appeal within fourteen days of the entry of the judgment
    being appealed. The district court may extend the time to file for thirty days
    upon a finding of excusable neglect or good cause. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(4).
    Because these time limits are not statutorily imposed, they are “mandatory,
    but not jurisdictional” and may be waived. United States v. Martinez, 
    496 F.3d 387
    , 388 (5th Cir. 2007).
    Bernal does not challenge the district court’s enforcement of these time
    limitations. Indeed, this court may not reverse a district court’s decision to do
    so. See United States v. Leijano-Cruz, 
    473 F.3d 571
    , 574 (5th Cir. 2006).
    Rather, he argues that the district court should have construed his filing as a
    motion pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     for an out-of-time appeal based on
    ineffective assistance of counsel.
    A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to timely file a
    notice of appeal is properly asserted in a § 2255 motion and the remedy is an
    out-of-time appeal. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 
    528 U.S. 470
    , 483–86 (2000); see
    also United States v. Tapp, 
    491 F.3d 263
    , 265–66 (5th Cir. 2007); United States
    v. West, 
    240 F.3d 456
    , 459 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Since the 1960s, our court, pursuant
    to a § 2255 motion, has permitted an out-of-time appeal when a defendant was
    denied assistance of counsel on appeal, through counsel’s failure to perfect an
    appeal.”).
    The Government contends that Bernal waived his right to § 2255 relief
    by originally requesting that the district court treat his motion as a “Belated
    Appeal, and not a 28 U.S.C[. §] 2255 motion.” However, the pleadings of pro
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    No. 13-40201
    se litigants should be construed liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 
    551 U.S. 89
    ,
    94 (2007). “It is the substance of the relief sought by a pro se pleading, not the
    label that the [movant] has attached to it, that determines [its] true nature
    and operative effect . . . .” Hernandez v. Thaler, 
    630 F.3d 420
    , 426–27 (5th Cir.
    2011). In his motion, Bernal advised the district court that he had been trying
    to file a notice of appeal, but had been unable to consult with his attorney and
    “was alone.”        In his objection to the magistrate judge’s report and
    recommendation, Bernal made it clear that he was seeking relief under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     and that he was asserting that he had been deprived of the
    effective assistance of counsel in exercising his right to appeal.
    We conclude that Bernal’s pro se motion should have been liberally
    construed as a § 2255 motion. We have previously required a district court to
    recharacterize as a § 2255 motion a request for an out-of-time appeal that in
    substance brought an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See United States
    v. Moron-Solis, 388 F. App’x 443, 444–45 (5th Cir. 2010) (unpublished); United
    States v. Flores, 380 F. App’x 371, 372 (5th Cir. 2010) (unpublished). 1 We
    express no opinion on the merits of Bernal’s constitutional claim, such as
    whether he actually asked counsel to file an appeal or whether counsel failed
    to consult with his client. See Flores-Ortega, 
    528 U.S. at
    477–78. However, the
    interests of justice require the district court to give Bernal’s claims additional
    consideration under § 2255. See Castro v. United States, 
    540 U.S. 375
    , 381–83
    (2003). We therefore remand to the district court for further proceedings
    consistent herewith.
    VACATED and REMANDED.
    1While Moron-Solis and Flores are not “controlling precedent,” they “may be [cited as]
    persuasive authority.” Ballard v. Burton, 
    444 F.3d 391
    , 401 n.7 (5th Cir. 2006).
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-40201

Filed Date: 1/20/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021