Shabazz v. Johnson ( 1998 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 98-10420
    Summary Calendar
    CURTIS SHABAZZ,
    Also known as Curtis Rollins,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    versus
    GARY L. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR,
    TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
    INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    - - - - - - - - - -
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 3:97-CV-2450-P
    - - - - - - - - - -
    November 13, 1998
    Before KING, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    This appeal is SEVERED from Shabazz v. Johnson, appeal No.
    98-40446.   Curtis Shabazz, Texas prisoner No. 522178, seeks a
    certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s
    dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition as time-barred under
    28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).   COA is GRANTED and the case is VACATED
    AND REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings
    consistent with this opinion.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 98-10420
    -2-
    Shabazz argues that principles of equitable tolling dictate
    that his petition is not time-barred because he has been held in
    administrative segregation since 1991; that he has no access to
    television, radio, newspapers, or magazines other than the prison
    newspaper, The Echo; that he is denied physical access to a law
    library and can obtain legal materials only by providing their
    exact citation; that the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
    (TDCJ) did not timely promulgate the Antiterrorism and Effective
    Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) to administrative segregation inmates;
    and that Shabazz did not learn of the § 2244(d)(1) limitations
    period** until he read an article published in the July 1997
    issue of The Echo.
    In appeals where the district court has denied habeas relief
    based on a procedural, nonconstitutional ground, we apply a two
    step COA process.    See Murphy v. Johnson, 
    110 F.3d 10
    , 11 (5th
    Cir. 1997).   First, the prisoner must make a credible showing
    that the district court erred in denying habeas relief on the
    nonconstitutional ground.    See 
    id. Second, we
    must consider
    whether he has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
    constitutional right with respect to his underlying conviction.
    See 
    id. This court
    has determined that the one-year statute of
    limitations in § 2244(d)(1) is subject to equitable tolling in
    appropriate extraordinary circumstances.     See Davis v. Johnson,
    **
    Absent equitable tolling, the last possible date on which
    Shabazz could have timely sought federal habeas relief was April
    23, 1997. United States v. Flores, 
    135 F.3d 1000
    , 1006 (5th Cir.
    1998) (§ 2255 case).
    No. 98-10420
    -3-
    No. 98-20507, 
    1998 WL 733731
    , at *6 (5th Cir. Oct. 21, 1998);
    accord Miller v. New Jersey State Dep’t of Corrections, 
    145 F.3d 616
    , 617-18 (3d Cir. 1998); Miller v. Marr, 
    141 F.3d 976
    , 978
    (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    1998 WL 407280
    (U.S. Oct. 5, 1998)
    (No. 98-5195); Calderon v. United States Dist. Court, 
    128 F.3d 1283
    , 1287-88 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 
    118 S. Ct. 899
    (1998).
    The district court erred by failing to address the factual
    and legal arguments Shabazz presented in support of his claim of
    equitable tolling.   Further factual development, including an
    evidentiary hearing, may be necessary to resolve the equitable
    tolling issue.
    We note that Shabazz’s petition raises arguments, cognizable
    in federal habeas, which have not been addressed in the first
    instance by the district court and which were not considered by
    the district court in its determination whether a COA should
    issue.    See Muniz v. Johnson, 
    114 F.3d 43
    , 45 (5th Cir. 1997);
    United States v. Youngblood, 
    116 F.3d 1113
    , 1114 (5th Cir. 1997).
    This opinion expresses no intimation as to the ultimate
    outcome of this appeal.   However, we note that the AEDPA
    limitations period should only be equitably tolled in “rare and
    exceptional circumstances.”    Davis, No. 98-20507, 
    1998 WL 733731
    ,
    at *6.
    APPEAL SEVERED FROM NO. 98-40446; COA GRANTED; VACATED AND
    REMANDED.