Sloan v. Sharp , 167 F.3d 207 ( 1998 )

Revised October 29, 1998
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 97-20168
Summary Calendar
LINDA SLOAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
JOHN SHARP; ET AL,
Defendants,
JOHN SHARP, Comptroller, in his capacity as head of Comptroller of
Public Accounts for the State of Texas; TEXAS, STATE OF; GRUNDY
WILEY, Individually and in his capacity as an employee with the
State of Texas; COMPTROLLER OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS
Defendant-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Texas
January 8, 1998
Before DUHÉ, DeMOSS, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
DUHÉ, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Linda Sloan, an employee in the Texas Comptroller’s
office, alleged that her supervisor, Appellee Grundy Wiley, began
sexually harassing her in 1989 and that he continued to do so until
she was fired in late 1995. Sloan filed a Title VII claim against
the Comptroller alleging quid pro quo sexual harassment and a
hostile work environment. Sloan alleged that the Comptroller was
liable for Wiley’s acts. The complaint also included a § 1983
claim against Wiley alleging violation of Sloan’s Fourth, Fifth,
and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed the
§ 1983 claim for failure to state a claim. The Title VII claim was
tried to a jury, which found for the Comptroller. We affirm.
I
In 1980, Sloan began working for the Comptroller in Fort Worth
and Arlington, Texas. In 1988, she transferred to the Southwest
office in Houston. In 1989, Wiley became the manager at the
Southwest office. Paul Eicke (“Eicke”) and Fern Francis
(“Francis”) worked as supervisors under Wiley and reported directly
to him. Sloan reported either to Fern or Eicke.
Sloan alleges that once Wiley became the manager of the
Southwest office, he began a pattern of sexual harassment that
became progressively more intense. She testified to numerous
events in the workplace, on the job away from the workplace and one
occasion at her home of what she considered to be harassment by
Wiley.
Sloan alleges also that Wiley tolerated her coworkers’
harassment of her. Sloan testified that when she reported the
incident to Wiley he told her that it “was a man’s world and women
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have got to get used to this.”
In another incident, another coworker touched Sloan in an
inappropriate way. Sloan again alleges that she told Wiley about
the touching and that he took no action.
Last, Sloan states that a third coworker made an inappropriate
remark to her. Sloan reported the remark to Wiley, and Wiley told
the coworker to apologize to Sloan. Sloan alleges that shortly
after the apology, Wiley and the coworker went into Wiley’s office
and began laughing.
In a final incident with Wiley, Sloan alleges that she was
waiting in line to get cake at another office birthday party when
someone pinched her buttocks. When she turned around she saw Wiley
taking his hand down and she threatened to slap him. Sloan
testified that Wiley left the room, and she went across the hall to
visit with a coworker. A few minutes later, Wiley bumped into
Sloan while she was talking to the coworker in the hall. The
parties dispute whether Sloan was knocked to the floor.
After this incident, Sloan contacted Judy Brittain
(“Brittain”), the employee assistance liaison for the Comptroller’s
office. Brittain talked with Sloan at length over the phone.
Brittain investigated Sloan’s sexual harassment claim and found no
sexual harassment.1
As a result of her complaint, Sloan was transferred to the
1
In addition to her telephone conversations with Sloan,
Brittain also interviewed Wiley, Eicke, and Francis.
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Northwest office in Houston in 1993. There, she worked for only
five days and never returned to work. Because all employees must
be removed from the payroll after twelve months without leave,
Sloan was fired in late 1995.
Sloan sued the Comptroller under Title VII claiming that the
Comptroller was liable to her for quid pro quo sexual harassment
and hostile work environment under the doctrine of vicarious
liability and/or respondeat superior. She sued Wiley under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for violating her Fourth Amendment right against
unlawful search and seizure, her Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
right to due process, and her Fourteenth Amendment right to equal
protection. Wiley successfully moved for dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6). Sloan’s remaining claim against the Comptroller was
submitted to the jury, and it found the Comptroller was not liable.
Sloan appeals arguing that the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal was
error and that the trial judge did not properly instruct the jury
on the doctrines of vicarious liability and respondeat superior.
II
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion is reviewed de novo. Johnston v. City
of Houston, Tex., 14 F.3d 1056, 1059 (5th Cir. 1994). Ruling on a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion requires the court to accept the allegations
as true and view them in the light most favorable to the non-mover
drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Baker v.
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Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). The motion is denied
unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts that would entitle her to relief. McCartney v. First
City Bank, 970 F.2d 45, 47 (5th Cir. 1992).
B. ANALYSIS
Wiley moved for a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on the grounds that
Sloan could not seek relief under both Title VII and § 1983 because
Sloan failed to show an independent basis for the § 1983 claim.
Wiley relied primarily upon Jackson v. City of Atlanta, Tex., 73
F.3d 60 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 70 (1996) which held
that the same facts that support a Title VII claim cannot also
support a separate § 1983 claim. The district court found that
despite the fact that Sloan was given another opportunity to
replead, she did not allege any conduct that supported her claim
for a constitutional injury.2
The district court held that Jackson only reaffirmed the rule
that a plaintiff may pursue claims under both Title VII and § 1983
if the predicate for the § 1983 is a right independent of one that
Title VII creates. Moreover, the district court’s analysis of the
due process claim examines whether Sloan stated her claim with
factual detail and particularity. Whether the claim arose from
identical facts was not controlling.
2
Sloan only briefs the Fourteenth Amendment due process claim;
therefore we address only that claim. All issues not briefed are
waived. Villenueva v. CNA Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 684, 687 n.5 (5th
Cir. 1989); Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1994).
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The court found that Sloan did not allege any facts that could
countenance a claim for a due process violation. When the court
dismissed Sloan’s third amended complaint, it stated that Sloan’s
repleaded complaint should state the specific conduct that resulted
in damage to her bodily integrity and how it amounted to a
constitutional deprivation. The court also stated that the amended
pleading must address Wiley’s qualified immunity defense. Sloan’s
fourth amended complaint does not address any of these
requirements. Sloan argues that she alleges she suffered a due
process violation when Wiley bumped into her and touched her leg,
but she does not explain how this amounts to a due process
violation. Nor does her complaint address Wiley’s qualified
immunity defense. She argues that Wiley does not have a qualified
immunity defense because the court denied his motion for summary
judgment based on qualified immunity and he did not cross appeal.
Thus, he waived his defense. The record cites that Sloan refers to
do not show that Wiley’s qualified immunity defense was denied, and
thus he has not waived his defense. Therefore, under Schultea v.
Wood, 47 F.3d 1427 (5th Cir. 1995), Sloan has not pled her claim
with factual detail and particularity. Id. at 1430.
III
Sloan’s second issue on appeal is that the court did not fully
instruct the jury on respondeat superior and/or vicarious
liability.
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A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial judge’s jury instructions with deference
because “it is the inescapable duty of the trial judge to instruct
the jurors, fully and correctly, on the applicable law of the case,
and to guide, direct, and assist them toward an intelligent
understanding of the legal and factual issues involved.” Treadway
v. Societe Anonyme Louis-Dreyfus, 894 F.2d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1990)
(internal quotation marks omitted). We apply a two part test to
evaluate objections to the failure to give a requested instruction.
The objecting party must first show that the proposed instruction
correctly states the law. If it does, then we determine if the
given instruction was misleading. We reverse the judgment only if
the charge as a whole leaves substantial and unremovable doubt as
to whether the jury was properly guided in its deliberations. Id.
at 167-68.
B. ANALYSIS
Sloan requested that the trial court’s instruction to the jury
on respondeat superior read:
The Court instructs you that respondeat superior
in the context of this case means that the State of
Texas is absolutely responsible for the acts of a
supervisor who has the power to make employment
decisions concerning the employee’s discipline,
promotion, performance evaluations, or termination.
The Court finds that Plaintiff was in a protected
group and that the alleged harassment complained of
was based on sex.
As for her claim of a sexually hostile work environment, Sloan
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asked that the jury instruction read:
Sexually discriminatory verbal intimidation,
ridicule and insult may be sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s
employment so as to create a sexually hostile work
environment.
Under the legal theory that Defendant State of
Texas subjected Plaintiff to a sexually hostile work
environment, the State of Texas is liable for the
sexual harassment acts of its supervisors if the
supervisor was entrusted with the position of
responsibility of supervising the employee.
The court’s actual instructions explained the elements of quid
pro quo sexual harassment and hostile work environment. Sloan
argues that her proposed instructions fall within the two-part
Treadway test. She argues that she meets the first part of the
test because the requested instruction correctly stated the law.
Sloan contends that because one of the elements of quid pro quo and
hostile work environment harassment is whether a defendant knew or
should have known of the sexual harassment, leaving out her
instruction would misguide the jury. Sloan argues that Wiley
and/or Eicke and Francis’ alleged commission of sexual harassment
satisfies the prima facie elements of notice. Therefore, without
the requested instruction, the jury would not have known that no
additional reporting to supervisors was necessary for there to be
notice where Wiley, Eicke, or Francis either perpetrated or
acquiesced in sexual harassment.
The Comptroller argues that even if Wiley sexually harassed or
acquiesced in sexual harassment, the Comptroller is not strictly
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liable. Sloan’s proposed instruction misstates the law. In
Patterson v. PHP Healthcare, 90 F.3d 927, 943 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 767 (1996), we held that agency principles apply
to Title VII when intentional wrongs are committed in furtherance
of employment; however, the tortfeasing employee must think that he
is doing the employer’s business when committing the wrong. Sloan
fails to explain how Wiley thought that he was doing the
Comptroller’s business when he was allegedly sexually harassing
her.
As for Wiley’s failure to report the coworker’s actions and/or
remarks, the jury heard testimony that Sloan reported only one of
the incidents to Eicke, Sloan’s direct supervisor at the time, or
to Wiley. Thus, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to
believe that Wiley did not know of the incidents with the
coworkers. Since Wiley did not fail to take action, then the
Comptroller cannot be found liable.
AFFIRMED.
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