George v. Foster ( 1997 )


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  •                 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    ____________________________________
    No. 96-31019
    ____________________________________
    BARBARA GEORGE and TASHA WILLIAMS,
    Plaintiffs-Appellees-
    Cross-Appellants,
    v.
    DALE FOSTER, et al.,
    Defendants,
    RACETRAC PETROLEUM, INC.,
    Defendant-Appellant-
    Cross-Appellees.
    _______________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Louisiana
    (94-CV-1778)
    _______________________________________________
    October 15, 1997
    Before KING, DUHÉ, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    In this hostile work environment sexual harassment case,
    Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee     Racetrac   Petroleum,      Inc.
    (Racetrac) appeals the district court’s denial of its motion for a
    new trial on the grounds that (1) the evidence did not support the
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIRCUIT RULE 47.5, the Court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIRCUIT RULE
    47.5.4.
    award of punitive damages to Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants
    Barbara George and Tasha Williams (collectively, plaintiffs) and
    (2) alternatively, the punitive damages award was excessive and
    should have been remitted. Racetrac also asserts that the district
    court erred in denying its motion to set aside the jury’s verdict
    awarding mental anguish damages to plaintiff George. On cross-
    appeal, plaintiffs seek to have the amount of compensatory damages
    increased.
    Having thoroughly reviewed the briefs and the record in this
    case, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
    discretion in denying Racetrac’s motion to set aside the verdict
    and motion for a new trial and remittitur, and we therefore affirm
    the   judgment   in    those      respects.     Additionally,    we   dismiss
    plaintiffs’ cross-appeal because plaintiffs failed to make a motion
    for a new trial in the district court.            Finding that prejudgment
    interest does not further the purpose of punitive damages, however,
    we reverse the district court’s award of prejudgment interest on
    plaintiffs’ punitive damages award.
    We set forth our reasons for the reversal of the district
    court’s assessment of prejudgment interest on plaintiffs’ punitive
    damages award.        We   have   established    a   two-step   analysis   for
    determining whether prejudgment interest should be awarded under
    federal statutes.      Employing this analysis, the court must ask:
    “[D]oes the federal act creating the cause of action preclude an
    award of prejudgment interest, and if not, does an award of
    2
    prejudgment interest further the congressional policies of the
    federal act.”1     If prejudgment interest can be awarded under this
    test, the award of such interest is within the discretion of the
    trial    court.2     As   Title    VII   is   silent     on   the   question   of
    prejudgment interest in general, the crucial question here is
    whether an award of prejudgment interest on punitive damages would
    advance the policy goals of § 1981a(b)(1) of the Civil Rights Act
    of 1991 (the Act) by punishing an employer who discriminates “with
    malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected
    rights” of an employee. Plaintiffs argue that prejudgment interest
    would advance this punitive goal by (1) further punishing those who
    violate the Act and (2) encouraging employers to settle meritorious
    claims.
    In    West    Virginia   v.    United    States,3    the   Supreme    Court
    explained   the    purpose    of   prejudgment    interest:         “Prejudgment
    interest serves to compensate for the loss of use of money due as
    damages from the time the claim accrues until judgment is entered,
    thereby achieving full compensation for the injury those damages
    are intended to redress.”4         We have not specifically addressed the
    1
    Carpenters Dist. Council of New Orleans and Vicinity v.
    Dillard Dep’t Stores, 
    15 F.3d 1275
    , 1288 (5th Cir. 1994), cert.
    denied, 
    513 U.S. 1126
    , 
    115 S. Ct. 933
    , 
    130 L. Ed. 2d 879
     (1995).
    2
    
    Id.
    3
    
    479 U.S. 305
    , 
    107 S. Ct. 702
    , 
    93 L. Ed. 2d 639
     (1987).
    4
    
    Id.
     at 310 n. 2, 
    107 S. Ct. at
    706 n. 2.
    3
    issue of prejudgment interest on punitive damages under Title VII,
    but we have held that awards that are penal in nature do not draw
    interest.5          As we noted in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Texas
    Eastern Transmission Corp.:
    The rationale of the rule that penalties do not draw
    prejudgment interest is that a penalty does not reflect
    damages to the plaintiff but is assessed to encourage
    certain conduct on the part of the party penalized.
    Interest on a penalty does not further the purpose of
    making an injured party whole.6
    Most        other   courts   that   have   addressed   the   issue   agree   that
    prejudgment interest is basically compensatory and generally should
    not be granted on punitive damages.7             We adopt the view of these
    5
    Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Texas E. Transmission Corp.,
    
    551 F.2d 943
    , 944 (5th Cir. 1977) (citing Rodgers v. United States,
    
    332 U.S. 371
    , 373, 
    68 S. Ct. 5
    , 7, 
    92 L. Ed. 3
     (1947) and United
    States v. West Texas Cottonoil Co., 
    155 F.2d 463
    , 466 (5th Cir.
    1946)).
    6
    
    Id.
    7
    See United States v. Reul, 
    959 F.2d 1572
    , 1578 (Fed. Cir.
    1992); Wickham Contracting Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int’l
    Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO, 
    955 F.2d 831
    , 834-35 (2d
    Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 
    506 U.S. 946
    , 
    113 S. Ct. 394
    , 
    121 L. Ed. 2d 302
     (1992) (“prejudgment interest should not be awarded if the
    statutory obligation on which interest is sought is punitive in
    nature” or the “statute itself already provides for . . . punitive
    damages”) (citing Rodgers v. United States, 
    332 U.S. 371
    , 374-76,
    
    68 S. Ct. 5
    , 7, 
    92 L. Ed. 3
     (1947)); Fortino v. Quasar Co., 
    950 F.2d 389
    , 397-98 (7th Cir. 1991) (prejudgment interest not
    available for punitive damages in age discrimination case); Emmel
    v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, Inc., 
    904 F. Supp. 723
    , 734
    (N.D. Ill. 1995), aff’d, 
    95 F.3d 627
     (7th Cir. 1996) (prejudgment
    interest not available for punitive damages in Title VII sexual
    harassment case); Nu-Life Constr. Corp. v. Board of Educ. of City
    of New York, 
    789 F. Supp. 103
    , 104 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Marshall,
    
    132 B.R. 904
    , 906 (C.D. Ill. 1991), aff’d, 
    970 F.2d 383
     (7th Cir.
    1992).
    4
    courts   and   hold   that    the   district   court    erred   in   awarding
    prejudgment interest on plaintiffs’ punitive damages award.
    Accordingly,     we     reverse   the   district   court’s      award   of
    prejudgment interest on plaintiffs’ punitive damages award.                  We
    dismiss plaintiffs’ cross-appeal, and in all other respects we
    affirm the judgment of the district court.               AFFIRMED in part;
    REVERSED in part; cross-appeal DISMISSED.
    5