United States v. Williams ( 2003 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 30, 2003
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 02-20997
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JUAN JOSE WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. H-02-CR-139-1
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Before BARKSDALE, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Juan Jose Williams appeals from his guilty-plea conviction for
being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). Relying on our decision in United States v. Emerson,
270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 907 (2002),
that the Second Amendment affords individuals a protected right to
bear arms, Williams argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is not
narrowly tailored in light of the interplay of the Second Amendment
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
and the regulation of interstate commerce under the Commerce
Clause, is overly broad in its reach given the legislative history
of its intent, and unevenly burdens a fundamental right in
violation of equal protection by relying on inconsistent state law
definitions.
Although Williams orally mentioned Emerson and the Second
Amendment at his rearraignment, he did not make the above arguments
in the district court either at rearraignment or at sentencing.
Therefore, our review is for plain error. See United States v.
Krout, 66 F.3d 1420, 1434 (5th Cir. 1995). We specifically
recognized in Emerson that "it is clear that felons, infants, and
those of unsound mind may be prohibited from possessing firearms."
Emerson, 270 F.3d at 261 (emphasis added). In light of this
recognition, we conclude that Williams has failed to demonstrate
plain error. See United States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 162-64
(5th Cir. 1994)(en banc).
Relying on the Supreme Court's decisions in Jones v. United
States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000), United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000), and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995),
Williams also argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is an
unconstitutional exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power
because the regulated activity does not substantially affect
interstate commerce. Alternatively, he argues that his indictment
was defective for failing to allege that his specific offense
substantially affected interstate commerce and that the factual
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basis for his plea was insufficient because the evidence
established only that the firearm had traveled across state lines
at some unspecified point in the past.
Williams raises his arguments solely to preserve them for
possible Supreme Court review. As he acknowledges, his arguments
are foreclosed by existing Fifth Circuit precedent. See United
States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 1150 (2002).
AFFIRMED.
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