Williams v. Scott ( 1994 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
for the Fifth Circuit
_____________________________________
No. 94-20375
_____________________________________
WILLIE RAY WILLIAMS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
VERSUS
WAYNE SCOTT, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Institutional Division,
Respondent-Appellee.
______________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
______________________________________________________
(September 30, 1994)
Before DAVIS, JONES, and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges.
DUHÉ, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Willie Ray Williams, a Texas death row inmate,
appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The
district court stayed Williams's execution, granted summary
judgment in favor of the State, and granted Williams a Certificate
of Probable Cause for appeal. We affirm the summary judgment and
vacate the stay of execution.
BACKGROUND
Willie Ray Williams and Jo Jo Nichols robbed a convenience
store. During the robbery, Williams murdered Claude Schaffer Jr.
by shooting him in the back with a pistol while he was in a
squatting position behind the counter. Houston police arrested
Williams three days later, at which time he voluntarily confessed
to the murder.
Williams pleaded guilty to capital murder. At the punishment
hearing, Viola Ferguson testified for the prosecution. She
identified Williams as having committed an armed robbery of a Taco
Bell just four days before the murder.1 Williams then testified in
his defense. He admitted the Taco Bell robbery, and that he had
carried an automatic weapon during that holdup. He denied
committing any other armed robberies. Charlotte Parker, Williams
former girlfriend, testified for the prosecution in rebuttal. She
stated that Williams had committed two other armed robberies before
the murder and two more afterwards. She admitted accompanying him
on two of those occasions. The jury answered the special issues in
the affirmative.2 The court then sentenced Williams to death.
Williams filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus after
exhausting his state remedies of direct appeal and habeas corpus.
He raises due process issues under Giglio and Brady, and a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
DISCUSSION
1
Williams was also convicted of theft in 1977.
2
The court submitted the following special issues to the jury:
"(1) Whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of
the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable
expectation that the death of the deceased or other would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat
to society; and (3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct
of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in
response to provocation, if any, by the deceased." Tex. Crim.
Proc. Code Ann. art. 37.071(b) (1981) (amended 1991).
2
Summary judgment is appropriate if the record discloses "that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c). We review the district court's grant of summary
judgment de novo. Weyant v. Acceptance Ins. Co., 917 F.2d 209, 212
(5th Cir. 1990). We consider all the facts contained in the
summary judgment record and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id.
Nevertheless, in the review of a petition for writ of habeas
corpus, we presume all state court findings of fact to be correct
in the absence of clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d) (1988); Collins v. Green, 505 F.2d 22, 23 (5th Cir. 1974).
I. Giglio claim.
Appellant contends that the State violated his right to due
process under Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). Giglio
requires the disclosure of material evidence affecting the
credibility of a witness. Id. at 154. The prosecution failed to
disclose a plea agreement made with Parker's counsel. A condition
of the agreement required Parker's counsel not to communicate the
agreement to Parker before she testified. The district court found
Parker's testimony to be relevant to special issue number two
(Williams's continuing threat to society). Appellant asserts that
the nondisclosed plea agreement is material impeachment evidence,
and that failure to disclose it is a due process violation.
The district court determined that nondisclosure of the plea
agreement was immaterial because Parker was unaware of the
3
agreement. Evidence is "material" if "there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense,
the result would have been different." United States v. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). Impeachment evidence is not material if
the witness does not have knowledge of the underlying fact. United
States v. Nixon, 881 F.2d 1305, 1309 (5th Cir. 1989); see also
Willhoite v. Vasquez, 921 F.2d 247, 249 (9th Cir. 1990). On state
habeas review, the court found that Parker had no knowledge of the
plea agreement. We presume that finding to be correct since
Appellant has offered no evidence within one of the eight
exceptions to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to refute the finding.
Appellant relies on Burkhalter v. State, 493 S.W.2d 214, 218
(Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1000 (1973), for the
proposition that the witness's knowledge of the plea bargain is
unnecessary. We disagree. The Texas court held that the
prosecution's non-disclosure of an immunity agreement with the
witness's attorney violated the defendant's due process rights.
Id. at 219. In Burkhalter, however, the witness "was not
completely in the dark" as to the existence of an agreement; "a
very real inference not to prosecute" existed.3 Id. at 217. In
contrast, the state court hearing Appellant's habeas petition found
that Parker was unaware of any agreement between the state and her
attorney, and the record fully supports that finding.
3
In Campbell v. Reed, 594 F.2d 4, 7 (4th Cir. 1979), the Fourth
Circuit did not require a witness to have knowledge of the exact
terms of the agreement to find a due process violation. The
witness, however, "well knew that such an agreement did exist."
Id.
4
Williams also argues in effect that had he known of a plea
agreement, he could have argued with more force that Parker
expected to benefit from her testimony. We are unable to say that
Williams's argument has absolutely no merit. If Williams's counsel
had known of the agreement between Parker's attorney and the
prosecutor, counsel may have more effectively argued that Parker's
lawyer had consciously or unconsciously telegraphed to her that a
deal had been made. However, we are persuaded in this case that
the marginal benefit Williams would have obtained from this
additional fact would not have changed the outcome of the
punishment hearing. Williams's attorney vigorously cross-examined
Parker about her motives for testifying.4 Williams, through his
cross-examination of Parker, strongly argued that she was expecting
4
During cross-examination, Parker was asked:
Q. [W]hat are you charged with in [this capital murder case]?
A. Resisting arrest; misdemeanor.
Q. I beg your pardon? You are not charged with capital
murder?
A. No, sir.
Q. You are not charged with a murder?
A. No, sir.
Q. You are not charged with aggravated robbery?
A. Not in the murder case, no.
***
Q. What has the District Attorney promised you to take the
stand today and tell these stories?
A. He hasn't promised me anything.
Q. But, you haven't been charged . . . with capital murder,
murder, robbery, aggravated robbery, or anything? Right?
You have been charged with a misdemeanor?
***
Q. You don't want to go to the penitentiary, do you?
A. I don't think nobody wants to go to the penitentiary.
Q. And you would say anything in the world to this jury to
save yourself in this particular case, wouldn't you?
R. Vol. III at 657-62.
5
compensation from the prosecutor in the form of leniency after
Williams's trial was over.
In sum, Parker's ignorance of the agreement substantially
reduced its impeachment value. Although disclosure to the jury
that the prosecutor had made this concession had some marginal
impeachment value, we are persuaded that under the facts presented
here its non-disclosure did not affect the jury's verdict. For
that reason, Williams's Giglio claim must fail.5
II. Brady Claim
Appellant also contends that the State violated his due
process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Brady
requires the prosecution to disclose all exculpatory evidence that
is material to guilt or punishment. Id. at 87. Cindy Ann Johnson
was an eyewitness to the robbery, but did not testify at the
punishment hearing. The prosecution gave the defense a summary of
her statement that included a cross reference to her full written
statement.6 Defense counsel never checked the full written
5
Our conclusion is further supported by the testimony of Joe
Cannon, Williams's lead counsel at the punishment hearing, who
testified at Williams's state habeas hearing. Cannon referred to
Parker as "a former girl friend who tried to tie [Williams] into
two or three robberies and we managed to nullify the examination."
When Cannon talked to some jurors afterwards, he noted that "they
didn't pay any attention to [Parker]. They considered her an angry
girl friend." Rather, it was Ferguson's testimony about Williams's
armed robbery committed a few days before the murder that Cannon
thought "was so critical and fatal to us." Writ Hearing R. at 70-
71.
6
The summary stated: "She was behind the counter, observed the
suspects enter the store, order beer and corn dog then pull the
guns and shoot the complainant. Can identify two suspects. For
details see written statement."
6
statement, which suggested that the victim may have provoked
Williams relevant to special issue number three.
A Brady violation does not arise if the defendant, using
reasonable diligence, could have obtained the information. United
States v. Ramirez, 810 F.2d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 844 (1987). The state court conducting habeas review
found that Appellant could have obtained Johnson's written
statement. We presume that finding to be correct. Because
Appellant could have obtained the exculpatory statement through
reasonable diligence, his Brady claim fails.
III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Appellant contends that his appointed counsel did not
effectively represent him. To prove ineffective assistance of
counsel, Appellant must show that his counsel's performance was
deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his
defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
Appellant raises his Sixth Amendment claim on three fronts: (1)
counsel should have reviewed Johnson's full written statement; (2)
counsel conducted a faulty voir dire; (3) counsel should not have
recommended pleading guilty.
Appellant's claim pertaining to Johnson's statement fails for
lack of prejudice. A showing of prejudice requires "a reasonable
probability that, but for the counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome." Id. at 696. Johnson testified at the trial of
7
Williams's co-conspirator, Joseph Nichols. The state court
conducting habeas review found that her testimony contradicted her
written statement. Furthermore, Johnson testified that her prior
written statement was incorrect. Appellant has not provided any
evidence to prove that Johnson's testimony would have been
different had she testified at Williams's trial. The addition of
Johnson's testimony does not create a reasonable probability that
the result of the trial would have been different.
Appellant also contends that his counsel's failure to voir
dire prospective jurors on the difference between "deliberately"
and "intentionally" rises to ineffective assistance of counsel.
Deliberately is the intent element in special issue number one;
intentionally is the intent element for capital murder.
Deliberately is the higher standard. See Heckert v. State, 612
S.W.2d 549, 552-53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). Thus, Williams could
plead guilty and still contest special issue number one.
In determining whether an attorney's performance is deficient,
we must avoid the distortion of hindsight. We must evaluate the
challenged conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Voir dire occurred on January 21-22,
1981. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decided Heckert on
February 25, 1981. Thus, at the time of voir dire, no definite
distinction between deliberately and intentionally had been
authoritatively expressed. From counsel's perspective at the time,
counsel's performance at voir dire was not deficient.
8
Finally, Appellant contends that his counsel's advice to plead
guilty was faulty because the guilty plea foreclosed any argument
on special issue number one. Appellant now claims that his best
defense was lack of intent; by pleading guilty he surrendered any
opportunity to contest intent at trial or at the punishment
hearing. For Appellant to succeed on his claim, he must show a
reasonable probability that one juror would have agreed with him on
special issue number one.7 The evidence of intent against
Williams, however, was overwhelming. Williams voluntarily
confessed to the murder. Dolly Jefferson testified that she
entered the store at the same time as Williams and Nichols. After
she left, she heard a gunshot and saw Williams run from the store
carrying a tin box, which was the cash register's coin box. Two or
three other witnesses not called by the prosecution at the
punishment hearing would have placed Williams at the scene of the
crime. Williams's own testimony, given during cross examination,
showed that he shot Schaffer in the back while he was in a
squatting position behind the counter. Williams's proposed
testimony on his lack of intent which he now argues he was
precluded from giving does not undermine confidence in the jury's
decision on special issue number one. His ineffective assistance
of counsel claim fails for lack of prejudice.
CONCLUSION
7
The Texas capital sentencing scheme requires a unanimous vote by
the jurors on the special issues to apply a death sentence. Tex.
Crim. Proc. Code Ann. art. 37.071(d).
9
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's grant of
Summary Judgment is AFFIRMED and its Stay of Execution is VACATED.
10