United States v. Mosquera-Olave ( 2000 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 99-31353
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    ENRIQUE MOSQUERA-OLAVE, also known as Juan
    Rodriguez Santos, also known as Juan Santos
    Rodriguez,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 99-CR-85-1-L
    --------------------
    October 18, 2000
    Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Enrique Mosquera-Olave appeals his sentence following his
    guilty-plea    conviction    for     conspiring   to   import   cocaine
    hydrochloride and for attempting to possess with the intent to
    distribute cocaine hydrochloride.      Mosquera-Olave asserts that the
    district court erred in applying an upward adjustment for his role
    in the offense, applying an upward adjustment for obstruction of
    justice, and refusing to apply a downward adjustment for acceptance
    of responsibility.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 99-31353
    -2-
    Because the record shows that Mosquera-Olave set up the drug
    transaction, recruited a codefendant to take part in the offense,
    and agreed to pay the codefendant for his participation, the
    district court did not clearly err in finding that Mosquera-Olave
    was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of the criminal
    activity. See § 3B1.1, comment. (n.4); United States v. Ocana, 
    204 F.3d 585
    , 592 (5th Cir. 2000).          The district court’s application of
    the role-in-the-offense adjustment was not error.
    In    an   attempt    to    hide    his     true   identity      during   the
    investigation and prosecution of this case, Mosquera-Olave produced
    a false Puerto Rican birth certificate and provided materially
    false information regarding his identity to the magistrate judge at
    his detention hearing and in a financial status affidavit, to the
    district judge at trial and rearraignment, and to the probation
    officer conducting a presentence investigation for the court.
    Thus, the district court did not clearly err in finding that
    Mosquera-Olave obstructed justice, and its application of the
    obstruction-of-justice       enhancement       was   proper.      See   §   3C1.1,
    comment. (nn.2,4(c),(f),(h); see also United States v. Rodriguez,
    
    942 F.2d 899
    ,   902   (5th   Cir.    1991)    (upholding     application    of
    enhancement where defendant provided court with a fraudulent birth
    certificate); United States v. McDonald, 
    964 F.2d 390
    , 391 (5th
    Cir. 1992) (holding that the use of a false name before a judge or
    magistrate      merits    enhancement      without      a   showing     that   the
    investigation or prosecution was significantly hindered).
    Finally, the district court did not err in refusing to apply
    the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment.                See United States v.
    No. 99-31353
    -3-
    Flucas, 
    99 F.3d 177
    , 180 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the district
    court’s acceptance-of-responsibility determination is reviewed with
    even more deference than the pure clearly erroneous standard);
    § 3E1.1, comment. (n.5).      Mosquera-Olave’s guilty plea, entered on
    the second day of trial, was not particularly timely since it did
    not allow the Government to avoid preparing for and conducting a
    portion   of   the   trial.    See   §   3E1.1,   comment.   (nn.1(h),6).
    Moreover, even after he pleaded guilty, Mosquera-Olave continued to
    obstruct justice by providing a false name, and he refused to admit
    his full participation in the conspiracy.           See id. at comment.
    (nn.3-4).
    The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.