Hughes v. Tobacco Institute, Inc. , 278 F.3d 417 ( 2002 )


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  •                     Revised January 17, 2002
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    For the Fifth Circuit
    No. 00-40658
    RUTH HUGHES, Individually and as Representative
    of the Estate of Sherman Hughes, Sr., Deceased,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    VERSUS
    THE TOBACCO INSTITUTE, INC.; PHILIP MORRIS, INC.; BROWN
    & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORPORATION; R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO CO.;
    B.A.T. INDUSTRIES PLC; LORILLARD TOBACCO CO.; THE AMERICAN
    TOBACCO COMPANY; LIGGETT GROUP, INC.; UNITED STATES TOBACCO
    COMPANY; THE COUNCIL FOR TOBACCO RESEARCH USA, INC.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    -----------------------------------------------------------------
    CONSOLIDATED WITH
    No. 00-40718
    CARLIS COLE; ET AL.,
    Plaintiffs,
    CARLIS COLE; CHARLES COLE; LOUIS ARDOIN; CHARLES BANKS;
    RUTH DAVIS; DONALD FRENCH; LOIS FRENCH; LINDA GOODWIN;
    DANIEL HUGHES; BARBARA ORR; DARRELL ORR, SR.; DALE SONNIER;
    AGNES VONDY, Individually & as Representative of the Estate
    of Luanne Davis, Deceased; KAFFIE WILLIAMS, Individually &
    as Representative of the Estate of Jules Williams, Sr.,
    Deceased; FRANK O’PRY; JOSEPH WRAY, the Son of Thomas H.
    Wray, Deceased, & Paula Wray Ewing, Executrix of the Estate
    of Thomas H. Wray, Deceased; PATRICIA GIBSON, Individually
    & as Representative of the Estate of Danny Gibson,
    Deceased & as Next Friend of Paul Gibson, Patrick Gibson,
    Bryan Gibson, Gayla Gibson & Gabrielle Gibson, Minors,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    STEVEN FAIRCLOTH,
    Intervenor Plaintiff-Appellant,
    VERSUS
    THE TOBACCO INSTITUTE, INC.; PHILIP MORRIS, INCORPORATED;
    BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORPORATION; R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO
    COMPANY; B.A.T. INDUSTRIES PLC; LORILLARD TOBACCO COMPANY; THE
    AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY; LIGGETT GROUP, INC.; UNITED STATES
    TOBACCO COMPANY; THE COUNCIL FOR TOBACCO RESEARCH USA, INC.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Texas
    December 28, 2001
    Before GARWOOD, DeMOSS, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
    DeMOSS, Circuit Judge:
    Several   Plaintiffs,   seeking    class   status,   sued   numerous
    tobacco manufacturer and trade association Defendants, alleging
    negligence, strict liability, fraud, misrepresentation, breach of
    2
    warranty,     antitrust     violations,       negligent    and     intentional
    entrustment,    public     nuisance,       unjust    enrichment,   aggravated
    assault, Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
    (RICO)    violations,     and   Deceptive    Trade    Practices    Act   (DTPA)
    violations.    The district court severed Plaintiff Hughes’ claims
    into a separate suit so it could proceed to resolution on the
    merits.
    The Defendants sought dismissal on the pleadings in the
    severed case Hughes v. Tobacco Institute, asserting that § 82.004
    of the Texas Practices and Remedies Code barred all Hughes’ claims.
    The Defendants’ motion was based in large part on this Court’s
    opinion in Sanchez v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 
    187 F.3d 486
    , 490 (5th
    Cir. 1999), where we held that § 82.004 barred various claims
    predicated on the harmful or addictive nature of cigarettes.                 In
    response, Hughes argued that the Sanchez majority erroneously
    rejected controlling Texas Supreme Court precedent and informative
    legislative history, and that Sanchez’s interpretation of § 82.004
    violated the United States and Texas Constitutions.
    On May 8, 2000, the district court granted the Defendants’
    motion to dismiss Hughes’ claims.              The court also sua sponte
    dismissed the claims in Cole v. Tobacco Institute, the suit from
    which Hughes had been severed, on the same grounds. The Plaintiffs
    from both suits appeal here.        For the reasons expressed below, we
    AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.
    3
    I.   STANDARD OF REVIEW
    Any party may move for judgment on the pleadings after the
    pleadings are closed.         FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c).            We review rule 12(c)
    dismissals de novo.         St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 
    224 F.3d 425
    , 440 n.8 (5th Cir. 2000).                     “[T]he central issue is
    whether,    in     the    light    most    favorable       to    the    plaintiff,   the
    complaint states a valid claim for relief.”                     
    Id. Pleadings should
    be     construed       liberally,    and    judgment       on     the    pleadings    is
    appropriate only if there are no disputed issues of fact and only
    questions of law remain. Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of
    China, 
    142 F.3d 887
    , 891 (5th Cir. 1998).                  In ruling, the district
    court is confined to the pleadings and must accept all allegations
    contained therein as true.            St. Paul Ins. Co. v. AFIA Worldwide
    Ins. Co., 
    937 F.2d 274
    , 279 (5th Cir. 1991).
    The district court, when presiding over a diversity case, must
    apply the law of the forum state.                Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 
    304 U.S. 64
    , 78 (1938).          And the court is “bound to apply the law as
    interpreted by the state’s highest court.”                  Texas Dep’t of Hous. &
    Cmty. Affairs v. Verex Assurance, Inc., 
    68 F.3d 922
    , 928 (5th Cir.
    1995) (quoting Ladue v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 
    920 F.2d 272
    , 274
    (5th Cir. 1991)).         “When there is no ruling by the state’s highest
    court, it is the duty of the federal court to determine as best it
    can,    what     the     highest    court       of   the    state       would   decide.”
    Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Transportation Ins. Co.,
    4
    
    953 F.2d 985
    , 988 (5th Cir. 1992).     This Court’s interpretation of
    Texas law is binding on the district court, unless a subsequent
    state court decision or statutory amendment renders our prior
    decision clearly wrong.     Batts v. Tow-Motor Forklift Co., 
    66 F.3d 743
    , 747 (5th Cir. 1995).
    II.   TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 82.004
    In 1993, the Texas Legislature enacted § 82.004, which limits
    product liability actions against manufacturers and sellers of
    allegedly defective products.     Specifically, it provides:
    (a)   In a products liability action, a manufacturer or
    seller shall not be liable if:
    (1) the product is inherently unsafe and the
    product is known to be unsafe by the ordinary
    consumer who consumes the product with the
    ordinary knowledge common to the community;
    and
    (2) the product is a common consumer product
    intended for personal consumption, such as
    sugar, castor oil, alcohol, tobacco, and
    butter, as identified in Comment i to Section
    402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
    (b)   For purposes of this section, the term “products
    liability action” does not include an action based
    on manufacturing defect or breach of an express
    warranty.
    TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 82.004.        Another section defines a
    “products liability action” as:
    any action against a manufacturer or seller for recovery
    of damages arising out of personal injury, death, or
    property damage allegedly caused by a defective product
    whether the action is based in strict tort liability,
    strict products liability, negligence, misrepresentation,
    breach of express or implied warranty, or any other
    theory or combination of theories.
    5
    TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 82.001.
    A.   JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF § 82.004
    No Texas Court has had occasion to apply § 82.004 in a tobacco
    suit.   However, in Sanchez, this Court concluded, as a matter of
    first impression, that § 82.004 bars claims premised on the harmful
    or addictive nature of tobacco, including those brought as claims
    for fraud, misrepresentation, breach of implied warranty, DTPA
    violations, and 
    conspiracy. 187 F.3d at 491
    .
    In Harris v. Phillip Morris Inc., 
    232 F.3d 456
    , 457-58 (5th
    Cir. 2000), and then again in Davis v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, Inc.,
    
    231 F.3d 928
    , 930 (5th Cir. 2000), this Court revisited this issue,
    holding that suits for assault were likewise precluded by § 82.004.
    In both cases, we reiterated that § 82.004 bars all state law
    claims, not expressly exempted by the statute, that are predicated
    on personal injury or death from a defective product “regardless of
    the theory or combination of theories under which the claim is
    brought.”   
    Harris, 232 F.3d at 459
    ; 
    Davis, 231 F.3d at 930
    .
    B.   PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS
    The district court held that our Sanchez decision precluded
    “most of [P]laintiffs’ claims as they arise from personal injury or
    death caused by a defective product.”   We agree.   Under Sanchez and
    its progeny, § 82.004 bars the Plaintiffs’ negligence, strict
    liability, fraud, misrepresentation, negligent and intentional
    6
    entrustment, public nuisance, unjust enrichment, assault, and DTPA
    claims because they are all predicated on a product-defect theory.
    
    Sanchez, 187 F.3d at 491
    .
    The district court did correctly recognize that some of the
    Plaintiffs’ claims are unaffected by § 82.004's limitation on
    liability.    Specifically, the court found that the Plaintiffs’
    breach of warranty claim survived because it is expressly exempted
    by the statute, and that the Plaintiffs’ RICO and antitrust claims
    survived because a state statute cannot preempt federal law.
    However, the court went on to hold that each of these remaining
    claims failed for reasons other than the preclusive effect of
    § 82.004.    We agree.
    1.   Plaintiffs’ RICO Claim
    The Plaintiffs assert a RICO claim based on the predicate
    offenses of assault and injury to a child, elderly individual or
    disabled individual.     TEX. PEN. CODE § 22.02 & 22.04.           To prevail in
    a RICO suit, a plaintiff must demonstrate an injury to business or
    property.    18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 
    473 U.S. 479
    , 496 (1985) (“[T]he plaintiff only has standing if, and
    can only recover to the extent that, he has been injured in his
    business or    property.”).     The       phrase    “injury   to    business   or
    property” excludes personal injuries.              Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,
    
    442 U.S. 330
    , 339 (1979).     Because the only damages asserted by the
    7
    Plaintiffs are for personal injuries, the district court’s judgment
    on the pleadings on this claim was proper.
    2.     Plaintiffs’ Antitrust Claim
    The Plaintiffs next assert an antitrust claim, contending that
    the    Defendants      entered        into   an   agreement       to    restrain         free
    competition by coordinating tobacco research on the safety of
    tobacco and other products such as the “safer cigarette.”                                They
    also   allege    that      the   Defendants       entered    into       a    “gentleman’s
    agreement”      to   suppress         independent      research   and        to   hide   any
    negative results. As a result of this conspiracy, Plaintiffs claim
    that information           on   the    dangers    of   smoking    and        addition     was
    suppressed, that safer cigarettes and products were not developed,
    and that cigarette prices increased as a result.
    Factors   relevant        to    determining      whether     a       plaintiff    has
    established antitrust standing include:                  (1) the causal connection
    between the alleged antitrust violation and harm to the plaintiff;
    (2) an improper motive; (3) the nature of the plaintiff’s alleged
    injury and whether the injury was of a type that Congress sought to
    redress   with       the   antitrust      laws    (antitrust      injury),         (4)   the
    directness with which the alleged market restraint caused the
    asserted injury; (5) the speculative nature of the damages; and (6)
    the risk of duplicative recovery or complex apportionment of
    damages. See Sullivan v. Tagliabue, 
    25 F.3d 43
    , 46 (1st Cir. 1994)
    8
    (summarizing antitrust standing factors established in Associated
    Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 
    459 U.S. 519
    , 537-45 (1983)). The district court found that several of
    these   factors   weigh   against   finding   antitrust   standing   for
    individual smokers:
    First is the risk of duplicative recovery and complexity
    in apportioning damages. Section 4 of the Clayton Act
    limits recovery to individuals who have been “injured in
    their business or property by reason of anything
    forbidden in the antitrust laws.” 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) . .
    . . [I]n Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, [the Court]
    limited antitrust standing to plaintiffs who purchased
    directly from the antitrust violators. 
    431 U.S. 720
    ,
    729-35 (1977).    The Court held that determining the
    extent of damages as divided between direct and indirect
    consumers would involve evidentiary complexities and
    uncertainties which would prolong and complicate
    proceedings rendering them 
    ineffective. 431 U.S. at 732
    .
    Another consideration was the risk of duplicative
    recovery. Allowing consumers who purchased goods from
    distributors who could bring their own suits would result
    in two sets of plaintiffs recovering from the defendant
    for the same acts.    In the present case, this factor
    weighs heavily against standing.
    . . . .
    The second factor which weighs heavily against finding
    antitrust standing is whether the type of injury alleged
    was intended to be remedied by antitrust law; that is
    whether the plaintiffs have suffered an antitrust injury.
    . . . The Ninth Circuit has determined that this requires
    the injured party to be a participant in the same market
    as the alleged malefactors.      Parties whose injuries,
    though flowing from that which makes the defendant’s
    conduct unlawful, are experienced in another market do
    not suffer antitrust injury. Individual smokers do not
    buy cigarettes from manufacturers, but from retailers who
    in turn buy from distributors thus the plaintiffs are at
    least one step removed from market in which the
    manufacturer    defendants   participate.     Since   the
    plaintiffs have not shown they were direct purchasers,
    9
    this factor weights heavily against finding antitrust
    standing.
    The court finds that these factors alone preclude a
    finding of antitrust standing The plaintiffs’ antitrust
    claims are therefore dismissed on the basis of the
    pleadings.
    (Citations and footnote omitted.) We are persuaded by the district
    court’s reasoning.      The Plaintiffs’ antitrust claims were properly
    dismissed on the pleadings.
    3.       Plaintiffs’ Breach of Warranty Claim
    In support of their breach of warranty claim, the Plaintiffs
    assert that the Defendants made knowingly false statements as to
    the health dangers of smoking and the addictive qualities of
    nicotine through advertising and public statements. The Plaintiffs
    claim these statements formed the “basis of the bargain” for
    themselves and others in both starting and continuing to smoke.
    Specifically, Plaintiffs point to statements Defendants made from
    1954 to 1994.
    As the district court correctly noted, any statement made
    before May 5, 1993 is barred by limitations.1         Thus, the only
    1
    This suit was filed on May 5, 1997, and the applicable statute
    of limitations is four years. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 2.725(a)-(b).
    The Plaintiffs have not alleged that the Defendants made any
    specific representation about future performance, which can, in
    certain circumstances, extend the time frame for bringing suit on
    an express warranty. See id.; Cornerstones Mun. Util. Dist. v.
    Mansanto Co., 
    889 S.W.2d 570
    , 577 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
    1994, writ denied).
    10
    relevant representation relied upon by the Plaintiffs is a 1994
    statement by major cigarette manufacturer executives before the
    House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the Committee
    on Energy and Commerce, that nicotine is not addictive.2            The
    Plaintiffs contend that, despite this statement in 1994, the
    Defendants have known cigarettes were addictive since the early
    1960s.
    An express warranty is “[a]ny affirmation of fact or promise
    made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and
    becomes part of the basis of the bargain.”         TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE
    2.313(a)(1); American Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 
    951 S.W.2d 420
    , 436
    (Tex. 1997).   Only sellers—not trade associations—may be liable
    for breach of express warranties. Allgood v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
    Co., 
    80 F.3d 168
    , 170-71 (5th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, judgment on
    the pleadings in favor of the Defendant trade associations on
    Plaintiffs’ express warranty claims was proper.
    The Plaintiffs’ breach of express warranty claims against the
    remaining   Defendants   necessarily   fail   as   well.   Defendants’
    statements before Congress were made forty-two years after the
    Plaintiffs became addicted to cigarettes.      Thus, these statements
    cannot have formed the “basis of the bargain” for the Plaintiffs’
    initial purchase of cigarettes. See generally Grinnell, 
    951 S.W.2d 2
         The district court correctly concluded that most of the other
    “representations” cited by the Plaintiffs were insufficient to
    constitute express warranties.
    11
    at 436 (explaining that “basis of the bargain” is analogous to the
    common law “reliance” element).           And, to the extent Plaintiffs’
    argument rests on the contention that they continued to smoke in
    reliance on the Defendants’ 1994 statement, we agree with the
    district court that “any express warranty within the limitations
    period   was   negated   by   the   common   knowledge      that   smoking   is
    addictive and dangerous to one’s health.”           Cf. 
    Allgood, 80 F.3d at 172
    (holding manufacture had no duty to warn of the dangers of
    smoking because “the dangers of cigarette smoking have long been
    known to the community”).
    III.    PLAINTIFFS’ CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
    Finally,   the    Plaintiffs       contend    that     this    Court’s
    interpretation of § 82.004 is unconstitutional.          First, they argue
    that our interpretation violates the open court’s provision of the
    Texas Constitution. The open courts provision provides that “[a]ll
    courts shall be open, and every person for a injury done him, in
    his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due
    course of law.”     TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.         To establish an open
    court’s violations, the plaintiff must establish that (1) he or she
    has a well-established, cognizable common law cause of action that
    is being abrogated or restricted, and (2) that restriction of the
    claim is unreasonable or arbitrary when balanced against the
    statute’s purpose.       Diaz v. Westphal, 
    941 S.W.2d 96
    , 100 (Tex.
    12
    1997).    The district court concluded that the Plaintiffs failed to
    establish the first prong, i.e. that they had a well-established,
    cognizable common-law claim that § 82.004 abrogated or restricted.
    We agree.     As recently as 1996, this Court labeled a product
    liability action premised on the addictive nature of cigarettes as
    a “novel and wholly untested theory.”    Castano v. American Tobacco
    Co., 
    84 F.3d 734
    , 737 (5th Cir. 1996).   And just last year another
    panel of this Court, whose decision we are bound to follow,
    concluded that an assault claim premised on personal injuries from
    smoking was not a “well-established” common-law claim.3     
    Harris, 232 F.3d at 458
    .      Accordingly, we conclude that the district
    court’s rejection of the Plaintiffs’ open courts challenge was
    proper.
    Lastly, the Plaintiffs argue that § 82.004 violates the Due
    Process clauses of the United States and Texas Constitutions.
    Specifically, the Plaintiffs argue that Sanchez’s interpretation of
    § 82.004 is unreasonable and arbitrary because it, in effect,
    grants tobacco manufacturers immunity from suit in the state of
    Texas.
    3
    We do not necessarily agree with the Harris Court’s dicta that
    the Texas Products Liability Act does not violate the open courts
    provision simply because it does not preclude manufacturing defect
    and express warranty claims. See 
    Harris, 232 F.3d at 458
    .
    13
    Since no fundamental right is implicated here, § 82.004 need
    only be rationally related to the stated legislative purpose.
    Texas Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 
    893 S.W.2d 504
    , 525 (Tex.
    1995).     Thus, the Texas Legislature’s enactment of § 82.004 is
    unconstitutional only if it is “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable,
    having no substantial relation to the public health, safety,
    morals, or general welfare.”      FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of
    Austin, 
    93 F.3d 167
    , 174 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Village of Euclid
    v. Ambler Realty Co., 
    272 U.S. 365
    , 395 (1926)).                The Texas
    Legislature’s stated purpose is passing § 82.004 was to abrogate
    frivolous lawsuits it perceived as wasting judicial time and money,
    and to adopt the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A.           We agree
    with the district court that a rational relationship exists between
    § 82.004 and the Texas Legislature’s objective.               Accordingly,
    § 82.004 does not violate the Plaintiffs’ Due Process rights.         The
    district    court   did   not   err    in   rejecting   the   Plaintiffs’
    constitutional challenges.
    IV.   PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO CERTIFY QUESTIONS TO THE SUPREME COURT
    OF TEXAS
    As an alternative to their urging this Court to reexamine
    Sanchez, the Plaintiffs have requested that we certify several
    questions to the Texas Supreme Court.         Specifically, they assert
    that we should ask the court (1) whether this Court correctly
    interpreted Texas law in Sanchez, and (2) whether the Sanchez
    14
    interpretation of § 82.004 violated the Texas Constitution.
    The Texas Constitution allows federal appellate courts to
    certify questions to the Texas Supreme Court if no Texas Supreme
    Court authority is on point.      TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3-c; see also
    TEX. R. APP. P. 58.1.      However, certification is not “a proper
    avenue to change our binding precedent.”      Jefferson v. Lead Indus.
    Ass’n, Inc., 
    106 F.3d 1245
    , 1247 (5th Cir. 1997).         “Once a panel of
    this Court has settled on the state law to be applied in a
    diversity case, the precedent should be followed by other panels
    without regard to any alleged existing confusion in state law,
    absent a subsequent state court decision or statutory amendment
    which makes this Court’s decision clearly wrong.”           Lee v. Frozen
    Food Express, Inc., 
    592 F.2d 271
    , 272 (5th Cir. 1979).
    A.   THE SANCHEZ QUESTION
    A panel of this Court interpreted § 82.004 in Sanchez, and two
    other panels followed that interpretation in Harris and Davis.
    Absent a “subsequent state court decision or statutory amendment
    which makes this Court’s decision clearly wrong,” this Court will
    deny this and any future motion to certify questions related to the
    correctness of our Sanchez decision.        
    Lee, 592 F.2d at 272
    .         We
    also take this opportunity to issue the caveat to future litigants
    that,   absent   a   contrary   Texas   Supreme   Court    opinion   or   a
    legislative amendment to § 82.004, we shall henceforth consider our
    15
    “Erie guesses” in Sanchez, Harris, Davis, and this case to be
    settled     law    in   this   Circuit      as   to   the     applicability   and
    interpretation of § 82.004 in regard to tobacco being an inherently
    unsafe product, and further appeals may be deemed frivolous by this
    Court.
    B.    THE CONSTITUTIONALITY QUESTION
    We    likewise     decline     to    certify     the    question   of   the
    constitutionality of our interpretation of § 82.004 in Sanchez.
    “Absent genuinely unsettled matters of state law, we are reluctant
    to certify” because we “do not lightly abdicate our mandate to
    decide issues of state law when sitting in diversity.”                
    Jefferson, 106 F.3d at 1247-48
    .           The ability to certify questions is a
    valuable tool, but we are cautious to avoid its overuse “lest we
    wear out our welcome.”          Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v.
    Transportation Ins. 
    Co., 953 F.2d at 623
    (5th Cir. 1992).                     The
    tests for determining the constitutionality of a statute are
    developed    enough     in   Texas   for    us   to   apply   these   tests   with
    confidence.       Thus, certification is inappropriate.
    IV.   CONCLUSION
    Having carefully reviewed the entire record of this case, and
    having fully considered the parties’ respective briefing on the
    issues of these appeals, we find no error in the district court’s
    judgment.    Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
    16
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 00-40658, 00-40718

Citation Numbers: 278 F.3d 417, 2001 WL 1669709

Judges: Garwood, Demoss, Dennis

Filed Date: 1/18/2002

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/4/2024

Authorities (23)

transcontinental-gas-pipe-line-corporation-v-transportation-insurance , 953 F.2d 985 ( 1992 )

Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. ... , 103 S. Ct. 897 ( 1983 )

Sullivan v. Tagliabue , 25 F.3d 43 ( 1994 )

29-ucc-repserv2d-496-prodliabrep-cch-p-14656-mrs-samuel-e , 80 F.3d 168 ( 1996 )

Erie Railroad v. Tompkins , 58 S. Ct. 817 ( 1938 )

Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois , 97 S. Ct. 2061 ( 1977 )

Diaz v. Westphal , 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 434 ( 1997 )

Harris v. Philip Morris Inc. , 232 F.3d 456 ( 2000 )

Stephen T. Ladue v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. , 920 F.2d 272 ( 1991 )

Davis Ex Rel. Davis v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, Inc. , 231 F.3d 928 ( 2000 )

St. Paul Insurance Company of Bellaire, Texas v. Afia ... , 937 F.2d 274 ( 1991 )

Cornerstones Municipal Utility District v. Monsanto Co. , 889 S.W.2d 570 ( 1994 )

American Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Grinnell , 951 S.W.2d 420 ( 1997 )

Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. , 47 S. Ct. 114 ( 1926 )

FM Properties Operating Co. v. City of Austin , 93 F.3d 167 ( 1996 )

Robert Hoy Lee and Shirley Hilderbrand Lee v. Frozen Food ... , 592 F.2d 271 ( 1979 )

Myron Batts v. Tow-Motor Forklift Company and Caterpillar, ... , 66 F.3d 743 ( 1995 )

st-paul-mercury-insurance-co-plaintiff-counter-v-robert-t-williamson , 224 F.3d 425 ( 2000 )

prodliabrep-cch-p-14882-letetia-jefferson-individually-and-as-duly , 106 F.3d 1245 ( 1997 )

Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co. , 105 S. Ct. 3275 ( 1985 )

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