Williams v. Houston Firefighters ( 2000 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-21080
ELMER F WILLIAMS, II,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
HOUSTON FIREFIGHTERS RELIEF AND
RETIREMENT FUND; DONNY R MYERS;
TOMMY R SHELTON; GEORGE LOWDERMILK;
MAXIE R PATTERSON; D GRADY PERDUE;
JERRY A BESSELMAN; PHILLIP J WEDGEWORTH;
ANDREA J GERBER; WINSTON JOHNSON;
J WILEY GEORGE; STRASBURGER & PRICE,
LLP; JONATHAN B CLAYTON,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(H-98-CV-63)
July 19, 2000
Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, JOLLY, and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Elmer R. Williams II appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to defendants regarding Williams’ 28 U.S.C. § 1983
claims that his pension fund, the Houston Firefighters Relief and
Retirement Fund, denied him due process and equal protection by
rejecting his request for certain pension benefits. Finding that
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
the Fund’s actions were based on a legislative act, we reject
Williams’s constitutional claims. We also find no error in the
district court’s denial of relief under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b) based on new evidence.
I
Williams is a Houston firefighter and participant in the Fund.
The Fund is created by state statute and serves Houston
firefighters only.1 Both participating Fund members and the City
of Houston contribute to the fund. The Fund is administered by a
Board of Trustees comprised of two City officials, former firemen,
and local citizens. It is given rulemaking authority under the
statute.
Williams transferred from the Hollywood Park Fire Department
to the Houston Department and in 1995 sought prior service credit
from the Houston Fund. Williams and other firefighters based their
claim, in part, on successful litigation brought by another
firefighter named Glenn Holleman. In response, in July 1996,
before the Fund’s Board of Trustees evaluated Williams’s claim, the
Board made changes to the criteria for receiving prior service
credit.2 These changes made Williams and many other firefighters
ineligible for the benefit. Williams was granted a hearing on his
1
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 6243e.2 (1996). This statute has
since been amended, but the pre-1997 statute is the version
applicable in Williams’s case.
2
Those requirements were subsequently codified by the Texas
legislature. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 6243e.2(1) § 16 (2000).
2
claim in December 1996, but he was not allowed to contest the new
guideline itself.
Williams brought suit against the Fund, Board members and the
Board’s attorneys, Strasburger & Price, alleging procedural due
process and equal protection violations. In addition to this suit,
Williams appealed the Board’s decision to a Texas state district
court under the statute’s appeal provision. That court deferred
its jurisdiction until 2003 or 2010, when Williams is eligible for
retirement.3 The defendants moved for summary judgment, and
Williams moved for partial summary judgment arguing collateral
estoppel based on the Holleman litigation. The district court
granted summary judgment to the defendants. After failing on a
motion to reconsider and two 60(b) motions, Williams timely
appealed.
II
Williams argues that the denial of prior service credit
violated his right to procedural due process and that the Board
members were biased.4 Williams does not complain of the due
process afforded him at his December 1996 hearing, where his
individual claim was considered; there, he had notice, counsel, an
opportunity to present evidence, testify, and cross-examine
3
See Williams v. Houston Fireman’s Relief & Retirement Fund,
1999 WL 82441 (Tex. App.).
4
The defendants argue that none of Williams’s claims are ripe.
They confuse ripeness with exhaustion.
3
witnesses, and a right to appeal to state court. Instead, he
alleges that he was denied due process at the July hearing at which
the Board promulgated the new guidelines.
Even assuming that Williams’s former right to statutory
benefits was a legitimate claim of entitlement whose judicial
denial necessitated due process, the denial by the Fund’s Board was
not judicial but legislative. As such, the due process protections
desired by Williams did not attach.5 As a general matter, the fact
that the Board interpreted the Texas statute does not make the
creation of the guidelines judicial. Their legislative authority
involved promulgating rules consistent with the meaning of the
statute, a task which involved interpretive functions.6
In distinguishing the legislative from the judicial model,
courts have examined whether the governmental body was motivated by
deciding the best course for the group in general, or adjudicating
the rights of contending petitioners.7 Also relevant is the
breadth of discretion which the governmental body enjoys.8 Under
these two criteria, the Board’s July actions were more legislative
than judicial. The Board was exercising its statutory authority to
5
See Atkins v. Parker, 105 S. Ct. 2520, 2528-29 (1985); United
States v. LULAC, 793 F.2d 636, 648 (5th Cir. 1986).
6
See art. 6243e.2 § 2(j).
7
See Mahone v. Addicks Util. Dist. of Harris County, 836 F.2d
921, 934-35 (5th Cir. 1988).
8
See Mahone, 836 F.2d at 935.
4
promulgate guidelines – rules that subsequently were codified in
the statute. And the guidelines, while made in the knowledge of
the pending claims before the Board, had general future
applicability beyond those claims. Williams’s argument as to the
bias of the Board’s members also fails because the Board was acting
legislatively.
III
Williams also contends that the Board’s decision denied him
equal protection under the law. He argues that the guidelines
created two classes of firefighters: those coming from towns with
a prior service credit like Houston’s, and those coming from towns
without.
As the categories are not a suspect class, the Board’s actions
need only reasonably relate to a legitimate state interest. A
desire on the part of the Board to save money meets this standard.
After the Holleman litigation, the Fund may have faced significant
liability for which it had not planned if the City’s and firemen’s
contributions did not cover the amount of accrued benefit. And if
the City would have been unable to make the contributions, the
health of the Fund might have been endangered.9
IV
9
The Board also is not collaterally estopped from promulgating
Guidelines not applied to Holleman: collateral estoppel does not
apply to legislative acts.
5
Finally, the district court did not err in denying Williams
relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The “new”
evidence relied upon by Williams -- an internal memorandum from a
consultant to the Board, and the deposition testimony of two Board
members taken in the state court case – does nothing to overcome
the legal barriers to Williams’s suit. In addition, nothing
prevented Williams from taking these depositions while the federal
suit was still pending. The new evidence did not warrant relief
from the judgment.
AFFIRMED.
6