United States v. Walker ( 2003 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 02-40991
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    STEPHEN DEWAYNE WALKER,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Texas
    USDC No. 6:01-CR-55-1
    --------------------
    February 6, 2003
    Before REAVLEY, SMITH and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Stephen DeWayne Walker appeals his sentence following his
    guilty-plea conviction for possession with intent to distribute
    and distribution of cocaine base, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a).   He argues that the district court erred in relying on
    the Presentence Report (PSR) to determine drug quantity and that
    the Government breached the plea agreement at sentencing by
    supporting the district court’s drug quantity determination.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 02-40991
    -2-
    Because Walker raises these arguments for the first time on
    appeal, this court’s review is for plain error only.      See FED.
    R. CRIM. P. 52(b); United States v. Calverley, 
    37 F.3d 160
    , 162-
    64 (5th Cir. 1994)(en banc), abrogated in part, Johnson v. United
    States, 
    520 U.S. 461
     (1997).
    A PSR generally bears sufficient indicia of reliability to
    be considered as evidence by the sentencing judge when making
    factual determinations required by the Sentencing Guidelines.
    United States v. Fitzgerald, 
    89 F.3d 218
    , 223 (5th Cir. 1996).
    Walker fails to demonstrate that the information in the PSR
    regarding the amount of drugs involved was “materially untrue,
    inaccurate or unreliable.”     
    Id.
       Furthermore, Walker’s reliance
    on United States v. Taylor, 
    277 F.3d 721
     (5th Cir. 2001), and
    United States v. Shacklett, 
    921 F.2d 580
     (5th Cir. 1991), is
    misplaced as the plea agreements in those cases contained “use
    immunity” provisions.    There is no such provision in Walker’s
    plea agreement.
    In determining whether the Government has breached a plea
    agreement, the court must determine whether the Government’s
    conduct is consistent with the parties’ reasonable understanding
    of the agreement.    United States v. Chagra, 
    957 F.2d 192
    , 194
    (5th Cir. 1992).    Contrary to Walker’s contentions, the plea
    agreement did not include terms concerning the quantity of drugs
    for which Walker would be held accountable or the probable
    sentence he would receive.    Moreover, Walker’s understanding that
    No. 02-40991
    -3-
    his sentence would be based on the amount of drugs alleged in the
    information was not reasonable in light of the plea agreement’s
    provisions regarding his sentencing.   See 
    id. at 195
    .
    Based on the foregoing, Walker fails to demonstrate error,
    plain or otherwise.   See Calverley, 
    37 F.3d at 162-64
    .
    Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.