Crompton Manufacturing Co. v. Plant Fab Inc. , 91 F. App'x 335 ( 2004 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS March 2, 2004
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-30668
Summary Calendar
CROMPTON MANUFACTURING COMPANY INC
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
PLANT FAB INC; GARY VENTRELLA
Defendants - Appellants
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana, Baton Rouge
No. 02-CV-947
Before KING, Chief Judge, and DAVIS and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Defendants-Appellants Plant Fab, Inc. and Gary Ventrella
appeal the district court’s order permanently enjoining them from
further prosecution of their claims against Plaintiff-Appellee
Crompton Manufacturing Company arising out of an accident in
Baton Rouge, Louisiana. For the following reasons, we affirm.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In July 1993, a tanker truck exploded in Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, spilling a hazardous mixture of chemicals. Crompton
Manufacturing Company, Inc.--then known as Uniroyal Chemical
Company, Inc.--brought suit against various defendants to recover
clean-up costs it incurred related to the accident. Uniroyal
Chem. Co. v. Deltech Corp., No. 93-CV-998 (M.D. La. June 23,
1997), vacated in part, 160 F.3d 238 (5th Cir. 1998), modified on
reh’g, 160 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 1999).1 A federal jury apportioned
fault for the accident among four potentially liable parties.
Crompton was found to be faultless.
On July 6, 1994, Plant Fab, Inc. and Gary Ventrella filed
suit in Louisiana state court against various defendants--
including Crompton--for damage to their facility caused by the
explosion.2 See Plant Fab, Inc. v. Uniroyal Chem. Co., No.
1
Crompton is correct to note that many of the judicial
proceedings referenced by Plant Fab and Ventrella are not in the
record and that “[a] court of appeals will not ordinarily enlarge
the record on appeal to include material not before the district
court.” Kemlon Prods. & Dev. Co. v. United States, 646 F.2d 223,
224 (5th Cir. 1981). We may, however, take judicial notice of
relevant state and federal proceedings. See United States v.
Verlinsky, 459 F.2d 1085, 1089 (5th Cir. 1972) (taking judicial
notice of “[t]he records of the district court and the court of
appeals here involved”); Paul v. Dade County, 419 F.2d 10, 12
(5th Cir. 1969) (taking judicial notice of a prior state case,
even though it “was not made part of the record
on . . . appeal”).
2
Plant Fab and Ventrella initially attempted to
intervene in Uniroyal, but ultimately withdrew their motion to
intervene and filed this separate suit.
2
26,042 (La. 18th Jud. Dist. Ct. filed July 6, 1994). Plant Fab
and Ventrella settled their claims with all defendants save
Crompton. Crompton removed the case to federal district court on
October 7, 2002. The district court found that it did not have
federal question jurisdiction and that removal based on diversity
was untimely, and, therefore, remanded the case to state court
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Also on October 7, 2002, Crompton brought this suit in
federal court against Plant Fab and Ventrella for declaratory and
injunctive relief. See Crompton Mfg. Co. v. Plant Fab, Inc., No.
02-947-B-M2 (M.D. La. Mar. 12, 2003). On June 17, 2003, the
district court, after finding that it had both federal-question
and diversity jurisdiction over the suit, entered judgment in
favor of Crompton. The district court ruled that Plant Fab and
Ventrella were collaterally estopped by the jury’s liability
determinations in Uniroyal, in addition to the settlement
agreement between Plant Fab, Ventrella, and the Uniroyal
defendants, from pursuing their claims against Crompton.
Therefore, the district court permanently enjoined Plant Fab and
Ventrella from continuing Plant Fab, their state-court suit.
Plant Fab and Ventrella appeal the district court’s decision to
this court.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
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We review a district court’s factual determinations for
clear error and we review its legal conclusions de novo. Peaches
Entm’t Corp. v. Entm’t Repertoire Assocs., Inc., 62 F.3d 690, 693
(5th Cir. 1995). In particular, “[t]he application of collateral
estoppel is a question of law that we review de novo.” United
States v. Brackett, 113 F.3d 1396, 1398 (5th Cir. 1997).
B. Analysis
1. Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
Crompton contends that we should dismiss this appeal because
Plant Fab and Ventrella violated Rule 10(b) of the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure by not providing this court with the
entire transcript of proceedings before the district court.
While an appellant is not always required to provide a complete
transcript of district court proceedings, see FED. R. APP. P.
10(b), the appellant does have a duty to provide those portions
that are necessary for a meaningful review. Birchler v. Gehl
Co., 88 F.3d 518, 519-20 (7th Cir. 1996). Crompton alleges that
the materials provided by Plant Fab and Ventrella do not meet
this requirement.
The record in this case is rather extraordinary, in that the
only papers filed by Plant Fab and Ventrella with the district
court were a motion for a status conference and a notice of
appeal. In light of the dearth of written material in the
record, it would have been helpful for Plant Fab and Ventrella to
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have included a transcript of all proceedings before the district
court. Nevertheless, the record provided by Plant Fab and
Ventrella, which included a transcript of a status conference,
provides us with sufficient material to rule on at least some of
the issues presented by Plant Fab and Ventrella. See id. at 520
(holding that an appellant’s failure to comply with Rule 10(b)
did not preclude the court from a meaningful review of the merits
of the appeal). Accordingly, dismissal on this basis is not
required. See Gulf Water Benefaction Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n,
674 F.2d 462, 465-66 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that an appellant’s
failure to comply with Rule 10 did not mandate dismissal of the
appeal). We will, however, “necessarily limit the scope of our
review to the available record.” Bozé v. Branstetter, 912 F.2d
801, 803 n.1 (5th Cir. 1990).
Crompton also alleges that Plant Fab and Ventrella violated
Rule 10(b)(3), which states that an appellant who does not order
the entire transcript of the district court proceedings must
“file a statement of the issues that the appellant intends to
present on the appeal and must serve on the appellee a copy of
both the order [placed with the court reporter for the partial
transcript] and the statement [of issues].” According to
Crompton, Plant Fab and Ventrella failed to provide Crompton with
either a copy of the order or a statement of issues. Thus,
Crompton urges this court to dismiss Plant Fab and Ventrella’s
appeal.
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Crompton’s assertion is well-taken; Plant Fab and Ventrella
did apparently violate Rule 10(b). As we explained above,
however, the materials provided by Appellants are sufficient for
a review of at least some of the issues presented on appeal. In
addition, Crompton has pointed to no portion of the transcript
that it would have included had it been notified by Plant Fab and
Ventrella that the entire transcript would not be made part of
the record. Therefore, in this case, Plant Fab and Ventrella’s
violation of Rule 10(b) was harmless. See RecoverEdge L.P. v.
Pentecost, 44 F.3d 1284, 1290 (5th Cir. 1995). For this reason,
we decline to exercise our discretion to dismiss Plant Fab and
Ventrella’s appeal for violation of Rule 10(b). See id.
2. Jurisdiction
The district court based its jurisdiction over this suit
both on the diversity of the parties, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(2000), and on the All Writs Act, see 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000).
Plant Fab and Ventrella contend that both of these determinations
were wrong. According to Plant Fab and Ventrella, the district
court could not have had diversity jurisdiction because the very
same district court, in a case involving the same parties and the
same incident, found that it did not have subject-matter
jurisdiction and remanded the case to state court. In addition,
Plant Fab and Ventrella argue that the district court did not
have federal-question jurisdiction because the All Writs Act
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cannot provide the basis for such jurisdiction.
Section 1332 provides that “district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of
interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different
States.” Crompton, in its amended complaint, alleged that the
parties were diverse and that the amount in controversy exceeded
$75,000. Thus, Crompton met its initial burden for establishing
jurisdiction under § 1332. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hillman,
796 F.2d 770, 775 (5th Cir. 1986) (“The party seeking to invoke
the jurisdiction of the federal court has the burden of proving
that jurisdiction exists.”). On appeal, Plant Fab and Ventrella
have not disputed the facts alleged in Crompton’s complaint and
have pointed to nothing in the record suggesting that Crompton’s
pleadings are erroneous. Indeed, Plant Fab and Ventrella never
denied Crompton’s allegations before the district court.
Furthermore, our own search of the record on appeal has uncovered
nothing that contradicts Crompton’s allegations. Therefore,
Crompton has met its burden of showing that the district court
had diversity jurisdiction over this suit.
Still, Plant Fab and Ventrella contend that the district
court’s determination that it had jurisdiction must have been
erroneous, since the court had previously remanded Plant Fab,
which involved the same parties, for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. The district court’s conclusion in Plant Fab,
7
however, is not inconsistent with the district court’s conclusion
that it had jurisdiction here.
The district court remanded Plant Fab to the state court
because (1) the petition for removal on the basis of diversity of
citizenship was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000) and (2)
the district court did not have federal-question jurisdiction
under the All Writs Act. See Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v.
Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 33 (2002) (“Because the All Writs Act does
not confer jurisdiction on the federal courts, it cannot confer
the original jurisdiction required to support removal pursuant to
§ 1441.”). Thus, timeliness of the removal petition, rather than
the parties’ failure to meet the requirements of § 1332,
prevented the district court from exercising jurisdiction over
Plant Fab on the basis of diversity. Here, by contrast, there is
no timeliness issue. Furthermore, the uncontradicted evidence
shows that the parties are diverse and that the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000. Thus, we conclude that the district
court had subject-matter jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. § 1332.3
Because the district court had diversity jurisdiction, we
3
Plant Fab and Ventrella further argue that the district
court should be found to lack jurisdiction because, otherwise,
Crompton would be allowed to have its claims heard in federal
court even though it did not timely remove the pending state-
court suit. This argument is meritless. If the requirements of
§ 1332 are met, the district court has subject-matter
jurisdiction, and (of course) § 1332 has no exception for cases
where the party failed to timely remove a similar state-court
case.
8
need not reach Plant Fab and Ventrella’s argument that the
district court lacked federal-question jurisdiction.
3. Full Faith and Credit and Collateral Estoppel
Plant Fab and Ventrella also argue that the district court
erred by applying collateral estoppel to bar them from continuing
their state-court suit against Crompton. First, Plant Fab and
Ventrella contend that the district court violated the Full Faith
and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (2000), by applying collateral
estoppel after the state court had denied Crompton’s motion for
summary judgment, which was based on Crompton’s collateral
estoppel theory. Second, Plant Fab and Ventrella maintain that
the issues relied on by the district court in finding them
collaterally estopped were not “fully and vigorously litigated”
by the defendants in Uniroyal, as required by this circuit for
application of collateral estoppel. See Gandy Nursery, Inc. v.
United States, 318 F.3d 631, 639 (5th Cir. 2003).
On the record presented by Plant Fab and Ventrella, there is
no indication that either of these issues was raised before the
district court. In this circuit, we usually do not consider
issues raised for the first time on appeal, absent “extraordinary
circumstances.” Vogel v. Veneman, 276 F.3d 729, 733 (5th Cir.
2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
“Extraordinary circumstances exist when the issue involved is a
pure question of law and a miscarriage of justice would result
9
from our failure to consider it.” Coggin v. Longview Ind. Sch.
Dist., 337 F.3d 459, 469 (5th Cir. 2003) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). For example, we will consider an issue
“when the asserted error is so obvious that the failure to
consider it would result in a miscarriage of justice.”
Id. at 469-70 (5th Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). Because we do not find such extraordinary
circumstances to be present here, we decline to address these
issues.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court enjoining Plant Fab and Ventrella from continuing
to prosecute Plant Fab, Inc. v. Uniroyal Chem. Co., No. 26,042
(La. 18th Jud. Dist. Ct. filed July 6, 1994).
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