Runge v. Waitz ( 2002 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-31109
Summary Calendar
DERRICK ROSS RUNGE
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
JOSEPH L. WAITZ, JR, Terrebonne Parish District Attorney,
individually and in his official capacity as District
Attorney for the 32nd Judicial District Attorney, in and for
the Parish of Terrebonne, State of Louisiana; JERRY
LARPENTER, Terrebonne Parish Sheriff, individually and in his
capacity as Sheriff of Terrebonne Parish, State of Louisiana,
Defendants - Appellees
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 00-CV-1967-F
--------------------
April 22, 2002
Before KING, Chief Judge, and DAVIS and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Derrick Ross Runge appeals the district court’s summary-
judgment dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action
against Terrebonne Parish District Attorney Joseph L. Waitz, Jr.,
and Terrebonne Parish Sheriff Jerry Larpenter. Runge contends
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 01-31109
-2-
that the district court erred in determining that there was no
evidence that his wrongful arrest and detention resulted from a
custom or policy adopted by District Attorney Waitz and Sheriff
Larpenter and that Sheriff Larpenter was not vicariously liable
for the failure of his subordinates to ensure that Runge was not
wrongfully arrested and detained. Runge has failed to assert on
appeal, and has thereby abandoned, any challenge to the district
court’s summary-judgment dismissal of his individual-capacity
claim against District Attorney Waitz. See Yohey v. Collins, 985
F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993).
The district court did not err in granting Sheriff Larpenter
summary judgment on Runge’s individual-capacity claim. Runge
does not assert that his constitutional injury was caused by
Sheriff Larpenter’s failure to supervise or train his
subordinates. See Smith v. Brenoettsy, 158 F.3d 908, 911-12 (5th
Cir. 1998). To the extent that Runge asserts that his
constitutional injury resulted from Sheriff Larpenter’s own
omission in failing to check Runge’s disposition sheet, Runge has
failed to allege that that omission constituted deliberate
indifference. See Alton v. Texas A&M Univ., 168 F.3d 196, 200
(5th Cir. 1999); Brown v. Bryan County, OK, 219 F.3d 450, 457
(5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1007 (2001).
The district court also did not err in granting Sheriff
Larpenter summary judgment on Runge’s official-capacity claim.
There is no evidence supporting Runge’s assertion that the policy
No. 01-31109
-3-
of the Sheriff’s Office is for an employee of that office to
determine if a person arrested on an attachment for failure to
pay fines and costs is brought to court or is made to remain in
jail. Rather, the record clearly establishes that it is the
judge who issued the attachment who decides whether the person
receives a court appearance and that the Sheriff’s Office
employee simply complies with the judge’s order. Runge has
therefore failed to demonstrate the existence of an official
policy of the Sheriff’s Office that was the moving force behind
his alleged constitutional injury. See Piotrowski v. City of
Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct.
53 (2001).
Finally, the district court did not err in granting District
Attorney Waitz summary judgment on Runge’s official-capacity
claim. Since Runge did not raise in the district court his
argument that an official policy or custom of the District
Attorney’s Office caused his constitutional injury, that argument
should not be considered for the first time in this appeal. See
id. at 578; Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1132 n.10 (5th
Cir. 1992). The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.